ACCEPTED
14-15-00259-CR
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
9/18/2015 5:19:27 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
Cause No. 14-15-00259-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS RECEIVED IN
14th COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE HOUSTON, TEXAS
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
9/18/2015 5:19:27 PM
AT HOUSTON CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
JORDAN NICHOLS,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
Appeal from Cause No. 194143
In the County Court at Law No. 4 of
Brazoria County, Texas
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
CARMEN ROE
CARMEN ROE LAW FIRM
TBN: 24048773
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002
713.236.7755 Phone
713.236.7756 Fax
carmen@carmenroe.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTIFICATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 28.1(a), a complete list of the names and
addresses of all interested parties is provided below so the members of this
Honorable Court may at once determine whether they are disqualified to
serve or should recuse themselves from participating in the decision of this
case.
Counsel for Defendant:
Robert Miller
1346 W. Broadway Street
Pearland, Texas 77581
Counsel on Appeal for Appellant:
Carmen Roe
Carmen Roe | Law Firm
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002
Counsel for the State:
Jerri Yenne
Brazoria County District Attorney’s Office
111 E. Locust Street
Angleton, Texas 77515
Trial Judge:
Honorable Lori Rickert
County Court at Law No. 4
Brazoria County Texas
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTIFICATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES........................................ 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... 5
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .................................... 9
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................................................... 9
APPELLANT’S POINTS OF ERROR ....................................................... 11
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................................................. 12
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.. ......................................................... 13
APPELLANT’S POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE……………………14
Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntarily and
unknowingly entered as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to advise him that the stop that formed the basis
for an illegal detention, and that yielded the contraband
forming the basis of his arrest and plea was illegal and
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution and
Art. 38.28 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
APPELLANT’S POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO………………….14
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to perform an adequate legal
and factual investigation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS………………………………………….14
A. The Writ Hearing……………………………………………...…….…14
1. Appellant’s Post-Conviction Writ Exhibits…………………….…...14
3
2. Conflicting Affidavits and File of Robert Miller………………….15
B. Applicant’s Plea of Guilty……………………………………………18
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES………………………………….19
A. Standard of Review: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel…………19
B. Standard of Review: Involuntary Guilty Pleas………………...…23
C. Trial Court Determinations Unsupported By The Record Are Not
Entitled to Deference………………………………………………..24
D. Counsel’s Performance Was Objectively Deficient……………..27
1. Counsel’s Failure to Advise Appellant That The Detention
That Yielded Contraband Was Constitutionally Flawed
Was Objectively Deficient Conduct………………………27
2. Illegal Detention: Did Not Commit a Traffic Offense……28
3. A Motion to Suppress If Filed Would Have Been
Successful………………………………………………...33
E. Prejudice……………………………………………………………..34
F. Conclusion…………………………………………………………...36
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER……………………………………….37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………38
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE…………………………………...38
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Ballard v. State, 987 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)……………..….28
Boyington v. State, 738 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
no pet.)…………………………………………………………………. 27,33
Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)……………......19
Cardenas v. State, 960 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1998)……….23
Cooper v. State, 769 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1989)...20
Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008)………………………...25
Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)…………....26
Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)………………..34
Ex parte Felton, 815 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)………………...20
Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)…………………24
Ex parte Lilly, 656 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)…………………..21
Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)………….…22,34
Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)………..…….23
Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)……….……23
Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)…...…..21,24,32
Ex parte Wolfe, 296 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.]
2009, pet. ref’d)……………………………………………………………36
Ex parte Zepeda, 819 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)………………19
5
Flowers v. State, 951 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997)……...34
Gonzalez v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)……………….28
Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.]
2006)……………………………………………………………………….28
Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1992)…………………………25
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)………………………………..22,35,36
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 S. Ct. 1081 (2014)………………………….……32
Jackson v. State, 857 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993)..
Kimmleman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)…………………………….25
Lloyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992)…………………………….24
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)………………………….22,34
Melton v. State, 987 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998)…..…25,28,33,36
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)………………………………….29
Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)…………….…..19
Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999)………………………....26
Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1979)……………………..…..21
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)…………………………23,37
Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)…………….26
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)………………………………….21
State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004)…….passim
6
State v. Patterson, 291 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009)…………32
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)………………………passim
Tallant v. State, 866 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1993)………………35
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)………………………………………….29
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)………………………………..23
United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999)…………….29
Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996)………………………………………30
Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)………….…20
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)…………………………………...20
7
OTHER SOURCES
ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §4-4.1……………………………21
ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §14-3.2………………………..…24
ART. 1 SEC. 9, TEXAS CONSTITUTION ............................................. 10,13,18,27
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 38.23…………………………………………..28,35
TEX.R.APP.P. 28.1(a)...................................................................................... 2
TEX. TRANS. CODE §542.001…………………………………………..passim
TEX. TRANS. CODE §542.201………………………………………..... passim
PEARLAND. MUNI. CODE §29-189………………………………….… passim
8
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument would significantly assist this Court in the decision-
making process because this case presents an important question regarding
counsel’s duty to conduct a reasonable and factual investigation, prior to
advising Appellant to plead guilty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 7, 2012, Appellant was charged by information with the
misdemeanor offense of possession of marijuana in Cause Number 194143
in the County Court At Law No. 4, Brazoria County, Honorable Lori
Rickert, presiding. (1 CR1 4). Appellant retained Robert Miller to represent
him. (2 RR 31). On August 23, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to the reduced
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia after completing a drug
awareness class. Punishment was assessed at a $500 fine. (2 RR 7-9).
On September 16, 2014, Appellant filed a misdemeanor post-
conviction writ of habeas corpus alleging that the Appellant’s plea was
involuntary based on the incomplete or inadequate advice of counsel. (1 CR
11). On February 26, 2015, the court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s
1 “CR” refers to the Clerk’s Record following by page number and “RR” refers to the
Reporter’s Record followed by page number.
9
post-conviction writ. (1 RR 5). On February 27, 2015, the trial court denied
Appellant’s writ of habeas corpus. (1 Suppl. CR2 1).
On June 23, 2015, without a request from the trial court, the State
filed finding of facts and conclusions of law. (1 Suppl. CR 3). The trial court
adopted the State’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. (1 Suppl. CR 3).
On March 5, 2015, Appellant’s notice of appeal and the trial court’s
certification of the right to appeal were timely entered. (1 CR 98; 108). This
appeal follows.
2
“Supp. CR” refers to the Supplemental Clerk’s Record followed by page number.
10
APPELLANT’S POINTS OF ERROR
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntarily and
unknowingly entered as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to advise him that the stop that formed the
basis for an illegal detention, and that yielded the
contraband forming the basis of his arrest and
plea was illegal and violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Art.
I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution and Art. 38.28 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. (1 CR 15)
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when trial counsel failed to perform an
adequate legal and factual investigation. (1 CR
15).
11
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 7, 2012 at approximately 4:30 p.m., Appellant, an 18-year
old high school student, was exiting the Food Town parking lot located at
7121 Broadway in Pearland, Texas. (1 CR 45). Officer T.W. Madrid of the
Pearland Police Department stopped him at the nearby Exxon gas station for
failing to signal when exiting the Food Town parking lot. (1 CR 45).
Once stopped, Officer Madrid approached Appellant’s vehicle where
he smelled the strong odor of fresh marijuana. (1 CR 45). Officer Madrid
observed Appellant to be visibly shaking and described him as so shaken he
could barely remove his drivers license from his wallet. (1 CR 45). When
asked if there was any marijuana in the vehicle, Appellant told Officer
Madrid there was a baggie located in the center console. (1 CR 45).
Appellant was placed under arrest and a search of his vehicle revealed
a baggie of a green leafy substance in the center console, which measured
0.06 ounces. (1 CR 45). No other drugs or paraphernalia was found in the
vehicle.
At Appellant’s first court setting a plea agreement was negotiated to
reduce the possession of marijuana charge to a possession of drug
paraphernalia after Appellant successfully completed a drug awareness class
(1 RR 23). On his second court setting, having completed the drug
12
awareness class, Appellant waived his right to trial and entered a plea of
guilty to the reduced charge of Class C misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia. (2 RR 9).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. & II.
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to conduct a reasonable pretrial factual or legal investigation
that would have provided a meritorious defense to drug charges. Even a
cursory review of case law that was available at the time of Appellant’s
guilty plea would have revealed that no traffic offense was committed and
therefore any detention was unlawful. Because trial counsel neither
identified the correct legal issue nor researched the law applicable in this
case, his conduct was objectively deficient. Because Appellant both relied
on trial counsel’s advice prior to pleading guilty and suffered harm as a
result, counsel’s objectively deficient conduct prejudiced the defense.
13
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE (RESTATED)
Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntarily and
unknowingly entered as a result of trial counsel’s
failure to advise him that the stop that formed the
basis for an illegal detention, and that yielded the
contraband forming the basis of his arrest and
plea was illegal and violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Art.
I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution and Art. 38.28 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. (1 CR 15).
POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO (RESTATED)
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when trial counsel failed to perform an
adequate legal and factual investigation. (1 CR
15).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Writ Hearing
1. Appellant’s Post-Conviction Writ Exhibits
Appellant’s nineteen post-conviction exhibits were admitted without
objection at the writ hearing. (1 RR 4). Pertinent exhibits included:
• Transportation Code §545.104: a turn signal is required to
indicate an intention to turn when a vehicle is being operated
on a highway. (2 RR 44)
• Transportation Code §542.201: a local authority may not
enact or enforce an ordinance or rule that conflicts with this
subtitle unless expressly authorized by this subtitle. (2 RR
74).
14
• Transportation Code §542.001: operation of a vehicle applies
only to the operation of a vehicle on a highway. (2 RR 72).
• Pearland Municipal Code §29-189: “no person shall turn any
vehicle without first giving an appropriate turn signal in the
event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.
Such signal of intention to turn right or left, when required,
shall be given continuously during not less than one hundred
(100) feet by the driver of such vehicle before turning.” (2 RR
73).
• State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth
2004, pet. ref’d): the failure to signal from private parking lot
onto a public highway did not establish probable cause
warranting a traffic stop. (2 RR 48).
• Trial counsel’s three affidavits. (2 RR 7,63,71).
• Appellant’s trial file. (2 RR 29-42).
2. Conflicting Affidavits and Trial Counsel’s File
Undersigned counsel met with Appellant’s trial counsel, on May 27,
2014 regarding his representation of Appellant. (1 RR 88). At that time trial
counsel provided a complete copy of the file maintained in his office for
Appellant’s case. On July 8, 2014 Undersigned counsel sent an affidavit to
trial counsel, which memorialized the conversation regarding his
representation in this case, specifically the affidavit addressed the issue
identified by trial counsel. After reviewing same, trial counsel emailed the
signed affidavit. (1 RR 65).
15
In the July 19th affidavit trial counsel identified the issue in
Appellant’s case as the following:
“I researched the case law as to the legality of Mr. Nichols’ traffic
stop and felt it was a bad stop because my interpretation of the
relevant case law was that he was only required to use his turn
signal within the last 100 feet before the turn, even when pulling
into a turn-only lane”. (2 RR 65; Exhibit 18)(emphasis added).
Undersigned counsel subsequently called trial counsel and advised
him that he had in fact identified the wrong issue in this case, because the
actual issue was not that Appellant was required to use a turn signal within
the last 100 feet before the turn but rather, whether or not Appellant was
required to use a turn signal when exiting from a private drive onto a public
roadway. (1 RR 67).
On August 22, 2014, trial counsel was sent an updated affidavit
memorializing this conversation where Undersigned counsel advised him of
the legal issue impacting the traffic stop. (1 RR 68). Undersigned counsel
proffered an un-admitted affidavit dated July 21, 2014 that identified the
issue in this case as:
“I researched case law about the legality of the traffic stop and at
the time I believed it was a bad stop because Mr. Nichols was only
required to use his turn signal within the last 100 feet before the
turn, even when pulling into a turn-only lane. However, I am now
aware that the controlling legal issue in this case was whether
Mr. Nichols was required to use his turn signal when leaving a
private driveway upon entering a public roadway.”
16
(2 RR 87-89; emphasis added).
On September 1, 2014, trial counsel responded by email stating that
he did not agree with the updated affidavit, and specifically he disagreed that
he had missed the issue. (2 RR 83). In addition, he attached to his
correspondence a “slightly modified” affidavit, insisting this affidavit was
his final statement. (2 RR 68).
The September 1, 2014 “slightly modified” affidavit is identical to the
July 21st3 affidavit (2 RR 87), with the exception that he used a different
font and identified the legal issue as the following:
“I researched the case law as to the legality of Mr. Nichols’ traffic
stop and felt it was a bad stop because my interpretation of the
relevant case law was that he was not required to use his turn
signal when leaving a private driveway upon entering a public
roadway”
(2 RR 72-73; Exhibit 23)(emphasis added).
During the writ hearing, however, trial counsel admitted that the first
time he identified the correct legal issue in this case was only after
Undersigned counsel provided it to him in the affidavit not admitted in
evidence of July 21, 2014. (2 RR 90). Notably, the legal basis provided trial
counsel final affidavit signed, September 1, 2014, uses the identical
language provided to him in the prior affidavit he refused to sign. (2 RR 73).
3
This affidavit was not admitted into evidence, was unsigned by trial counsel, and dated
July 21, 2014.
17
Although trial counsel testified that he discussed the potential to file a
motion to suppress, (2 RR 50), his notes and affidavits make clear that he
identified and researched the wrong legal issue in this case based on the
following information:
• Handwritten notes in his file identifying the issue as whether a turn
signal was required 100 feet before an intersection. (2 RR 36;
Exhibit 7).
• Case law contained in his file regarding whether a turn signal was
required 100 feet from an intersection. (2 RR 35; Exhibit 7).
• The July 8, 2014 affidavit sent to trial counsel memorializing a
conversation where he identified the legal issue as whether a turn
signal was required 100 feet from an intersection. (2 RR 76;
Exhibit 18).
• The July 8, 2014 affidavit signed by trial counsel identifying the
issue as whether a turn signal was required 100 feet from an
intersection. (2 RR 81; Exhibit 19).
B. Appellant’s Plea of Guilty
Trial counsel testified during the writ hearing that he knew that
Appellant had no prior criminal history and was going to college or intended
to go to college. (1 RR 79). He testified he never discussed deferred
adjudication with Appellant and that it was a “judgment call”, (1 RR 80-81),
based on the fact that Appellant “was young and could mess up on
18
probation”4 (1 RR 81). Trial counsel testified that he ultimately told
Appellant to take a deal based on the legal research he conducted. (1 RR 92).
Specifically trial counsel said:
“And based on my research and what I was seeing and my
interpretation of what was out there, I advised him that I believed it
was in his best interest to accept a Class C [misdemeanor].”
(1 RR 51).
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. Standard of Review: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant was entitled to the reasonably effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Art. I, §9 of the Texas Constitution. Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 548
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Under the standard in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984), a defendant seeking relief as a result of counsel’s
conduct must first show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s
performance was deficient and then demonstrate that this deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Deficient performance is conduct by a lawyer that
goes beyond the bounds of prevailing, objective professional standards.
4
Trial counsel admitted at the writ hearing that he never discussed probation with
Appellant. (1 RR 18). In addition, there is no evidence in trial counsel’s file or the writ
hearing that would indicate Appellant would have been unsuccessful on probation.
19
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). For an error on
counsel’s part to reach this level, there must be a reasonable probability, a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial,
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Ex parte Zepeda, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). The defendant must only prove ineffective assistance of
counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d
401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The Supreme Court has held that a
defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient performance more likely
than not altered the outcome in the case:
The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence, the
proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome…
In every case the court should be concerned with whether … the result
of the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.
Id. at 694-96.
The Supreme Court has held that counsel’s performance is measured
against an “objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. at 688, “under prevailing professional norms.” Id. “Prevailing
norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar Association standards
and the like … are guides to what is reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
20
510, 527 (2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387
(2005)(“[W]e have long referred [to these ABA Standards] as guides to
determining what is reasonable.”); 1 ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Sec. 4-4.1, (“Defense counsel should
conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore
all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty
in the event of conviction.”)(emphasis added).
While the adequacy of trial counsel’s performance must be gauged by
the totality of the representation afforded the accused, “[S]omtimes a single
error is so substantial that it alone causes the attorney’s assistance to fall
below the Sixth Amendment standard.” Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991,
994 (5th Cir. 1979). As the First Court of Appeals has written:
To ignore a grievous error simply because it is single, while granting
relief where multiple errors cumulatively reach the same magnitude,
would be contrary to the reasons that caused the creation of the
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Cooper v. State, 769 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]
1989, pet. ref’d); see also Ex parte Felton, 815 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991)(single error was of sufficient magnitude to render trial counsel’s
performance ineffective).
An attorney must have a firm command of the facts of the case as well
as the governing law before he can render reasonably effective assistance of
21
counsel. Ex parte Lilly, 656 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Counsel’s assertion that his challenged conduct was the result of a trial
strategy does not of itself negate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
because, “It may not be argued that a given course of conduct was within the
realm of trial strategy unless and until the trial attorney has conduct the
necessary legal and factual investigation which would enable him to make
an informed rational decision.” Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 395
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (emphasis added). An appellate court’s core concern
in deciding whether counsel exercised “reasonable professional judgment” is
not whether counsel’s professed tactical decision was reasonable but
whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision was itself
reasonable. A strategy informed by an incorrect understanding of
controlling case law or where counsel conducts no investigation into the
facts or the law, that an otherwise reasonable prudent attorney would have
investigated, cannot be an objectively reasonable trial strategy. Id.,
(unreasonable strategy not to object to inadmissible hearsay in pen packets
where counsel thought material could be introduced “in a more damaging
manner”).
22
B. Standard of Review: Involuntary Guilty Pleas
The test for determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea is “whether
the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-
57 (1985), quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). When
a defendant enters his plea of guilty upon the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice “was within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id.,
quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), the Court held that a defendant who
enters a plea of guilty upon the advice of counsel “may only attack the
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the
advice of counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.” A
defendant must show that but for counsel’s unreasonable advice, there is a
reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty, i.e., the prejudice
prong of Strickland. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56-57.
If counsel conveys erroneous or incomplete information of a sufficient
magnitude to the defendant, a guilty plea based on that information is
23
involuntary5. Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). A guilty plea will not support a conviction where it is motivated by
significantly misleading or incomplete advice conveyed by counsel, and a
guilty plea based thereon is involuntary. Cardenas v. State, 960 S.W.2d 941,
943 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1998, pet. ref’d).
C. Trial Court Determination Are Not Entitled to Deference if
Unsupported By The Record
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his habeas
relief from a judgment of conviction of the misdemeanor offense of
possession of drug paraphernalia on the ground that his trial counsel was
ineffective.
Appellant must only prove facts that entitle him to relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 870
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Although the trial court’s factual findings based on
credibility determinations are entitled to almost total deference, its legal
conclusions are not. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.
1997). This Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the trial
5
The ABA Standards mandate, inter alia, that defense counsel must “after appropriate
investigation…advise the defendant of the alternatives available and address
considerations deemed important by… the defendant in reaching a decision. See ABA
Standard 14-3.2 Responsibilities of defense counsel-Guilty Pleas.
24
courts determination only if the record supports them. Id. Miller v. State, 393
S.W.3d 255 (Tex.Crim.App.2012).
Because trial counsel’s claimed strategic decisions are entitled to
deference only if they are the product of informed decisions, this Court’s
“principle concern” is not whether trial counsel‘s challenged conduct was
strategic, “but rather whether the investigation supporting [his]
decision…was itself reasonable. Strickland does not establish that a cursory
investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision.” Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003)(emphasis added). Counsels “decision cannot be
fairly characterized as ‘strategic’ unless it is a conscious choice between two
legitimate and rational alternatives. It must be borne of deliberation and not
happenstance, inattention, or neglect.” Id at 526-527.
Trial counsel’s claim that his challenged conduct was “strategic” is
also not the end of the inquiry. “It may not be argued that a given course of
conduct was within the realm of trial strategy unless and until the trial
attorney has conducted the necessary legal and factual investigation which
would enable him to make an informed rational decision.” Ex parte
Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Melton v. State, 987
S.W.2d 72, 77 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.)(counsel’s failure to fully
investigate facts of case before advising defendant to plea guilty was
25
deficient conduct). Because there is a “crucial distinction between strategic
judgments and plain omissions,” Lloyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 158 (5th
Cir. 1992), courts are “not required to condone unreasonable decisions
parading under the umbrella of strategy, or to fabricate tactical decisions on
behalf of Counsel when it appears on the face of the record that Counsel
made no strategic decision at all”. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 604 (5th
Cir. 1999). A sound trial strategy is one formed by a reasonable
investigation of the facts and the controlling case law. See Robertson v.
State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Trial counsel challenged conduct is evaluated from his perspective at
the time of the plea. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 689 (“A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” (emphasis
added). Accordingly, this Court may not recreate a strategy asserted by trial
counsel by engaging in “a post-hoc rationalization of [his] conduct in lieu of
relying on “an accurate description of [his] deliberations.” 539 U.S. 510,
526-27 (2003); Kimmleman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (“The
justification [counsel] offered from his omission betray a startling ignorance
of the law-or a weak attempt to shift blame from inadequate preparation.”);
26
See also Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1992)(“Courts
should not conjure up tactical decisions an attorney could have made, but
plainly did not.”); Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1237 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“In light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that reviewing courts may not
substitute their own strategic reasoning for that of trial counsel in order to
find the counsel’s performance was justified, we do not consider additional
speculative justification…).
D. Counsel’s Performance Was Objectively Deficient
Trial counsel had a constitutional duty to present “available evidence
and arguments” to support Appellant’s only defense. Jackson v. State, 857
S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). He was
obligated to conduct a reasonable investigation in an effort to present the
most persuasive case that he could. This duty encompasses presenting
evidence to demonstrate Appellant’s innocence, undermine the prosecutions
case, or raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. See Ex parte Amezquita, 223
S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
1. Counsel’s Failure to Advise Appellant That The Detention That
Yielded Contraband Was Constitutionally Flawed Was Objectively
Deficient Conduct
Based on the facts as recounted in the offense report, trial counsel should
have recognized that:
27
• Officer Madrid’s initial stop was based on Appellant’s failure to
use a turn signal when exiting the Food Town parking lot headed
southbound onto Reid Road and not as he approached the
intersection of FM 518 and Reid Road.
• Based on the plain language of the statute and well-established
case law, Officer Madrid’s detention of Appellant’s vehicle was
unlawful because Appellant was not required to signal when exiting
a private parking lot and entering a public highway.
Trial counsel’s failure to investigate the relevant case law and discuss
the merits of a motion to suppress with Appellant, as well as advise him of
the chances on any motion to suppress, could not have been the result of any
reasoned trial strategy because his failure was not informed by a reasonable
investigation and therefore was objectively deficient conduct. See Boyington
v. State, 738 S.W.2d 704, 708 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no
pet.) (counsel’s failure to file motion to suppress that was fruit of illegal
arrest was objectively deficient performance); Melton v. State, 987 S.W.2d
72, 77 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.) (counsel’s failure to fully
investigate facts of case before advising defendant to plea guilty was
deficient conduct).
2. Illegal Detention: Appellant Did Not Commit a Traffic Offense
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as
Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, and Art. 38.23 of the Code of Criminal
28
Procedure6 make illegal all unreasonable searches and seizures. “Searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject
only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Gonzalez v. State, 369 S.W.3d
851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012). One such exception is embodied in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), allowing an investigating officer to detain a
person temporarily upon a showing of reasonable suspicion that he is
involved in criminal activity, including a traffic offense. The decision to stop
a vehicle is reasonable when the officer has reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S.
806, 812 (1996). Although an officer’s observations alone can be sufficient
to establish the traffic offense, the officer must be clear on the elements of
the law that constitute the offense and it must be a violation of the law. “An
officer’s suspicion of an alleged traffic violation, however, cannot be based
on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws.” Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d
713, 716 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2006); see also United States v.
Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999).
6
“No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United
States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on trial of any
criminal case.”
29
An officer must have probable cause to arrest the driver for a traffic
violation without a warrant. State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App. –
Fort Worth, pet. ref’d); see also Ballard v. State, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge at that time would cause a reasonably prudent
officer to believe that a certain person has committed or is committing a
crime. Id. When an officer observes a traffic offense, he may arrest the
violator. “Here, however, [Officer Madrid] did not observe a traffic offense;
he only thought he had.” Citing State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d at 70.
Viewed through this prism of legal authority, it is clear that Officer
Madrid’s detention of Appellant was not justified because no traffic offense
occurred when Appellant failed to signal his turn when exiting the Food
Town parking lot onto a public highway. The offense report shows that
while monitoring traffic, Officer Madrid predicated his stop upon observing
Appellant’s vehicle,
“…exit the Food Town parking lot southbound onto Reid Road
without signaling. I then followed the vehicle southbound through the
intersection of FM 518 and Reid Road before stopping the vehicle at
the Exxon Gas station at 7218 Broadway.” (1 CR 45).
There is nothing about these facts that would lead a reasonable officer to
believe that a traffic offense had been committed based on the plain
language of the Texas Transportation Code.
30
Section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code provides that an
operator is required to use a turn signal to indicate an intention to turn,
change lanes, or start from a parked position when a vehicle is being
operated on a highway. Further, a “highway” is defined as “the width
between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained way any part of which
is open to the public for vehicle traffic.” Id., see also §541.302(5).
Relying on the language of the statute, case law makes clear that
failing to signal a turn when exiting a private parking lot onto a public
highway is not a traffic offense, and therefore could not justify Officer
Madrid’s stop of Appellant’s vehicle. State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d at 70,
(defendant’s failure to signal from private parking lot did not establish
probable cause warranting traffic stop).
As an initial matter Appellant contends trial counsel failed to
recognize the correct legal issue in this case. Trial counsel had three cases in
his file that provided his legal research before advising Appellant to plead
guilty. Two of those cases were State v. Kidd, 2010 WL 5463893 (Tex.
App.—Austin Dec. 30, 2010, no pet.) and Reha v. State, 99 S.W. 3d 373
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.), which dealt with whether a turn
signal was required one hundred feet from an intersection. (1 RR 77). The
third case Zeno v. State, 862 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
31
1993, pet. ref'd), analyzed a search incident to arrest. (1 RR 77). Not one
case contained in trial counsel’s file indicated he researched or identified the
correct legal issue7.
Trial counsel also erroneously relied on a Pearland Municipal
Ordinance, believing that it would validate the stop. When asked at the writ
hearing whether he thought the Pearland Municipal Ordinance did validate
the stop of Appellant’s vehicle, trial counsel said, “Yes, I did”. (1 RR 59).
When questioned about whether the Transportation Code supersedes the
municipal ordinance, trial counsel said he, “[n]ever researched that issue” (1
RR 59), and “I don’t really agree with that. But okay.” (1 RR 60).
In spite of trial counsel’s belief, case law makes clear that a municipal
ordinance cannot supersede the Transportation Code. State v. Patterson, 291
S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (“To the extent
Patterson suggests that Amarillo's ordinance superseded § 552.006, he is
mistaken. Our legislature declared that a ‘local authority may not enact or
enforce an ordinance or rule that conflicts with’ subtitle C of title 7 of the
Transportation Code ‘unless expressly authorized by’ that same subtitle.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.201 (Vernon 1999)”. Since trial counsel
7
Trial counsel verified that his file did not contain State v. Ballman (1 RR 62) and
admitted that there was nowhere in his file that shows he researched Texas
Transportation Code §542.001 (vehicles entering a highway from a private drive), or
that
he relied on Texas Transportation Code §542.201 to decide which code would supersede
the other. (1 RR 62).
32
failed to adequately investigate the case law impacting this meritorious
issue, his advice that Appellant plea guilty pursuant to the State’s plea
agreement was objectively deficient. (1 RR 81).
3. A Motion to Suppress: Had One Been Filed it Would Have Been
Successful
As the Supreme Court of the United States recently held, “An
attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case
combined with his failure to perform basic [legal] research on that point is a
quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.”
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). So too, even if trial counsel had
investigated relevant case law, he did not advise Appellant of the legal issues
raised by Officer Madrid’s report or the likelihood of success had Appellant
filed a motion to suppress8. Because the case law in this area was readily
available at the time of Appellant’s guilty plea and because trial counsel
failed to conduct a reasonable legal investigation or advise Appellant of the
only meritorious issue raised by evidence prior to entering a plea of guilty,
his conduct was objectively unreasonable. Melton v. State, 987 S.W.2d 72,
77 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1998, no pet.)(counsel’s failure to fully investigate
facts of case before advising defendant to plea guilty was deficient conduct).
8
Trial counsel admitted during the writ hearing that he does not even remember advising
Appellant of the possibility of filing a motion to suppress (“I believe I did. I don't know
why we wouldn't have, but I don't recall specifically”). (1 RR 51).
33
Because the detention that formed the basis for the search of
Appellant’s vehicle was constitutionally flawed, counsel’s failure to
determine there were meritorious grounds to suppress the marijuana was
objectively deficient conduct that could not have been the product of a
reasoned trial strategy. See Boyington v. State, 738 S.W.2d at 708 (counsel’s
failure to file motion to suppress that was fruit of illegal arrest was
objectively deficient performance); Melton v. State, 987 S.W.2d at 77
(counsel’s failure to fully investigate facts of case before advising defendant
to plea guilty was deficient conduct).
E. Prejudice
Appellant is a layman and not versed in Texas or United States search
and seizure law. His guilty plea was induced by counsel’s advice to accept
the State’s plea bargain based on a substantially unreasonable investigation
of the facts and law. At the writ hearing, Appellant stated he would not have
accepted the State’s plea offer if he had known there was a meritorious
search issue in his case. (1 RR 42). Moreover, Appellant said he relied on
Trial counsel’s advice in deciding to plead guilty to a misdemeanor drug
charge. (1 RR 42). Trial counsel’s advice was inadequate and incomplete in
that he did not advise Appellant that Officer Madrid’s detention and
subsequent search yielding contraband forming the basis of his arrest and
34
guilty plea was illegal and violated the Fourth Amendment, Art. I. § 9, and
Art. 38.23(a). It is well settled that this incomplete and misleading advice
was not within the range of competence for a criminal attorney. Ex parte
Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Flowers v. State, 951
S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Tallant v. State,
866 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1993, no pet.). Because counsel’s
failure to advise Appellant that the detention yielding the contraband, which
formed the basis of his arrest and guilty plea, was illegal and violated state
and federal constitutional and statutory prohibitions was not a “strategic”
decision made after a full investigation of the law and facts, his performance
was objectively deficient.
Prejudice is shown in this case because Appellant can demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence that, but for counsel’s objectively deficient
performance, there was a reasonable probability that Appellant would not
have pleaded guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. Appellant was entitled
to rely upon counsel to conduct an independent examination of the facts and
the law, including any meritorious suppression issues, and then offer his
informed opinion as to what plea should be entered. McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. at 769-770. Because Appellant has shown that he would not have
pleaded guilty had he known that he had a meritorious basis to exclude the
35
marijuana which formed the basis of his arrest and plea, he has demonstrated
that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Ex Parte
Wolfe, 296 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d);
Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. Crim. App 2012) (guilty
plea was involuntarily entered where defendant would not have pleaded
guilty but for counsel’s incorrect advice concerning parole eligibility). Rios
v. State, 377 S.W.3d at 137 (guilty plea was involuntary where defendant
would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s failure to discover that
technician who maintained breath-testing machine had falsified calibration
records).
F. Conclusion
This case presents, in compelling terms, a breakdown in the
adversarial system of justice. The sole legal issue in Appellant’s drug case
was never identified, researched or litigated even though the controlling
statutes and case law make clear that the ultimate detention and search of
Appellant’s vehicle was constitutionally flawed. Trial counsel failed to
identify the issue, research the relevant case law, present it to the prosecutor
or advise Appellant prior to encouraging him to plead guilty. Because
Appellant relied on the inadequate or misleading advise of trial counsel, his
plea was involuntary, in that it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
36
because it does not “represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985), quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31
(1970). For all these reasons, Appellant asks this Court to sustain these
claims and reverse the trial courts ruling denying habeas corpus relief.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant prays that this Honorable Court reverse the trial court’s
order denying habeas corpus relief and remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/ Carmen Roe
_________________________________
CARMEN ROE
TBN: 24048772
440 LOUISIANA, SUITE 900
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002
713.236.7755
713.236.7756 FAX
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 9.5(d), this appeal was served upon
opposing counsel by electronic-filing system of same on September 18,
2015.
/s/ Carmen Roe
_______________________________
CARMEN ROE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no
smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also
complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i), if
applicable, because it contains 6,898 words, excluding any parts exempted
by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Carmen Roe
______________________________
CARMEN ROE
38
Jordan Dwayne Nichols v. State
Combined Opinion