AFFIRMED; and Opinion Filed April 13, 2015.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01584-CR
BRIGHAM EUGENE KREBS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 006-80655-2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Lang
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Brigham Eugene Krebs pleaded
guilty to driving while intoxicated. The trial court imposed a sentence of 120 days’ confinement,
probated for fifteen months, and assessed a $500 fine. In a single issue, Krebs asserts the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Krebs was arrested after he admitted rear-ending another car and field sobriety tests
administered at the scene showed he was intoxicated. Although he admitted he was responsible
for the accident, Krebs moved to suppress, in part, “all evidence, whether testimonial or physical,
relating to or resulting from [his warrantless] arrest.” Krebs asserted the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to arrest him because the officer had not seen him driving.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Dallas police corporal Joshua Boykin testified
he was called to the scene to administer the field sobriety tests at the request of the responding
officers, who smelled alcohol on Krebs’s breath and suspected Krebs was intoxicated. Boykin
further testified he talked with Krebs prior to administering the tests and noticed Krebs’s eyes
were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he “swayed while standing.” According to Boykin,
Krebs admitted he had been driving and had consumed a “couple” of the “larger . . . draft beers”
at a nearby restaurant about two to three hours before the accident. Based on the information he
gathered from the responding officers and Krebs, his observations of Krebs, and Krebs’s
performance on the field sobriety tests, Boykin arrested Krebs for driving while intoxicated.
The trial court found the testimony credible and, based on State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d
404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), found Boykin had sufficient information to believe Krebs drove
while intoxicated.
II. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
Krebs’s contention that his motion should have been granted because Boykin did not see
him driving is founded on Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 14.01(b), which provides
that an “officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his
presence or within his view.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (West 2005). In
arguing this point, Krebs recognizes the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a
warrantless arrest is permitted under 14.01(b) even if the officer did not observe the commission
of an offense as long as the officer received information from reasonably trustworthy sources
that an offense was committed. See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901-02 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). He also recognizes that in the DWI context specifically, the court of criminal appeals in
Woodard found lawful an arrest that was based on the defendant’s admission of driving while
intoxicated, the arresting officer’s observation that the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication,
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and the discovery by another officer of alcoholic beverages in defendant’s car. See Woodard,
341 S.W.3d at 414. Krebs asserts, however, that Woodard and the other cases holding an officer
does not need to witness the offense being committed to effect a warrantless arrest were wrongly
decided. Further, he argues that the facts in Woodard are distinguishable from the facts at hand. 1
A. Applicable Law
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless arrest is
unreasonable per se and any evidence obtained as a result inadmissible unless the State shows
the arrest fell within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule and the officer had
probable cause, that is, a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” See Baldwin v. State, 278
S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901-02; Wilson v. State, 621
S.W.2d 799, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Exceptions to the general rule are limited and are
governed primarily by Chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 14 (West 2005 & SUPP. 2014); Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). As acknowledged by Krebs, the court of criminal appeals has held that, under
article 14.01(b) of the code of criminal procedure, an officer may effect a warrantless arrest
based on his own observations, information received from trustworthy sources that an offense
was committed, or a combination of both. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b);
Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901-02.
B. Standard of Review
When, as here, the facts are uncontroverted and the testimony found credible, an
appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress de novo. See Woodard,
341 S.W.3d at 410; State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In conducting
1
Krebs asserts also that he was illegally detained by the responding officers. Krebs, however, did not make this argument to the trial court.
Accordingly, the argument is waived. See State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex.
App.-–Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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this review, the court is bound by the law declared by the court of criminal appeals. State ex rel.
Vance v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Hailey v. State, 413 S.W.3d
457, 489 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d).
C. Application of Law to Facts
Krebs’s argument that Woodard and other similar court of criminal appeals decisions
were incorrectly decided is not an argument we are authorized to address. See Clawson, 465
S.W.2d at 168. As an intermediate court of appeals, we are bound by Woodard and other court
of criminal appeals’ decisions. See Hailey, 413 S.W.3d at 489. Accordingly, we apply Woodard
and other decisions similarly holding that an officer need not personally witness the offense
being committed before making a warrantless arrest.
Although Krebs argues the facts in Woodard are distinguishable, we disagree. Krebs
argues his case differs from Woodard in that in Woodard, the arresting officer learned from the
appellant directly that the appellant had been driving while here, Boykin, the arresting officer,
learned of Krebs’s driving from another source. 2 See Woodard, 314 S.W.3d at 407-08. The
record, however, reflects Boykin learned of Krebs’s driving from Krebs himself. This
information, along with Krebs’s admission he had been drinking, Boykin’s observations of
Krebs, and the results of the field sobriety tests provided Boykin with probable cause to believe
Krebs had been driving while intoxicated and to arrest him. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 327
S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (arresting officer’s observations of
appellant, including field sobriety test results, and appellant’s admission he had been drinking
gave officer probable cause to arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated). On the record,
2
Krebs also argues Woodard is distinguishable because Woodard was not illegally detained. See Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 412-13.
Because Krebs did not argue to the trial court that he was illegally detained by the responding officers, we need not address this contention. See
Allen, 53 S.W.3d at 734.
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before us, we conclude Boykin’s warrantless arrest of Krebs was reasonable and the trial court
did not err in denying Krebs’s motion to suppress. We resolve Krebs’s sole issue against him.
III. CONCLUSION
Having decided Krebs’s sole issue against him, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
131584F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
BRIGHAM EUGENE KREBS, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 6, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-13-01584-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 006-80655-2013.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Bridges and Evans participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment entered this 13th day of April, 2015.
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