ACCEPTED
01-15-00221-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/7/2015 3:11:50 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NOS. 01-15-00220-CR,
01-15-00221-CR, 01-15-00222-CR
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE HOUSTON, TEXAS
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 12/7/2015 3:11:50 PM
HOUSTON, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
GARY JAMES COX, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appealed from the 122ND Judicial District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Cause Nos. 13-CR-0183, 13-CR-0184, 14-CR-3651
BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
JACK ROADY
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY
ALLISON LINDBLADE
ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY
STATE BAR NO. 24062850
600 59TH STREET, SUITE 1001
GALVESTON, TX 77551
(409) 766-2355, FAX (409) 765-3261
allison.lindblade@co.galveston.tx.us
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ii
Identity of Parties and Counsel iv
Index of Authorities v
Statement Regarding Oral Argument 1
Summary of the Argument 1
Statement of Facts 3
Sole Issue 9
Rule 403 does not require exclusion of evidence simply
because it creates prejudice. The prejudice must be unfair.
Unfair prejudice refers only to the tendency of relevant
evidence to tempt the jury into finding guilt on grounds
apart from proof of the offense charged.
How did the extraneous child pornography unfairly
prejudice Cox when it directly related to the Attempted
Sexual Performance of a Child charge, was admissible
under Article 38.37, and admissible to rebut a defensive
theory?
Argument and Authorities 9
I. Standard of Review and applicable law 10
II. The trial court’s ruling on the extraneous evidence of child
pornography 14
III. The child pornography was admissible as propensity or
character evidence according to Texas Code of Criminal
procedure Article 38.37 §2. 16
ii
IV. The evidence was admissible to rebut the defensive theory
that Cox had no intent. 17
V. A Rule 403 analysis demonstrates that the admission of the
child pornography was not unfairly prejudice to Cox. 20
A. First factor: the probative value of the evidence. 22
B. Second factor: the potential of the evidence to impress
the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way. 22
C. Third factor: the time needed for the State to develop
the evidence. 24
D. Fourth factor: the State’s need for the evidence. 24
VI. Cox’s facts are distinguishable from the facts in Pawlak. 26
VII. Conclusion: the admission of all the child pornography was
more probative than prejudicial. 27
Conclusion and Prayer 29
Certificate of Service 30
Certificate of Compliance 30
iii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Presiding Judge Hon. John Ellisor
Appellant Gary James Cox
Appellee The State of Texas
Attorneys for Appellant Mike Gilliam – Trial
Joel Bennett – Appeal
Attorneys for State Adam Poole – Trial
Allison Lindblade – Appeal
The Clerk’s Record is referred to in the State’s Brief as “C.R. cause number:
page”. The Reporter’s Record is multiple volumes and is referred to as “R.R.
volume number: page”.
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ..................................18
Bradshaw v. State, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, No. 06–14–00165–CR, 2015 WL
2091376, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 5, 2015, pet. filed). .......................13
Bradshaw v. State, 65 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) ...........10
Brantley v. State, 48 S.W.3d 318, 329–30 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) ........
...............................................................................................................................12
Burke v. State, 371 S.W.3d 252, 257–58 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.
dism'd) ............................................................................................................ 23, 26
Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). ........................ 14, 25
Couret v. State, 792 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ..............................10
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 450–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)................ 11, 12
Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). ...............................14
Dominguez v. State, 467 S.W.3d 521, ––––, 2015 WL 1939378, at *4 (Tex. App.–
San Antonio 2015, pet. filed) ................................................................................17
Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ..................................26
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). ...................25
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)…. ... 13, 22, 26
Hankton v. State, 23 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.
ref'd) ............................................................................................................... 10, 11
v
Harris v. State, 14-14-00152-CR, 2015 WL 4984560, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)...................................................................11
Hernandez v. State, 03-13-00186-CR, 2014 WL 7474212, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Austin Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.) ..............................................................................26
Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 323-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)............ 14, 21
Jenkins v. State, 993 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. ref'd) .... 12, 14
Martin v. State, 176 S.W.3d 887, 902 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) ..........
...............................................................................................................................12
McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678, 683–84 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2001, pet.
ref'd) ......................................................................................................................17
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). ....... 11, 23, 27
Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)...............................15
Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)......................... 27, 28, 29
Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) .........................11
Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ................................18
Rankin v. State, 995 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.
ref'd) ......................................................................................................................11
Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). ..............................15
Sandoval v. State, 14-12-00879-CR, 2014 WL 3870504, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) .........................................................22
Sarabia v. State, 227 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd) .....
...............................................................................................................................15
State v. Balderas, 915 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet.
vi
ref’d) ......................................................................................................................18
State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440-441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). ......... 9, 23, 24
Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).........................21
Wenger v. State, 292 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) ............15
Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ..............................18
Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ...........................18
Wright v. State, 178 S.W.3d 905, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
ref'd). .............................................................................................................. 21, 22
Wysack v. State, 01-13-00683-CR, 2015 WL 4366245, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] pet. ref’d, 2015). ............................................................................ 23, 26
Young v. State, 242 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.) ................15
STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 ...........................................................................18
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 1(b). ..............................................................12
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § art. 38.37 §2(1)(E). ........................................................17
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § art. 38.37(b). ..................................................................16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Senate Comm, on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg. R.S.
(2013) ....................................................................................................................13
vii
RULES
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) ................................................................................................10
viii
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Now comes Jack Roady, Criminal District Attorney for Galveston County,
Texas, and files this brief for the State of Texas.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State of Texas does not request oral argument.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Gary Cox brings a single issue on appeal in order to reverse his convictions
of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child under Six enhanced with an Aggravated
Sexual Assault of a Child, Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child, and Failure
to Register as a Sex Offender for which he received a statutory life sentence in
addition to 2 ten year sentences.
Cox alleges that the sheer volume of the admission of child pornography
images, 1994 in all, were unfairly prejudicial to his case.
Even if this evidence was prejudicial to Cox, it was not unfairly
prejudicial because of the fact that it relates to the charged offense. The
extraneous child pornography evidence directly relates to the charged offenses,
specifically, the Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child. Because the
complained-of evidence relates to the charged offense, it did not have great
potential to impress the jury in an irrational way. Additionally, there was no
1
unfair prejudice due to the volume of pornography because the State only
showed a few pages of thumbnail images of child pornography to the jury and
the record does not support the premise that the jury reviewed the images during
its deliberations. The evidence was also admissible under Article 38.37, and to
rebut a defensive theory.
For all these reasons, the Trial Court did not err to admit the extraneous
evidence.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of the sexual abuse, Tom and Debbie Bowman had three
children: an 18 year old son, and two daughters, 13 and 3 years old,
respectively.1 The Bowmans came to know Cox when he dated Debbie’s sister.2
After that dating-relationship ended, the Bowmans asked Cox to house sit for
them during the summer of 2013 while they went on vacation.3 They were trying
to help Cox because he needed a place to stay.4 Soon after that, their son moved
out of the house.5 The Bowmans offered to let Cox continue to stay in their
home and to live in their son’s bedroom.6 Cox lived continuously with the
Bowmans from about August to December of 2013.7
The Bowmans allowed Cox to live in their home even though they knew
he was a convicted sex offender.8 Tom and Debbie trusted and befriended Cox.9
They left their kids alone with Cox.10 Debbie told the jury that she came to trust
Cox because he believed in God and he prayed with them.11 Both Tom and
Debbie testified that they didn’t see any improper behavior between their girls
1
R.R.V:19-20, 28, 44.
2
R.R.V:21, 42.
3
R.R.V:22; State’s Exhibit No. 2 (In-custody interview of Cox).
4
R.R.V:22-23.
5
R.R.V:22-23.
6
R.R.V:22-23.
7
R.R.V:45; State’s Exhibit No. 2.
8
R.R.V:24-25.
9
R.R.V:45-46.
10
R.R.V:45-46.
11
R.R.V:38.
3
and Cox until the phone was discovered.12 Tom and Debbie didn’t see any signs
or behaviors from the girls that they were afraid of Cox.13 Debbie told the jury
that Cox would play with the girls and tickle the 3 year old.14 She said she didn’t
see anything that was inappropriate.15
One afternoon, Debbie discovered that her 13 year old daughter had a cell
phone.16 Debbie and Tom hadn’t given it to her.17 Debbie told Tom and gave
him the phone when he came home.18 Tom looked on the phone and saw a text
conversation.19 It appeared to be between his 13 year old daughter and Cox.20
Some of the texts included, “And you can practice on role playing /sexing with
me without the fear of messing up, if you want.”21 “What would you do if you
woke up and you were coming because a guy was going down on you?”22
“Would you tell him to stop, or just keep cumming because it felt so good?”23
“Remember those pics of me….. The special ones?”24 “The ones of me, nude.”25
12
R.R.V:26, 29, 44.
13
R.R.V:25-26.
14
R.R.V:35.
15
R.R.V:35.
16
R.R.V:29-30.
17
R.R.V:29-30.
18
R.R.V:29-30.
19
R.R.V:47-49.
20
R.R.V:51-52.
21
State’s Exhibit 1 (list of texts on Facebook Messenger from Gary Cox and 13 year old
victim).
22
State’s Exhibit 1.
23
State’s Exhibit 1.
24
State’s Exhibit 1.
4
“Well, to make it fair, where’s the pics of you? Lol.”26 “Lol, but now I’m
supposed to see your pics….lol.”27 “I’m just teasing with you.”28 “Then you
better take the pics fast….hahaha.”29
After Tom read the texts, he told Cox he wasn’t allowed to live with them
anymore.30 The Bowmans took the phone to the League City Police Department
and filed a complaint.31
After Cox moved out, their 3 year old started sleeping with them more.32
After they moved to Ohio, the 3 year old allowed a boy to draw on the upper
part of her leg near her vagina.33 Alarmed and knowing that Cox had a prior
sexual assault with a child conviction before he lived with them, the Bowman’s
asked for the matter to be further investigated.
League City Police Detective Martin Grant spoke with the Bowmans.34
The 3 year old victim was sent to the Child Advocacy Center for a forensic
interview and then to the hospital for a medical exam.35 During her forensic
interview, later ruled to be her outcry, the 3 year old told the examiner that Cox
25
State’s Exhibit 1.
26
State’s Exhibit 1.
27
State’s Exhibit 1.
28
State’s Exhibit 1.
29
State’s Exhibit 1.
30
R.R.V:53.
31
R.R.V:53.
32
R.R.V:36, 59-60.
33
R.R.V:55.
34
R.R.V:117.
35
R.R.V:181, VI:10.
5
took her clothes off.36 By pointing to an anatomic diagram, the 3 year old told
the interviewer that Cox put his penis in her vagina.37 She said she saw the stuff
and that the stuff was white.38 By pointing to the picture, the 3 year old said that
Cox put his penis in her butt.39 She said it hurt.40 She said that he put his penis in
her mouth.41 She said it tasted like orange juice.42
In trial, the 3 year old told the jury, with the aid of a diagram, that Cox’s
penis touched her vagina underneath her clothes.43 She said she likes to play
make believe being a princess.44 She told the jury that this wasn’t a pretend
story.45 This really happened.46
During his investigation, Detective Grant discovered Cox was not current
on his registration as a sex offender.47 Cox was charged with failure to register
as a sex offender and Detective Grant obtained a warrant for his arrest.
Once Cox was in custody, Detective Grant obtained a video recorded
statement from Cox.48 During this statement, Cox denied that the texts he sent to
36
R.R.VI:184-186.
37
R.R.VI:184-186.
38
R.R.VI:184-186.
39
R.R.VI:184-186.
40
R.R.VI:184-186.
41
R.R.VI:184-186.
42
R.R.VI:184-186.
43
R.R.V:115.
44
R.R.V:107-108.
45
R.R.V:115.
46
R.R.V:115.
47
R.R.V:118.
6
the 13 year old victim were anything but joking and teasing.49 Cox claimed that
the 13 year old was looking for advice and he was providing it.50 Cox said that
he never intended for her to send him any nude photos.51 Cox said that she saw a
nude photo of him only by accident while she was looking at the pictures on his
phone.52
During his interview, Cox said that he cared for the girls but he strongly
denied being sexually attracted to children.53 Cox admitted that he spent time
alone with the girls.54 He said that he would kiss them good-night on the
forehead.55 Cox adamantly denied any sexual contact with the 3 year old
victim.56 Cox denied his failure to register saying it was just a
misunderstanding.57
Cox was charged and indicted with Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child
Under Six, Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child, and Failure to Register As
a Sex Offender.58 The jury found Cox guilty of all charges. Cox was sentenced
48
State’s Exhibit 2.
49
State’s Exhibit 2.
50
State’s Exhibit 2.
51
State’s Exhibit 2.
52
State’s Exhibit 2.
53
State’s Exhibit 2.
54
State’s Exhibit 2.
55
State’s Exhibit 2.
56
State’s Exhibit 2.
57
State’s Exhibit 2.
58
C.R. 13CR0183:7, C.R. 13CR0184:6, C.R. 14CR3651:5.
7
to life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in addition to
two 10 years sentences.59 This appeal followed.
59
C.R. 13CR0183: 185-189, C.R. 13CR0184:78-83, C.R. 14CR3651:36-41.
8
SOLE ISSUE
Rule 403 does not require exclusion of evidence simply because it
creates prejudice. The prejudice must be unfair. Unfair prejudice refers
only to the tendency of relevant evidence to tempt the jury into finding
guilt on grounds apart from proof of the offense charged.
How did the extraneous child pornography unfairly prejudice Cox when
it directly related to the Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child
charge, was admissible under Article 38.37, and admissible to rebut a
defensive theory?
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Cox believes that the admission of the numerous child pornography
images, 1994 in all, were unfairly prejudicial to his case.
Even if this evidence was prejudicial to Cox, it was not unfairly
prejudicial because of the fact that it relates to the charged offense.60 The
extraneous child pornography evidence directly relates to the charged offenses,
specifically, the Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child.61 Because the
complained-of evidence relates to the charged offense, it did not have great
potential to impress the jury in an irrational way.62
Cox alleges that the sheer volume of the evidence was unfairly
60
See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440-441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
61
See id.
62
See id. at 441.
9
prejudicial.63 However, there was no unfair prejudice due to the volume of
pornography because the State only showed a few pages of thumbnail images of
child pornography to the jury.64 When the child pornography evidence was
explained by the investigator, the jury was shown computer files and icons that
were believed to contain child pornography.65 Additionally, there is nothing in
the record that indicates the jury was given this evidence during deliberations or
that the jury had time to view all the images during the time it took to reach a
guilty verdict.
The admission of this extraneous evidence was not error.
I. Standard of review and applicable law
The general rule is that an accused may not be tried for being a criminal
generally.66 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts are not admissible to prove
the character of the defendant and that he acted in conformity with that
character.67 However, evidence may be admissible if it has relevance separate
from the tendency to prove the defendant’s character.68 A party may introduce
such evidence where it tends to establish some elemental fact, such as identity or
63
Cox brief, p. 31.
64
R.R.VI:29-31.
65
R.R.VI:29-31.
66
Couret v. State, 792 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Hankton v. State, 23 S.W.3d
540, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); Bradshaw v. State, 65 S.W.3d
232, 236 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.).
67
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Hankton, 23 S.W.3d at 545.
68
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
10
intent; some evidentiary fact, such as motive, opportunity or preparation, leading
inferentially to an elemental fact; or “it rebuts a defensive theory by showing,
e.g., absence of mistake or accident.”69 When a defendant claims his act was free
from criminal intent, extraneous offenses are relevant to prove guilty intent.70
Appellate courts measure the trial court’s rulings concerning the
admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b) by
an abuse of discretion standard.71 As long as the trial court’s ruling was at least
within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the appellate court will not interfere
with the ruling.72
Although the general rule provides that evidence of extraneous offenses
may not be used against the accused in a criminal trial, the Legislature has
chosen to make specific and limited exceptions to this prohibition.73 For
example, “Rule 404(b) sets out an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of exceptions
to the prohibition against admitting evidence of extraneous offenses including
‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
69
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387, 388.
70
Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Rankin v. State, 995
S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).
71
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391; Hankton, 23 S.W.3d at 546.
72
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391; Hankton, 23 S.W.3d at 546.
73
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 450–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Harris v. State, 14-14-
00152-CR, 2015 WL 4984560, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).
11
absence of mistake or accident.’”74 Section 1 of Article 38.37 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure also provides an exception to the general rule by allowing
“evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against
the child who is the victim of the alleged offense” for its bearing on relevant
matters, including the state of mind of the defendant and the child and the
previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and the child.75 This
exception has been held to be constitutional by several Texas courts of appeals.76
It is clear that the Legislature chose to carve out another exception to the
prohibition on evidence of extraneous offenses when it enacted Article 38.37,
Section 2 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The statute recognizes that
evidence of this type is, by definition, propensity or character evidence and that
it is admissible notwithstanding those characteristics.77 The legislative history
behind Section 2(b) reflects that it was enacted to “give prosecutors additional
resources to prosecute sex crimes committed against children” due to the “nature
of these heinous crimes and the importance of protecting children from sexual
74
Id. at 451 n. 13.
75
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 1(b).
76
See Martin v. State, 176 S.W.3d 887, 902 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding
that Article 38.37, Section 1 did not deny appellant constitutional right to due process);
Brantley v. State, 48 S.W.3d 318, 329–30 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (rejecting
appellant's argument that article 38.37 was unconstitutional “because it permits a blanket
introduction of propensity evidence”); Jenkins v. State, 993 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1999, pet. ref'd) (holding appellant was not denied fair trial guaranteed by Due Process
Clause by admission of evidence of extraneous bad acts).
77
Bradshaw v. State, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, No. 06–14–00165–CR, 2015 WL 2091376, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 5, 2015, pet. filed).
12
predators.”78 The Legislature acknowledged that:
Prosecuting sex crimes committed against children can
be difficult due to the physical and emotional trauma
suffered by the victims. This can result in long delays
in reporting these crimes during which physical
evidence can deteriorate or be destroyed. Often the
only evidence at a trial may be the testimony of the
traumatized child. Children often are targeted for these
crimes, in part because they tend to make poor
witnesses.79
The Court of Criminal Appeals has also recognized that “[s]exual assault cases
are frequently ‘he said, she said’ trials in which the jury must reach a unanimous
verdict based solely upon two diametrically different versions of an event,
unaided by any physical, scientific, or other corroborative evidence.”80 “The
special circumstances surrounding the sexual assault of a child victim outweigh
normal concerns associated with evidence of extraneous acts.”81
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 allows for the exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.82 This rule carries a presumption that relevant
78
Senate Comm, on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg. R.S. (2013);
Bradshaw, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2015 WL 2091376, at *7.
79
Senate Comm, on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg. R.S. (2013);
Bradshaw, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2015 WL 2091376, at *7.
80
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
81
Jenkins, 993 S.W.2d at 136.
82
Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 323-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
13
evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.83 “‘Probative value’ refers to
the inherent probative force of an item of evidence-that is, how strongly it serves
to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the
litigation-coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.”84
“Unfair prejudice” refers to the tendency to suggest that decisions may be
made on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one.85 All evidence is
prejudicial to one party or the other-it is only when there is a clear disparity
between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value
that Rule 403 is applicable.86 Similar to the admission of evidence under Rule
404B, a trial court’s decision to allow or disallow evidence under Rule 403 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and in doing so, the appellate court will
reverse a decision only when it lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.87 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has said that a reversal
of the trial court's judgment regarding a balancing test determination should be
done “rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.”88
II. The trial court’s ruling on the extraneous evidence of child
pornography
83
See Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
84
Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
85
Id.; Hernandez, 390 S.W.3d at 323-24.
86
See Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 806.
87
Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
88
Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (emphasis added).
14
THE COURT: The State has proffered that they want
to put in some evidence seized from Mr. Cox’s
computer that would compromise or would be
comprised of child pornography. There’s been an
objection by the Defense basically raising a 4.03
objection that however probative the evidence might
be, that it would be more prejudicial than probative.
I have looked at the case law that’s been provided by
the State.89 I have heard the voir dire, the opening
statement by the Defense. I’ve heard the tenor of the
cross-examination. And I believe that the evidence is
probative of the ultimate issues in this case. I think
they go toward issues that the Jury’s going to need to
decide.
And I’ll quote something regarding unfair prejudice,
which is what my job is to do is to determine that no
unfair prejudice is put on Mr. Cox, that the Jury would
not be unfairly prejudiced by what they hear. It says,
"Unfair prejudice refers to a tendency to suggest a
decision on an improper basis commonly, although not
necessarily an emotional one. Only unfair prejudice
provides the basis for exclusion of relevant evidence."
In light of Mr. Cox’s denial of having interest in
children, in light of his denial of being serious about
suggesting that [V.B.] provide him with pictures that
would be of a pornographic nature, I think that the
evidence is relevant, I think it is not unfairly
prejudicial.
In balancing the interest of Mr. Cox and the State’s
need for this evidence, I’m going to err on the side for
the State and overrule your objection.90
89
Sarabia v. State, 227 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd); Young v.
State, 242 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.); Wenger v. State, 292 S.W.3d
191 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
90
R.R.V:159-160.
15
III. The child pornography was admissible as propensity or
character evidence according to Texas Code Criminal
Procedure Article 38.37 §2.
Article 38.37 instructs:
(b) Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules
of Evidence, and subject to Section 2-a, evidence that
the defendant has committed a separate offense
described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted
in the trial of an alleged offense described by
Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the evidence
has on relevant matters, including the character of the
defendant and acts performed in conformity with the
character of the defendant.91
“The statute simply provides that a specific type of evidence will be admissible
on certain relevant matters, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405.”92 “Article
38.37, section 2(b) allows testimony regarding other extraneous offenses to
show character conformity.”93
Here, one of the cases before the jury was Cox’s charge of Aggravated
Sexual Assault of a Child, with a 3 year old female victim.94 According to
Article 38.37 §2(1)(E), the article applies in the prosecution for Aggravated
91
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § art. 38.37(b).
92
Dominguez v. State, 467 S.W.3d 521, ––––, 2015 WL 1939378, at *4 (Tex. App.–San
Antonio 2015, pet. filed); McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678, 683–84 (Tex. App.–Beaumont
2001, pet. ref'd).
93
Dominguez, 467 S.W.3d 521, ––––, 2015 WL 1939378, at *4; McCulloch, 39 S.W.3d at
683–84.
94
C.R. 7.
16
Sexual Assault of a Child.95 The child pornography was relevant to corroborate
the 3 year old victim’s testimony that, in addition to the sexual acts Cox
committed upon her, he also photographed her. The child pornography was
relevant to counter the defensive theory that the sexual assault on the child just
didn’t occur;96 to rebut the defensive theory that the 3 year old child’s “delayed
outcry” was a result of the investigation into the lude texts Cox sent to her
sister;97 and to refute the defensive theory that the relationship Cox had with
both the victims was a healthy relationship.98
IV. The evidence was admissible to rebut the defensive theory
that Cox had no intent.
Once the defense opens the door, through either its opening statement or
cross examination, the State can offer extraneous offense evidence to rebut the
defensive theory.99 However, the State may not elicit the defensive theory it
wishes to rebut.100
Cox maintains that the State was the party the introduced the evidence it
95
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § art. 38.37 §2(1)(E).
96
R.R.V:15-16.
97
R.R.V:36
98
R.R.V:35-36.
99
Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d
435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).
100
See Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
17
wished to rebut.101 While Cox is correct that the State admitted his interview
video, this evidence was properly admitted after Cox had presented a clear
defensive theory to the jury in his opening statement and throughout the cross-
examinations of all 4 witnesses that preceded the introduction of the video.102
In Cox’s opening statement he told the jury,
In regards to the attempted sexual performance
of a child, the second charge, I think the evidence will
show totally inappropriate text messages from my
client to [V.B.]. I believe the evidence will show that.
But the evidence will not show that Gary Cox had the
intent of actually trying to get [V.B.] to send him a
nude picture. Rather, I think the evidence will show
totally inappropriate humor or inappropriate attempt at
humor from my client to [V.B.], but nothing more.103
The cross examination questions included the following:
Question to Deborah Bowman:
When [L.B.] was around Gary Cox before you
discovered the messages, did [L.B.] ever show
that she was afraid of Gary at all?
A. No. But she was young.
101
Cox’s brief, p. 31.
102
R.R.V:153; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22; see also State v. Balderas, 915 S.W.2d
913, 919 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (This Court held that the
confession conformed to all the elements of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. It was apparent from Officer Trevino’s testimony that he gave appellee his
statutory warnings and that appellee understood those rights and so indicated by initialing
each right on his written statement.).
103
R.R.V:16 (emphasis added).
18
Q. And -- and -- and would she play with Gary
at all or anything at all?
A. Well, yeah.
Q. And how would they play? What would they
do?
A. Well, he would, I mean, just joke around and
hold her and sometimes tickle her and I mean –
but nothing that we didn't think was abnormal.
Q. Did she ever look at Gary and start to cry or
run away from him or anything like that?
A. No.104
Q. Did you ever inquire as to whether the
messages were an inappropriate attempt at
humor by Gary Cox?105
Question to Tom Bowman: Q. Did you ever inquire as to whether some of
those messages -- and again, this is did you ever
inquire. I’m going to ask -- the question is
whether you ever inquired as to whether those
text messages were just a very inappropriate
attempt at humor. Did you ever ask about that or
did that never just come into play?106
Questions to the 13 year-old victim [V.B.]:
Q. Did he at the time include, like, “Just
kidding,” after he made the request in the
message?
Q. After some of those requests, there’s little
104
R.R.V:35-56.
105
R.R.V:39.
106
R.R.V: 60-61.
19
letters like “LOL.” What does that mean?
Q. And also with the messages, did Mr. Gary
say he was just teasing you? Is that --
A. Yes, sir, he would say that.
Q. Now, I know you’ve had -- it’s been two
years. And over time you can think differently.
But back then -- even though today you think
differently. But back then did you think it was
just a joke or teasing even though you were
uncomfortable?
A. I don’t think he was really teasing.
Q. At the time did you think he was?
A. I didn’t think at the time he was teasing
either. I was just, like, I don’t think so. Actually,
I was, like, "Uh, okay." But, like, what I meant
by that was, like, I’m okay without it, without
doing that.107
Throughout trial, Cox consistently maintained a clear defensive strategy.
Even before the jury viewed his interview video, Cox wanted the jury to believe
that he had a normal relationship with the victims, that he had no intent to
procure a nude photo from the 13 year old victim, and that the 3 year old’s
sexual assault outcry was a fabrication.
V. A Rule 403 analysis demonstrates that the admission of the
child pornography was not unfairly prejudice to Cox.
107
R.R.V:85-86.
20
In addition to the admissibility of the child pornography evidence under
Article 38.27 and to rebut a defensive theory, its probative value substantially
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.108
Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a
presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.109
Trials involving sexual assault may raise particular evidentiary and
constitutional concerns because the credibility of both the complainant and
defendant is a central, often dispositive, issue.110 Sexual assault cases are
frequently “he said, she said” trials in which the jury must reach a unanimous
verdict based solely upon two diametrically different versions of an event,
unaided by any physical, scientific, or other corroborative evidence.111
A Rule 403 analysis demonstrates that the admission of the child
pornography was not unfairly prejudice to Cox. A Rule 403 analysis includes
such factors as “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential of the
evidence to impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way;
(3) the time the proponent needs to develop the evidence; and (4) the
108
Hernandez, 390 S.W.3d at 323-24.
109
Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc); Wright v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 905, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).
110
Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 561-62.
111
Id.
21
proponent’s need for the evidence.”112
A. First factor: the probative value of the evidence.
Here, the first factor weighs in favor of admissibility because the evidence
that Cox possessed and viewed child pornography was probative of his state of
mind and made more probable that he had the intent and motive to sexually
assault the 3 year old victim, as well as, induce the 13 year old victim to send
him nude photographs of herself.113
B. Second factor: the potential of the evidence to
impress the jury in some irrational but
nevertheless indelible way.
The second factor also weighs in favor of admissibility. The intent behind
Cox’s texts to the 13 year old victim was the focus of significant dispute during
trial. The jury could not have been distracted from the charged offenses because
the complained-of evidence directly relates to the charged offenses, specifically,
the Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child.114 Also, although the contested
evidence was prejudicial to Cox, it was not unfairly prejudicial because of the
112
Sandoval v. State, 14-12-00879-CR, 2014 WL 3870504, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.); Wright, 178 S.W.3d at 923.
113
See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 381 (holding evidence defendant had frequently exposed
himself to complainants on prior occasions probative of his “manner” with them and not
unfairly prejudicial); Burke v. State, 371 S.W.3d 252, 257–58 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, pet. dism'd) (holding evidence of prior sexual assaults probative of relationship and not
unfairly prejudicial); Wysack v. State, 01-13-00683-CR, 2015 WL 4366245, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] pet. ref’d, 2015).
114
See Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 435.
22
fact that it relates to the charged offense.115
Rule 403 does not require exclusion of evidence simply because it creates
prejudice; rather, the prejudice must be “unfair.”116 “Unfair prejudice” refers
only to the tendency of relevant evidence to “tempt the jury into finding guilt on
grounds apart from proof of the offense charged.”117 Because the complained-of
evidence relates to the charged offense, it did not have great potential to impress
the jury in an irrational way.118
Cox alleges that the sheer volume of the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial.119 However, there was no unfair prejudice due to the volume of
images because the State only showed a few pages of thumbnail images of child
pornography to the jury.120 When the child pornography evidence was explained
by the investigator, the jury was shown computer files and icons and that were
believed to contain child pornography. There is nothing in the record that
indicates the jury was given this evidence during its deliberations. The evidence
probably was prejudicial to Cox as all extraneous evidence is prejudicial;
however, it was not unfairly prejudicial.
C. Third factor: the time needed for the State to
115
See id. at 440–41.
116
Id. at 440.
117
Id.
118
See id. at 441.
119
Cox brief, p. 31.
120
R.R.VI:29-31.
23
develop the evidence.
The tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
issues and the time required to develop the evidence weighs in favor of
admissibility.121 “Evidence that consumes an inordinate amount of time to
present or answer, for example, might tend to confuse or distract the jury from
the main issues.”122 Here, the amount of time the State devoted to developing the
evidence was not insignificant. The State used 2 witnesses to introduce the how
and where the child pornography was found. Their testimony was not lengthy
and only spanned approximately 18 pages out of a total of 198 pages of trial
record.123 The State did not take time to show any full-scale images to the jury.
D. Fourth factor: the State’s need for the evidence.
Finally, the State’s need for the contested evidence was significant. Even
though the jury knew of the prior aggravated sexual assault of a child
conviction, the testimony by Debbie Bowman suggested that, at one time at
least, she believed Cox had changed since that time. In her efforts to explain to
the jury why she allowed Cox to live in the same house with her daughters and
spend time alone with them, Debbie became a possible positive character
witness for Cox. This testimony, added to the defensive theory that the sexual
121
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
122
Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 870.
123
R.R.I:4; R.R.V:161-166.
24
assault on the child didn’t happen, and to Cox’s interpretation that the texts were
made in humor as he wrote “just joking” and “LOL”, created a strong need for
the State to introduce evidence of Cox’s intent and propensity character.
In addition, the defense made an issue out of the fact that the 3 year old
victim did not make an outcry until after cell phone texts were found and the
investigation ensued. In regards to the aggravated sexual assault on the 3 year
old victim, there was no physical evidence, no other witnesses to support her
testimony, and the State had a strong need to counter Cox’s theory that the
family and the victim fabricated the allegations.124
In sum, the rule 403 factors weigh in favor of admissibility, and the trial
court did not committed error in overruling a rule 403 objection to the
extraneous-offense evidence.125 Although it’s acknowledged that “misconduct
involving children [is] inherently inflammatory,” Cox has not shown that the
trial court committed reversible error had it concluded from balancing these
factors that the testimony’s prejudicial force did not substantially outweigh its
probative value.126
124
See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 561–62; Hernandez v. State, 03-13-00186-CR, 2014 WL
7474212, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 30, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(In a case of a child alleging sexual abuse [by an adult] with no physical evidence, there is a
strong need for the State to admit this evidence.).
125
See Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Burke, 371 S.W.3d at 258;
Wysack, 2015 WL 4366245, at *9.
126
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 397.
25
VI. Cox’s facts are distinguishable from the facts in Pawlak.
Cox wants this Court to believe his case is identical to Pawlak v. State.127
Both defendants were on trial for sexual assault of a child, in addition to other
charges, and the State introduced extraneous evidence of a lot of child
pornography. Specifically, Pawlak was convicted of 3 counts of sexual assault
of a child, 1 count of sexual assault, and 1 count of attempted sexual assault.128
Five victims testified at trial.129 But, unlike the sexual assault complainants in
Pawlak, the 3 year old victim in Cox’s aggravated sexual assault of a child
charge wasn’t followed by numerous other sexually abused children. She only
had her outcry witness to validate her abuse. The only other victim to testify was
her sister in relation to the attempted sexual performance of a child charge.
Unlike Pawlak, here the jury did not specifically request all the evidence
in the case during their deliberations. In fact, there is nothing the record to
suggest that the jury reviewed the child pornography when it deliberated. The
record indicates that the jury didn’t deliberate for long and wouldn’t have had
time to thoroughly review the child pornography during its deliberations.130
127
Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
The State’s case began at 9:33 a.m. when it presented 2 witnesses before closing. R.R.I:5.
After a charge conference made changes to the jury charges, the jury charge was file-stamped
at 11:07 a.m. R.R.VI:35, C.R.110. The jury was read the charge and given the case. The jury
broke for lunch. The jury returned a note announcing a verdict at 1:36 p.m. on the same day.
26
In Pawlak, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the images referred
to a crime for which the appellant was not on trial – possession of child
pornography.131 Most notably, the Court in Pawlak noted that
there was no allegation that Appellant took the pictures
or that he in any way participated in coercing children
to be involved in producing child pornography, much
less that he assaulted them. Thus, while the
extraneous-offense evidence may have been
permissible rebuttal evidence, it did not show that an
assault or attempted assault was more likely to have
occurred.132
Here, Cox was charged with Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child. There
was testimony that Cox took nude pictures of the 3 year old victim and that he
tried to coerce the 13 year old victim to be involved in producing child
pornography. The facts here are unmistakably distinguishable from Pawlak.
In Pawlak, the Court ruled, “Under these facts, the sheer volume of
extraneous-offense evidence was unfairly prejudicial.”133 The holding in Pawlak
is not applicable here.
VII. Conclusion: the admission of all the child pornography was
more probative than prejudicial.
The trial court’s ruling to admit the extraneous evidence was within the
C.R. 13CR0183:115.
131
Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 810.
132
Id.
133
See id. at 811 (emphasis added).
27
zone of reasonable disagreement because the evidence was not unfairly
prejudicial to Cox. The extraneous child pornography evidence directly related
to the charge of Attempted Sexual Performance of a Child.134 Because the
complained-of evidence relates to the charged offense, it did not have great
potential to impress the jury in an irrational way.135 The volume of the evidence
was not unfairly prejudicial because the jury did not see all the images and the
State only showed a few pages of thumbnail images of child pornography during
trial.136 Importantly, there is nothing in the record that indicates the jury was
given this evidence during deliberations or that the jury had time to view all the
images during the time it took to reach a guilty verdict. Lastly, these facts are
not like the case of Palwak and its holding doesn’t apply.
The admission of this extraneous evidence was not error.
134
See id.
135
See id. at 441.
136
R.R.VI:29-31.
28
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays that the
judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK ROADY
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar Number 24062850
600 59th Street, Suite 1001
Galveston, Texas 77551
Tel (409)766-2452/Fax (409)765-3261
allison.lindblade@co.galveston.tx.us
29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies a copy of the foregoing
brief was sent via email, eFile service, or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
Joel Bennett, Sears & Bennett, 1100 Nasa Parkway, Suite 302, Houston, Texas
77058, joel@searsandbennett.com, on December 7, 2015.
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Galveston County, Texas
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned Attorney for the State certifies this brief complies with Tex.
R. App. Proc. 9.4(i)(3), is a computer generated document, and consists of 6,153
words.
/s/ Allison Lindblade
ALLISON LINDBLADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Galveston County, Texas
30