Herring Bancorp, Inc. C.C. Burgess And C. Campbell Burgess v. John Mikkelsen, Acting Solely in His Capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust

ACCEPTED 07-15-00327-CV SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 11/20/2015 4:46:55 PM Vivian Long, Clerk No. 07-15-00327-CV ___________________________ FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 7th COURT OF APPEALS SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS 11/20/2015 4:46:55 PM ____________________________ VIVIAN LONG CLERK HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS v. JOHN MIKKELSEN, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, _____________________________ On Appeal from the 46th Judicial District Court, Wilbarger County, Texas Trial Court No. 24,955 _____________________________ BRIEF OF APPELLANTS _____________________________ Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275 CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez 1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760 Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap 940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563 940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75201 214.220.7700 214.999.7792 (facsimile) tleatherbury@velaw.com mberrelez@velaw.com sgilstrap@velaw.com Attorneys for Appellants Herring Bancorp, Inc.; C.C. Burgess; and C. Campbell Burgess Oral Argument Requested November 20, 2015 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Appellants/Cross-Appellees Herring Bancorp, Inc.; C.C. Burgess; and C. Campbell Burgess Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275 CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez 1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760 Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap 940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563 940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75201 214.220.7700 214.999.7792 (facsimile) tleatherbury@velaw.com mberrelez@velaw.com sgilstrap@velaw.com Appellee/Cross-Appellant John Mikkelsen, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust Lee F. Christie Michael L. Atchley, II POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP 500 West 7th Street, Suite 600 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 817.332.3245 817.877.4781 (facsimile) lfchristie@popehardwicke.com matchley@popehardwicke.com i TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity of Parties and Counsel ...................................................................................i Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... ii Index of Authorities ................................................................................................... v Record References ....................................................................................................ix Statement of the Case................................................................................................. x Statement Regarding Oral Argument ..................................................................... xii Issues Presented ..................................................................................................... xiii Statement of Facts ...................................................................................................... 1 I. Mikkelsen’s Prior Involvement at Herring Bancorp. ...................................... 1 II. The 2006 Conversion and Redemption. .......................................................... 2 III. The 2013 Redemption and Tender. ................................................................. 4 IV. Pre-Trial Proceedings/Partial Summary Judgment for Mikkelsen. ................. 7 V. The Trial. ......................................................................................................... 8 VI. The Final Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings. .................................. 10 Summary of the Argument....................................................................................... 11 Standards of Review ................................................................................................ 14 Argument.................................................................................................................. 16 I. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Minority-Oppression Claims. ........................................................................ 16 A. Ritchie v. Rupe Held That Minority Oppression Is Not a Viable Cause of Action Under Texas Law. .................................................... 17 B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Relevant Holding in Ritchie v. Rupe Was Dicta. ............................................................. 18 C. Alternatively, the Evidence at Trial Was Not Legally or Factually Sufficient to Constitute Minority Oppression. .................... 20 II. Mikkelsen Cannot Recover on His Breach of Contract Claim or on His Declaratory Judgment Claim, and Defendants Should Prevail on Their Declaratory Judgment Claim. ........................................................................ 22 A. The 2006 Redemption Was Valid. ...................................................... 22 ii B. Defendants Are Entitled to Prevail on Their Declaratory Judgment Claim Because the 2013 Redemption and Tender Were Valid. ......................................................................................... 26 C. Regardless of the Validity of the Two Redemptions, Mikkelsen Cannot Show Any Damages Resulting from Defendants’ Actions................................................................................................. 37 D. Even Assuming a Breach, Mikkelsen Is Not Entitled to Remain a Shareholder in Perpetuity; He Only Is Entitled to the Par Value of His Preferred Shares Plus Unpaid Dividends. ................................ 38 III. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against C.C. Burgess for an Additional Reason Than the One Found by the Jury. .................................................................. 39 A. C.C. Burgess Owes No Fiduciary Duties to Mikkelsen Under Texas Law. .......................................................................................... 40 B. Alternatively, the Evidence Was Not Legally or Factually Sufficient to Show That C.C. Burgess Violated Any Purported Fiduciary Duties. ................................................................................. 42 IV. The $127,442 Fee Award Should Be Reversed. ........................................... 43 A. Because Mikkelsen Cannot Prevail on His Breach of Contract Claim, He Is Not Entitled to an Attorneys’ Fee Award. ..................... 43 B. Alternatively, if Mikkelsen Is Entitled to Some of His Fees, the $127,442 Award Cannot Stand Because It Is Unsupported and Because Mikkelsen Did Not Segregate His Attorneys’ Fees Properly. .............................................................................................. 44 C. Defendants Are Entitled to Their Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees Spent Pursuing Their Declaratory Judgment Claim. .......................... 47 V. To the Extent the Court Does Not Render Judgment in Favor of Defendants, a New Trial Also Is Warranted Because the Trial Court Impermissibly Commented on the Weight of the Evidence When It Instructed the Jury That Herring Bancorp Had Breached its Articles of Incorporation as a Matter of Law. ................................................................. 48 Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................. 52 Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 53 Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 54 iii Index of Appendix Materials ................................................................................... 55 (1) Final Judgment (June 16, 2015) (2CR472-507) (2) Jury Verdict (January 30, 2015) (2CR228-58) (3) Orders Denying Defendants Post-Judgment Motions (August 19, 2015) (2CR409-10) (4) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (August 4, 2011) (1CR306-07) (5) Herring Bancorp Articles of Incorporation (13RR, DX-1) (6) October 31, 2006 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-18) (7) Acceptance of Subchapter S Status by IRS (13RR, DX-31) (8) October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-33) (9) November 22, 2013 Tender (13RR, DX-35) (10) Refused Jury Instructions Related to 2013 Redemption/Tender (January 30, 2015) (2CR260-61, 2CR267) (11) Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) ..............46 A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer, 235 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................46 American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ) ...........................................50 Arcadia Fin., Ltd. v. Sw.-Tex. Leasing Co., 78 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ......................................14 Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1998) ................................................................................41 Bair Chase Prop. Co., LLC v. S&K Dev. Co., Inc., 260 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) ....................................16 Bd. of Regents v. Denton Constr., 652 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ......................50 Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) ..................................................................................15 BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 466 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. filed) ....................................16 Cardiac Perfusion Servs., Inc. v. Hughes, 436 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. 2014) ......................................................................... 17, 18 Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) ................................................19 City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) ................................................................................15 Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), overruled by Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ................................30 Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), overruled by Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ......................... 17, 21 v Dilling v. Nationsbank, N.A., 897 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1996).........................................31 Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) ..................................................................................15 Enzo Invs., LP v. White, 468 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) ..............45 Ex parte Ellis, 279 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008), aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .....................................................32 First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo v. Jarnigan, 794 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) ..................................50 Grinnell v. Munson, 137 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) ...........................40 Guerra v. Guerra, No. 04-10-00271-CV, 2011 WL 3715051 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)..................................................................................................................21 Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) .........................................15 Harrison v. Williams Dental Grp., P.C., 140 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)............................................44 Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) ......................................................................................14 Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) ..................................................................................15 In re Mandel, 578 F. App’x 376 (5th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................19 Indian Beach Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) .......................16 Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) ......................................32 Jones v. Thompson, 338 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) ...................................41 vi Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) ................................................................................45 Mader v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 683 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) ..............................50 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................29 Opperman v. Opperman, No. 07-12-00033-CV, 2013 WL 6529228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 9, 2013, no pet.)........................................................................................................40 Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) ...............................40 Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986) ................................................................................15 Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998) ....................................................................................14 Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................24 Redwine v. AAA Life Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) ...................................... 49, 50 Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ........................................................................ passim S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................29 Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997) ................................................................................41 Seymore v. Dorsett, No. 07-03-0175-CV, 2005 WL 2849061 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31, 2005, no pet.)........................................................................................................49 Somers ex rel. EGL, Inc. v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ...........................40 Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) ..............................32 Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................................21 vii Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................16 Tex. Ear Nose & Throat Consultants, PLLC v. Jones, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 3918130 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.)..................................................................................................19 Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. 2000).....................................................................................................................36 Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................................12 Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................... 44, 46, 47 White Point Minerals, Inc. v. Swantner, 464 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.) ..............................19 Statutes Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.404 ................................................................................18 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009 ...................................................................47 Rules Tex. R. App. P. 44(a)(1) ................................................................................... 16, 37 Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 ...................................................................................................49 Other Authorities James Dawson, Ritchie v. Rupe and the Future of Shareholder Oppression, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 89 (2014) ..........................................................................20 Lyndon Bittle & Kelli Hinson, Texas Turns a Corner: Resolving Shareholder Disputes in Closely Held Businesses After Ritchie v. Rupe, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 339 (2015)............................................................................19 Todd A. Murray, The Texas Courts’ Ongoing Struggle to Harmonize the Texas Business Organizations Code with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in Derivative Shareholder Litigation, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245 (2015) ........................................................................20 viii RECORD REFERENCES Citations to the record will be formatted as follows: (1) Clerk’s Record Vol. No. CR Page No. (2) Reporter’s Record from February 5, 2009 2RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing (3) Reporter’s Record from April 18, 2011 3RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing (4) Reporter’s Record from May 19, 2014 4RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing (5) Reporter’s Record from November 12, 2014 5RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing (6) Reporter’s Record from January 26, 2015 6RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing on Motions in Limine & Voir Dire (7) Reporter’s Record from January 26, 2015 7RR Page:Line Nos. (8) Reporter’s Record from January 27, 2015 8RR Page:Line Nos. (9) Reporter’s Record from January 28, 2015 9RR Page:Line Nos. (10) Reporter’s Record from January 29, 2015 10RR Page:Line Nos. (11) Reporter’s Record from January 30, 2015 11RR Page:Line Nos. (12) Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits 12RR, PX-Exhibit No. (13) Defendants’ Trial Exhibits 13RR, DX-Exhibit No. (14) Reporter’s Record from April 27, 2015 14RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing on Motion to Enter Judgment (15) Reporter’s Record from August 19, 2015 15RR Page:Line Nos. Hearing on Post-Judgment Motions ix STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the Case This dispute raises the issue of whether Herring Bancorp, Inc. (“Herring Bancorp”), as part of its conversion into a Subchapter “S” Corporation, properly redeemed the small number of Herring Bancorp preferred shares that John Mikkelsen (and his brother, Mallory) inherited. This dispute also raises questions about (1) whether minority oppression is a valid cause of action following the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014), and (2) whether C.C. Burgess, as an officer, director, and majority shareholder of Herring Bancorp, owed any fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen, as a minority shareholder. In 2011, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s motion for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, holding that the 2006 redemption of Mikkelsen’s shares was invalid. In light of that ruling, Defendants again redeemed Mikkelsen’s preferred shares in 2013 by giving him a tender (in the form of a cashier’s check) for more than he was owed under the Articles of Incorporation. In 2015, after a three-day jury trial, the trial court entered Final Judgment, which (1) held that Herring Bancorp breached its Articles of Incorporation in redeeming Mikkelsen’s preferred shares; (2) declared that the 2006 redemption and subsequent 2013 redemption were void as to Mikkelsen and that Mikkelsen remains a preferred shareholder of Herring Bancorp with the right to inspect its books and records; and (3) held that C.C. Burgess and C. Campbell Burgess (“Burgess Defendants”) engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen. The Final Judgment awarded Mikkelsen $23,112.00 in compensatory damages (representing the par value and unpaid dividends on his preferred shares from October 31, 2006 to December 31, 2014), $5,222.25 in prejudgment interest, $127,442.00 in attorneys’ fees through trial, conditional appellate attorneys’ fees, costs, and postjudgment interest. Ex. 1. Trial Court Honorable Dan Mike Bird, 46th Judicial District Court, Wilbarger County, Texas x Trial Court Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, signed Disposition on August 4, 2011 Final Judgment, signed on June 16, 2015 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to Disregard Jury Findings, and Conditional Motion for Judgment, denied by Order signed on August 19, 2015 Additional Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, denied by Order signed on August 19, 2015 Motion for New Trial, for Remittitur, and to Modify, Correct and/or Reform the Judgment, denied by Order signed on August 19, 2015 xi STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Defendants respectfully request that the Court hold oral argument. This appeal presents an important question about the effect of Ritchie v. Rupe on minority-oppression claims. It also presents novel questions about whether a preferred shareholder can hold his shares in perpetuity—based on the allegation that a prior redemption was ineffective as to him—even though the Articles of Incorporation permit the Corporation to purchase and/or redeem preferred shares at any time and even though a shareholder is only entitled to receive the par value of his shares plus any unpaid dividends. Defendants believe that oral argument will aid the Court in understanding these complex issues and the factual record. xii ISSUES PRESENTED 1. In 2014, the Texas Supreme Court held that no common-law cause of action for minority oppression exists under Texas law. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014). In light of Ritchie, did the trial court err by not granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the minority oppression claims, and alternatively, does legally and/or factually sufficient evidence support the jury’s findings on Mikkelsen’s minority-oppression claims? 2. Did the trial court err by concluding, as a matter of law, that the 2006 redemption violated the Articles of Incorporation as to Mikkelsen because it was not done “by lot, or pro rata” when undisputed evidence shows that all outstanding preferred shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006, meaning that the “by lot, or pro rata” language—which only applies to partial redemptions—is inapplicable? 3. Were Defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim relating to the 2006 redemption, or alternatively, did the trial court err in denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial on this claim? 4. Did the trial court err by holding, as a matter of law and/or fact, that the 2013 redemption and tender were invalid when (a) there is no dispute that the Mikkelsens were the only remaining shareholders in 2013 (assuming the 2006 redemption was invalid as to them), and (b) the tender more than covered any amounts due under the Articles of Incorporation? xiii 5. Were Defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their declaratory judgment claim relating to the 2013 redemption and tender, or alternatively, did the trial court err in failing to submit these issues for the jury to decide, thus warranting a new trial? 6. The jury found “$0.00” damages proximately caused by any breach of fiduciary duty and denied relief on Mikkelsen’s breach of fiduciary duty claims. Given that officers, directors, and majority shareholders of a corporation do not owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders under Texas law, did the trial court further err by not granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, and alternatively, does legally and/or factually sufficient evidence support the jury’s finding that C.C. Burgess breached his alleged fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen? 7. Can the fee awards be upheld on legal/factual sufficiency review where (a) the trial evidence showed that, to the extent Mikkelsen is entitled to any attorneys’ fees, they are limited to at most $39,545.87, (b) Mikkelsen failed to segregate his fees properly, and (c) the trial court did not ask the jury whether Defendants were entitled to attorneys’ fees based on their declaratory judgment claim? 8. Should this Court render a fee award in favor of Defendants based on their declaratory judgment claim because undisputed trial evidence showed that xiv Defendants incurred $5,500 in reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees pursuing that claim through trial plus $12,500 in conditional appellate fees? Alternatively, are Defendants entitled to a new trial on their request for attorneys’ fees? 9. Even though the trial focused on whether Herring Bancorp breached its Articles of Incorporation, the trial court instructed the jury that the 2006 redemption breached the Articles of Incorporation as a matter of law. Is this instruction an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence that further requires a new trial to the extent there are any remaining fact issues for the trial court to resolve? xv STATEMENT OF FACTS I. Mikkelsen’s Prior Involvement at Herring Bancorp. Herring National Bank became a chartered bank in 1903. 8RR 22:22-25. Mikkelsen became Chairman of Herring National Bank in 1982 and served in that position until 1997. 8RR 22:10-15. About ten years before Mikkelsen became Chairman, C.C. Burgess purchased stock in Herring National Bank and was elected to its Board shortly thereafter. 8RR 26:13-27:8. In 1984, Herring Bancorp, Inc. (“Herring Bancorp”), a bank holding company for Herring National Bank, was formed. 8RR 22:16-21. Mikkelsen served as Chairman of Herring Bancorp from its formation in 1984 until 1992. 8RR 27:21-24. In 1992, Herring Bancorp held a special shareholder meeting, and the Burgess Defendants were elected as directors, such that control of Herring Bancorp and Herring National Bank shifted away from Mikkelsen and in favor of the Burgess Defendants. See 8RR 33:7-22. Afterwards, Mikkelsen participated in a lawsuit against the Burgess Defendants. That lawsuit resulted in a settlement through which the Burgess Defendants purchased 10,000 Herring Bancorp shares from Mikkelsen and his family. 8RR 35:10-22. Mikkelsen then sold his remaining 280 Herring Bancorp shares in January 1998. 8RR 35:23-36:9. As of January 1998, Mikkelsen owned no shares in Herring Bancorp and “was completely out of the bank.” 8RR 36:10-37:3. 1 In 2005, Mikkelsen and his brother, Mallory, inherited a total of 300 Herring Bancorp preferred shares from their late mother. 8RR 46:9-47:5. Of those 300 shares, 150 shares were issued to the John Mikkelsen Trust and 150 shares were issued to Mallory Mikkelsen. 8RR 47:16-48:17; 12RR, PX-4; 12RR, PX-5.1 II. The 2006 Conversion and Redemption. The year after Mikkelsen inherited this small number of preferred shares from his late mother, Herring Bancorp decided to convert into a Subchapter “S” Corporation. See, e.g., 12RR, PX-34 at 3. As relevant here, a Subchapter “S” Corporation is different from a traditional corporation because a Subchapter “S” Corporation (1) can have only one class of stock, (2) cannot have more than 100 shareholders, and (3) avoids double taxation of dividends. See 8RR 56:7-24, 61:18-24; 9RR 29:24-30:5; 13RR, DX-10. Mikkelsen has never questioned the Herring Bancorp Board’s business judgment to convert into a Subchapter “S” Corporation, and testified during trial that being a Subchapter “S” Corporation offers a “better, more effective utilization of the income of the corporation.” 8RR 56:23-24. 1 In 2008, after the 2006 redemption, Mallory Mikkelsen purportedly assigned his 150 shares to the John Mikkelsen Trust. See 8RR 48:21-49:23; 12RR, PX-6. This purported assignment was not effective (or otherwise is irrelevant) for at least three reasons. First, this assignment was not effective because it was not done in accordance with Herring Bancorp’s Bylaws regarding the transfer or assignment of shares. See infra Section II.B.2. Second, given that the 2006 redemption was valid, these shares no longer were Mallory Mikkelsen’s to assign in 2008. Third, because the 2013 tender more than compensated both John and Mallory Mikkelsen for the value of their preferred shares, the tender was effective. See infra Section II.B.2. 2 Because Subchapter “S” Corporations are limited to 100 shareholders, the Herring Bancorp Board decided to implement neutral criteria to restrict which preferred shares could be converted into common stock so the number of shareholders would not exceed the maximum 100-shareholder cap. These criteria were implemented to ensure that Herring Bancorp would preserve its ability to attract new investment and shareholders in the future. See 9RR 29:10-30:5 (testifying that the purpose of these criteria was to ensure that, as the Bank grew, it would be able to attract new shareholders without sacrificing its Subchapter “S” status). The two neutral criteria selected by the Herring Bancorp Board were that the preferred shareholder: (1) had a banking relationship with Herring Bank; and (2) would own at least 50 shares of common stock in the Subchapter “S” Corporation after the conversion.2 Ex. 6 at 1. If preferred shareholders met these two criteria, they had the opportunity to exchange their preferred shares for common stock in the new Subchapter “S” Corporation. Id. If preferred shareholders did not satisfy these criteria, their shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006. Id. All preferred shareholders were given notice of these criteria and notice of both the conversion and redemption deadlines on October 31, 2006. Ex. 6; 13RR, DX-20. 2 The conversion ratio for converting preferred shares into common stock was approximately 7.8 to 1, meaning that a preferred shareholder was required to have about 390 preferred shares to be eligible to convert those shares into common stock. See 8RR 65:23-66:22. As noted, Mikkelsen only inherited 150 preferred shares, as did his brother. Mikkelsen and his brother thus did not satisfy the 50-share criterion for conversion. 3 Between the October 31, 2006 notice and the November 20, 2006 redemption, preferred shareholders that met the criteria and wanted to convert their preferred shares into common stock had to make that election. See 13RR, DX-20 at 3 (“If you elect to exchange your shares of Preferred Stock of the Company, please return an executed copy of the Stock Exchange Agreement as soon as possible, but no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 20, 2006.”) (emphasis omitted). No shareholder (other than Mikkelsen) complained about this process, and all preferred shares not exchanged for common stock (i.e., all outstanding preferred shares as of November 20, 2006) were redeemed on that date. Id. at 3-4. On November 20, 2006, Herring Bancorp redeemed Mikkelsen’s preferred shares by placing sufficient funds to cover the par value of his shares and any unpaid dividends in an escrow/deposit account in Mikkelsen’s name.3 13RR, DX-26 at 2. On July 30, 2007, Herring Bancorp’s status as a Subchapter “S” Corporation was accepted by the IRS. Ex. 7. III. The 2013 Redemption and Tender. Mikkelsen claimed that the 2006 redemption was invalid and that he continued to be a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp. See 13RR, DX-26 at 1. 3 This same procedure was followed for Mallory Mikkelsen and any other preferred shareholders who elected not to convert their preferred shares into common stock. 4 Specifically, Mikkelsen asserted that, even though Herring Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation allow the Corporation to redeem and/or repurchase preferred shares at any time, see Ex. 5, art. IV, XII, the redemption was invalid because it was not done “by lot, or pro rata,” Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Because only partial redemptions are subject to the “by lot, or pro rata” restriction, Mikkelsen’s argument necessarily (and incorrectly) assumes that the 2006 redemption was a partial redemption. Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Mikkelsen ignores that, on November 20, 2006, Herring Bancorp completed a “whole” redemption because it redeemed all outstanding preferred shares on that date. See supra Facts Section II. Ultimately, Mikkelsen filed this lawsuit in 2008, alleging a breach of contract claim, tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty, minority oppression, and conspiracy, and a demand to inspect Herring Bancorp’s books and records. 1CR5-13. In 2011, the trial court—apparently accepting Mikkelsen’s incorrect argument about the 2006 redemption being a “partial” redemption—granted Mikkelsen’s partial summary judgment motion, finding that the 2006 redemption as to Mikkelsen was invalid as a matter of law. Ex. 4. After that ruling, Defendants sought to remove any doubt about Mikkelsen’s purported ownership of Herring Bancorp’s preferred stock, especially considering that a Subchapter “S” Corporation can have only one type of outstanding stock. See 1CR344 (“The Herring Board’s decision to redeem the Preferred Stock in 2013 was 5 consistent with the Board’s decision in 2006 but also sought to correct any issues that led to this Court’s August 4, 2011 Order on partial summary judgment, and pay the Mikkelsens everything they could be owed.”). Accordingly, in 2013, Defendants sent the Mikkelsens a tender—in the form of a cashier’s check—for $115,548.24, an amount greater than the Mikkelsens were owed under Herring Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation. Compare Ex. 9 (unconditional tender included $28,500 for redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value), $21,070.48 in unpaid dividends, $15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees), with Ex. 5, art. IV (stating that a preferred shareholder is only entitled to the $95 par value per share plus dividends). Despite receiving a larger payment than he was entitled to under the Articles of Incorporation, Mikkelsen pressed forward with this lawsuit and never cashed the cashier’s check. See 8RR 137:4-5. And while Mikkelsen claimed that the 2006 redemption was invalid because it was a partial redemption that was not done “by lot, or pro rata,” Mikkelsen concedes that, when the 2013 redemption took place, the Mikkelsens were the only preferred shareholders of Herring Bancorp. See 8RR 151:2-5 (“So after the 2006 adventure that you and Herring Bank had, you and Mallory [Mikkelsen] were the only shareholders of preferred stock, right? A. Yes.”); see also infra Section II.B.1. The 2013 redemption thus was a “whole” redemption not subject to the “by lot, or pro rata” requirement, which means that—even 6 assuming that the 2006 redemption was invalid—the 2013 redemption complied with the Articles of Incorporation and redeemed Mikkelsen’s preferred shares such that he no longer is a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp. IV. Pre-Trial Proceedings/Partial Summary Judgment for Mikkelsen. As noted, Mikkelsen originally filed this action in 2008, claiming that the 2006 redemption breached his contractual rights under the Articles of Incorporation and constituted (1) a breach of the Burgess Defendants’ fiduciary duties, (2) minority oppression, and (3) a civil conspiracy. 1CR5-13. In March 2011, Mikkelsen moved for partial summary judgment as to whether the 2006 redemption was valid. 1CR58-103. Defendants responded to that motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on all of Mikkelsen’s claims. 1CR105-45. On August 4, 2011, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied Defendants’ cross-motion. Ex. 4. In deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found as a matter of law that the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen and that Mikkelsen continued to be a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp. 1CR307. In December 2013, after Herring Bancorp had undertaken the 2013 redemption and tendered to Mikkelsen more than he was owed under the Articles of Incorporation, see supra Facts Section III, Defendants filed their Original Counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2013 redemption was valid, 7 1CR389-92. Defendants also filed a second traditional motion for partial summary judgment on their newly asserted counterclaim, 1CR338-81, as well as a no-evidence summary judgment motion on causation and damages, 1CR382-85. The Court denied both of Defendants’ summary judgment motions on August 1, 2014. 1CR432-35. In September 2014, Defendants filed their third traditional motion for partial summary judgment. 2Supp.CR3-8. This motion was based largely on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie v. Rupe, and sought summary judgment on Mikkelsen’s minority oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy tort claims. The trial court denied that motion on December 23, 2014. 2CR148-49. Finally, less than two weeks before trial began in January 2015, Mikkelsen added a cross-declaratory judgment claim related to the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender. 2CR158. V. The Trial. The case was tried to a jury beginning on January 26, 2015. During three days of testimony, the jury heard argument and evidence about whether the 2006 and 2013 redemptions were valid. See, e.g., 8RR 151:15-22; 8RR 156:21-157:2; 10RR 37:1-25. Indeed, Mikkelsen’s counsel began his opening and closing statements by claiming that “this case is about the breach of a covenant” in the Articles of 8 Incorporation and by asserting that “the evidence” showed that a covenant had been breached. 7RR 16:12-14; 11RR 32:23-33:17. But when the jury received its instructions, instead of being asked to decide whether the redemptions were valid, the trial court: (1) instructed the jury that it “previously determined, as a matter of law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply with the Articles of Incorporation . . . when it purported to involuntarily redeem Mikkelsen’s preferred shares in 2006”; and (2) did not ask the jury to decide whether the 2013 redemption was valid. See Ex. 2. Thus, even though Mikkelsen’s attorney had previewed the case as being “about the breach of a covenant” and asserted that “the evidence” showed that such a breach occurred, the only question the jury was instructed to answer related to Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim was the amount of attorneys’ fees associated with that claim. Ex. 2 at 8-9. The only other questions the jury was instructed to answer related to Mikkelsen’s tort claims. See Ex. 2 at 10-30. Ultimately, the jury awarded Mikkelsen $23,314.80 in compensatory damages based on its findings that the Burgess Defendants engaged in oppressive conduct, and it awarded Mikkelsen $127,442.00 in attorneys’ fees through trial plus $50,000.00 in conditional appellate fees based on Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim that had been determined as a matter of law almost four years earlier. See Ex. 2 at 8-12. 9 VI. The Final Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings. After the jury verdict, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to Disregard Jury Findings, and Conditional Motion for Judgment. 2CR268-91. Mikkelsen then filed a Motion for Judgment, and the trial court heard argument on those motions on April 27, 2015. 2CR292-332. On May 14, 2015, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s Motion for Judgment in all respects, except that it slightly adjusted the damages award given that a portion of the calculated unpaid dividend amount was “not yet due.” 2CR333. The trial court entered Final Judgment on June 16, 2015. Ex. 1. On July 16, 2015, Defendants timely filed: (1) an Additional Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, see 2CR344-52, and (2) a Motion for New Trial, for Remittitur, and to Modify, Correct, and/or Reform the Judgment, see 2CR353-407. The Court denied these motions, as well as Defendants’ previously filed Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, by Orders signed on August 19, 2015 after hearing argument. Ex. 3. Defendants timely filed a Joint Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2015. 2CR411-61. Mikkelsen timely filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on September 17, 2015. See 2CR468-517. 10 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT This lawsuit is the most recent instance where Mikkelsen has attempted to use his purported shareholder status in Herring Bancorp to extract money and other concessions from the Burgess Defendants. Mikkelsen sold his interest in Herring Bancorp to the Burgess Defendants almost 20 years ago and only became involved with Herring Bancorp again by inheriting a handful of shares from his late mother. Through this lawsuit, Mikkelsen is attempting to use his purported shareholder status to call into question Herring Bancorp’s Subchapter “S” Corporation status and otherwise to disrupt the Burgess Defendants’ ability to run the Corporation efficiently. The Court should reject Mikkelsen’s thinly veiled efforts because Herring Bancorp validly redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares in 2006 (and again in 20134), and because Mikkelsen’s tort claims are based on invalid legal theories. Moreover, Mikkelsen’s claim that he is entitled to hold preferred shares in Herring Bancorp in perpetuity is wrong because Mikkelsen only is entitled to the par value of his preferred shares plus any unpaid dividends, which he already received both in 2006 and 2013. All of Mikkelsen’s tort claims should have been dismissed before trial as a matter of law, and the trial court misapprehended binding precedent in allowing 4 Out of an abundance of caution, Defendants redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares again in 2013 because the trial court held, incorrectly, that the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen as a matter of law. See supra Facts Section III. 11 Mikkelsen’s minority oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy claims to reach the jury. Texas does not recognize a common-law cause of action for minority oppression. Moreover, corporate officers/directors only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, and majority shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.5 The trial court should have dismissed these claims and, if it had done so, the only claims left for the jury would have been the cross-declaratory judgment claims regarding the 2013 redemption.6 See 1CR390; 2CR158. On the breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims, under Herring Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation, Herring Bancorp had the absolute right to redeem all of its preferred shares at any time, and it also had the absolute right to purchase its shares “without submitting such purchase to a vote of the shareholders of the Corporation.” Ex. 5, art. IV, XII. On two occasions—first in 2006 and then in 2013—Herring Bancorp redeemed all outstanding preferred shares, including Mikkelsen’s, and both of these redemptions complied with the Articles of Incorporation. The trial court held, however, that the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen and—while it denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the 5 The jury found that C.C. Burgess breached his alleged fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen, but awarded no damages. Ex. 2 at 17, 19-22. The Final Judgment addresses this claim only by denying Mikkelsen relief in the “Mother Hubbard” clause. Ex. 1. 6 If the substantive tort claims had been dismissed before trial, the derivative conspiracy claim necessarily would have been dismissed as well. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996). 12 validity of the 2013 redemption and tender—it refused to ask the jury about that redemption and tender. Ex. 10; 11RR 16:20-17:8. Rather, the trial court held, as a matter of law and/or fact, that the 2013 redemption and tender were also invalid. Ex. 1 at 2. The trial court should have determined that the 2006 redemption was valid, or alternatively, that the 2013 redemption was valid. At the very least, it should have submitted these questions to the jury. All of Mikkelsen’s claims should have been decided as a matter of law in Defendants’ favor. The 2006 redemption was valid, and all of Mikkelsen’s tort claims fail as a matter of law. Alternatively, to the extent the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen, the trial court should have held, as a matter of law, that the 2013 redemption and tender were valid and that they compensated Mikkelsen for all amounts owed under the Articles of Incorporation. While all of these claims should have been decided as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to follow binding precedent led to a confusing trial where evidence relating to Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim (which the trial court already had decided, albeit wrongly) was presented, giving the jury the false impression that it would decide that disputed issue. Then, in instructing the jury, the trial court committed reversible error by commenting on the weight of the evidence and telling the jury that it already had decided that Defendants breached Herring Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation in 13 2006. This improper instruction was prejudicial and also requires a new trial to the extent the Court does not render judgment in favor of Defendants. To the extent the Court does not reverse the trial court’s finding on the 2006 redemption, it must reverse the attorneys’ fee award and remand for a new trial on attorneys’ fees. If the Court reverses the trial court’s holding on the 2013 redemption and renders judgment for Defendants on that claim, the Court should also render judgment on Defendants’ claim for attorneys’ fees or at least grant a new trial on Defendants’ fee request. Finally, if the Final Judgment is reversed, the awards of interest and costs in favor of Mikkelsen should be reversed as well. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Texas appellate courts review questions of law de novo, “exercis[ing] [their] own judgment and redetermin[ing] each issue,” while affording the lower courts’ decisions “absolutely no deference.” Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998). When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court independently evaluates the trial court’s conclusions of law to determine whether the trial court drew the correct legal conclusions from the facts. See Arcadia Fin., Ltd. v. Sw.-Tex. Leasing Co., 78 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied); see also Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999). 14 Appellate courts must sustain legal sufficiency challenges when the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) that rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) that the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). For factual sufficiency challenges, appellate courts must examine, consider, and weigh all of the evidence that supports or contradicts the jury’s determinations, and set aside the verdict if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). An award of attorneys’ fees generally is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while the amount of such an award also is reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex. 1998); Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 353 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles.”) (citations omitted). The need to segregate fees is a question of law, while the extent to which certain claims can or cannot be segregated is a mixed question of law and 15 fact. See Bair Chase Prop. Co., LLC v. S&K Dev. Co., Inc., 260 S.W.3d 133, 128 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). Complaints of jury charge error are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); see BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 466 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. filed). A jury charge error warrants reversal when the improper instruction probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Indian Beach Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44(a)(1). ARGUMENT I. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Minority-Oppression Claims. Clear error underlies the trial court’s Final Judgment in favor of Mikkelsen on the minority-oppression claims. Minority oppression does not exist as a common-law cause of action in Texas, and the Texas Supreme Court recently clarified that this cause of action never existed. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014). Instead of submitting questions on minority oppression to the jury and entering judgment for Mikkelsen on its findings, the trial court was required to dismiss these claims as a matter of law. 16 A. Ritchie v. Rupe Held That Minority Oppression Is Not a Viable Cause of Action Under Texas Law. For decades, Texas intermediate appellate courts recognized a common-law cause of action known as minority shareholder oppression. See, e.g., Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), overruled by Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d 856. The Texas Supreme Court, however, never recognized that common-law cause of action and, more than a year ago, it explicitly held that no such cause of action exists in Texas. See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 860 (“Moving beyond the statutory claims, we decline to recognize or create a Texas common-law cause of action for ‘minority shareholder oppression.’”); see id. at 877-91 (outlining the Court’s reasoning and concluding that “[w]e . . . therefore decline to recognize a common-law cause of action for ‘shareholder oppression’”); id. at 904-05 (Guzman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court acknowledges that its . . . failure to impose a common-law remedy for oppression leaves a ‘gap’ in the protection that the law affords to individual minority shareholders when the harm to the minority shareholders does not harm the corporation.” (citation omitted)). The Texas Supreme Court also has made clear that Ritchie applies retroactively to minority-oppression claims pleaded or decided prior to Ritchie. See, e.g., Cardiac Perfusion Servs., Inc. v. Hughes, 436 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. 2014) (applying Ritchie’s holding to a minority-oppression claim decided before Ritchie was decided). 17 B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Relevant Holding in Ritchie v. Rupe Was Dicta. Defendants brought the Ritchie decision to the trial court’s attention and filed a summary judgment motion asserting that Ritchie was “fatal” to Mikkelsen’s minority-oppression claim and other tort claims. See 2Supp.CR3. In response to that motion, Mikkelsen argued that one of Ritchie’s holdings—i.e., that Texas did not recognize a common-law cause of action for minority oppression—was dicta. 2CR118-20 (asserting that “[t]he discussion in Ritchie of common law oppression claims is dictum and not binding”); see also 5RR 36:18-19 (“On the oppression issue this Ritchie case is not binding on anybody because it is dicta.”). The trial court—despite the unmistakable language in Ritchie, see supra Section I.A.—allowed the minority-oppression claims against the Burgess Defendants to go to the jury. See Ex. 2 at 10-16. The trial court’s decision was error. It cannot be squared with the plain language in Ritchie, and it runs counter to every single Texas appellate court that has considered the vitality of common-law minority-oppression claims since Ritchie. See, e.g., Cardiac Perfusion Servs., 436 S.W.3d at 792 (“In Ritchie, we clarified that a claim for shareholder oppression is only available under section 11.404 of the Texas Business Organizations Code, and that the only remedy available under that statute is a rehabilitative receivership.”); Tex. Ear Nose & Throat Consultants, PLLC v. Jones, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 3918130, at *16 (Tex. 18 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.) (noting that Ritchie was a “sea change” and that, “[i]n Ritchie, the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no common law cause of action for shareholder oppression”); White Point Minerals, Inc. v. Swantner, 464 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.) (noting that Ritchie “held that Texas does not recognize a common law action for minority shareholder oppression”); Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on Feb. 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) (Ex. 11 at 25-26) (holding that, “[i]n Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court . . . held that there is no common law cause of action for minority oppression in Texas,” and rendering judgment in favor of defendants on the minority-oppression claim). In addition to these state-law authorities, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, has concluded that Ritchie’s statements on common-law minority-oppression claims were binding and more than mere dicta. See In re Mandel, 578 F. App’x 376, 387 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Texas held that there is no common law cause of action for shareholder oppression.”) (emphasis added).7 7 In addition to this undisputed appellate authority, Mikkelsen’s argument that the relevant language in Ritchie is nothing more than dicta is contradicted by scholars and commentators. See, e.g., Lyndon Bittle & Kelli Hinson, Texas Turns a Corner: Resolving Shareholder Disputes in Closely Held Businesses After Ritchie v. Rupe, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 383 (2015) (“Based on [the Supreme Court’s] consideration of [factors], [it] determined it would not ‘recognize a common-law cause of action for ‘shareholder oppression.’’”) (quoting Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 891); Todd A. Murray, The Texas Courts’ Ongoing Struggle to Harmonize the Texas Business Organizations Code with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in Derivative Shareholder Litigation, 19 Defendants are not aware of any case law that either supports Mikkelsen’s reading of Ritchie or stands for the proposition that a common-law claim for minority oppression remains viable in Texas. The Final Judgment must be reversed insofar as it holds the Burgess Defendants liable based on a cause of action that does not exist, and judgment must be rendered in favor of the Burgess Defendants on the minority-oppression claims. C. Alternatively, the Evidence at Trial Was Not Legally or Factually Sufficient to Constitute Minority Oppression. Because common-law minority oppression is not a valid cause of action in Texas, Defendants only briefly address why the alleged evidence of minority oppression at trial was not legally or factually sufficient to sustain the jury’s findings even under the now-defunct test for minority oppression. Under the trial court’s instructions on minority oppression, Mikkelsen was required to show that the majority member’s conduct constituted: burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair dealing in the company’s affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely. 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 261 (2015) (noting that Ritchie “foreclosed” a common-law remedy for shareholder oppression). Even commentators who disagree with Ritchie acknowledge that, in that case, the Texas Supreme Court held that no common-law cause of action for minority oppression exists under Texas law. James Dawson, Ritchie v. Rupe and the Future of Shareholder Oppression, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 89, 90, 92 (2014) (stating that Ritchie “gutted the cause of action for shareholder oppression in Texas” and that, “[u]nder Ritchie, majority shareholders are not liable for oppression unless their conduct is irrational and harmful to the corporation”). 20 Ex. 2 at 10-11; see also Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381-82. Mikkelsen failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy this “definition” of minority oppression. The Herring Bancorp Board’s decision to institute two neutral criteria for determining which preferred shares could be converted into common stock did not constitute “burdensome,” “harsh,” or “wrongful” conduct. In fact, the evidence at trial demonstrated that this decision was based on the Herring Bancorp Board’s business judgment and was made to ensure that Herring Bancorp would remain a Subchapter “S” Corporation. See 9RR 29:10-30:5 (testifying that the purpose of implementing the two criteria was to ensure that, as the Bank grew, it would be able to attract new shareholders without sacrificing its Subchapter “S” status). Such conduct does not constitute minority oppression, especially considering that both the 2006 and 2013 redemptions complied with the Articles of Incorporation. See infra Sections II.A.-B.; Guerra v. Guerra, No. 04-10-00271-CV, 2011 WL 3715051, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (noting that conduct is not wrongful when the defendant has followed corporate procedure and exercised business judgment); see also Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex. 1996) (“Whatever a man has a legal right to do, he may do with impunity, regardless of motive, and if in exercising his legal right in a legal way damage results to another, no cause of action arises against him because of a bad motive in exercising the right.”) (citation omitted). 21 Further, there was no legally or factually sufficient evidence of damages “that proximately resulted” from any minority oppression. Ex. 2 at 12. As explained below, see infra Sections II.C.-D., Mikkelsen has received everything that he was entitled to under the Articles of Incorporation, and thus any alleged minority oppression did not harm him. In sum, common-law minority oppression is not a valid cause of action in Texas but, even if it were, Mikkelsen failed to present legally or factually sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding of minority oppression by either of the Burgess Defendants here. The Final Judgment should be reversed and judgment should be rendered in favor of Defendants on Mikkelsen’s minority-oppression claims. Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds that a fact issue prevents the rendition of judgment in Defendants’ favor, a new trial is warranted on the minority oppression claims. II. Mikkelsen Cannot Recover on His Breach of Contract Claim or on His Declaratory Judgment Claim, and Defendants Should Prevail on Their Declaratory Judgment Claim. A. The 2006 Redemption Was Valid. Mikkelsen does not contest that Herring Bancorp had the right to redeem his preferred shares; he only attacks the procedure Herring Bancorp used. According to Mikkelsen, the 2006 redemption was invalid because only some of the preferred shares were redeemed, and thus, under the Articles of Incorporation, that redemption 22 had to be done “by lot, or pro rata.” Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Mikkelsen, like the trial court, misunderstands the structure of the 2006 redemption. Under the Articles of Incorporation, there is no restriction on Herring Bancorp’s ability to redeem all outstanding preferred shares, except that it must pay preferred shareholders the par value and accrued dividends associated with their preferred shares. Ex. 5, art. IV. The record shows that Mikkelsen’s (and his brother’s) preferred shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006, and that this redemption covered all outstanding preferred shares. See 9RR 214:10-20 (“[A]s of 5:01 p.m. [on November 20, 2006], John Mikkelsen and Mallory Mikkelsen, they were the only ones that had preferred stock because all the others had elected to convert. A. Yes.”). All other preferred shares had been converted into common stock in the new Subchapter “S” Corporation prior to the redemption. Mikkelsen cannot cite a provision in the Articles of Incorporation restricting Herring Bancorp’s ability to convert preferred shares into common stock and, because the 2006 redemption involved “the whole . . . of the preferred shares outstanding,” that redemption was not required to be done “by lot, or pro rata.” Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Despite the fact that Herring Bancorp followed the Articles of Incorporation in conducting the 2006 redemption, Mikkelsen convinced the trial court that all of the preferred shares were not redeemed because the 2006 conversion of preferred 23 shares into common stock constituted a partial redemption. Mikkelsen’s argument is wrong. There is no provision in the Articles of Incorporation addressing the conversion of preferred shares, restricting Herring Bancorp’s ability to convert some or all of its shares, or outlining the criteria that must be used in making such a conversion. In fact, the provision most closely related to converting shares is Article XII, which allows Herring Bancorp “to purchase, directly or indirectly, its own shares . . . without submitting such purchase to a vote of the shareholders of the Corporation.” Ex. 5, art. XII (emphasis added). The language in Article XII suggests no restriction on Herring Bancorp’s ability to “indirectly” purchase its own stock,8 and Mikkelsen cannot point to any such restriction. Once the other shares were converted, Herring Bancorp redeemed all outstanding shares in accordance with Article IV. Mikkelsen’s argument boils down to the insupportable assertion that he was entitled to convert his preferred shares into common stock. See 8RR 163:16-23 (“Q. Okay. So, you’re not complaining about what happened to anybody else [during the 2006 redemption], are you? A. No. Q. Only what happened to yours and Mallory’s? A. Yes. Q. And the only complaint is that you wanted common stock. A. Yes.”). But, 8 Mikkelsen’s attempt to treat the conversion as a redemption is misguided. See Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a conversion of shares as part of a corporate restructuring is legally distinct from a redemption). 24 as noted, the Articles of Incorporation gave Mikkelsen no such right. Accordingly, the Herring Bancorp Board was permitted to allow preferred shareholders that met certain criteria to convert their preferred shares into common stock in the new Subchapter “S” Corporation, while not providing that right to every preferred shareholder. In fact, the Articles of Incorporation explicitly provide that Mikkelsen, as a preferred shareholder, has no preferential right to purchase stock. See Ex. 5, art. V. Mikkelsen thus fails to show how the Board’s actions breached the Articles of Incorporation.9 Because Herring Bancorp redeemed every outstanding preferred share on November 20, 2006, the 2006 redemption complied with the Articles of Incorporation. There is no restriction on Herring Bancorp’s ability to convert its preferred shares, and it is permitted to purchase those shares (directly or indirectly) at any time and for any reason. Mikkelsen’s attempt to turn a conversion of shares into a redemption of shares is without merit. The Final Judgment should be reversed on this issue, and this Court should render judgment in favor of Defendants. Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds that a fact issue prevents the rendition of 9 Mikkelsen’s argument about the 2006 redemption also elevates form over substance. Herring Bancorp could have redeemed all of its preferred shares before any conversion, and then allowed certain former preferred shareholders to purchase common stock in the new Subchapter “S” Corporation. If Herring Bancorp had proceeded in that manner, Mikkelsen’s contract claim would be baseless. While Herring Bancorp ultimately chose to convert certain preferred shareholders before the November 2006 redemption simply “to save time,” the record is clear that Herring Bancorp “just as easily [could have] paid everybody out and then had them buy the [common] stock, had they wanted to . . . .” 9RR 215:5-12. 25 judgment in Defendants’ favor, a new trial is warranted so a jury can decide whether Defendants’ actions complied with the Articles of Incorporation. B. Defendants Are Entitled to Prevail on Their Declaratory Judgment Claim Because the 2013 Redemption and Tender Were Valid. The 2006 redemption was valid and complied with the Articles of Incorporation. See supra Section II.A. But, to the extent the Court disagrees, it should hold that the 2013 redemption and tender were valid, that Defendants prevail on their declaratory judgment claim, and that Mikkelsen is not entitled to any additional damages or attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion on their declaratory judgment claim about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender, 1CR434-35, and denied Defendants’ motions for directed verdict on that claim, 10RR 76:12-77:22, 85:8-10; 239:3-240:18, 245:19:24. The trial court appears to have granted a directed verdict in favor of Mikkelsen on this claim, 11RR 16:20-17:8; 2CR294, but the record reveals no motion or request by Mikkelsen for any such relief and no order or ruling during trial granting any such ruling. The trial court also denied Defendants’ relevant post-judgment motions on this claim. Ex. 3. In any event, the trial court took this issue away from the jury, and refused to include Defendants’ requested instructions and questions on this claim in the jury charge. This error warrants a new trial should the Court not render judgment in favor of Defendants about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender. 26 1. The 2013 Redemption Was Valid. Mikkelsen made several admissions at trial that demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of the 2013 redemption:  Mikkelsen admitted that he and his brother were the only preferred shareholders in Herring Bancorp when the (alternative) 2013 redemption took place. See 8RR 151:2-5 (“So after the 2006 adventure that you and Herring Bank had, you and Mallory [Mikkelsen] were the only shareholders of preferred stock, right? A. Yes.”).10  Mikkelsen admitted that Herring Bancorp had the right to redeem his shares in November 2013 if he was the only shareholder (or if he and his brother were shareholders and they both were redeemed). See 8RR 171:2-4 (“Q. If you were the only shareholder, [Herring Bancorp] had the right to redeem you, correct? A. If I was the only shareholder.”).  Mikkelsen admitted that he is entitled to receive only money for his preferred shares under the Articles of Incorporation. See 8RR 171:9-12. In addition to these admissions, there is no dispute that Mikkelsen was given proper notice of the 2013 redemption. Ex. 8. And there is no dispute that the 2013 tender that accompanied the redemption more than covered the amounts owed to 10 After testifying to this point, Mikkelsen attempted to walk back his admission based on his argument that the conversion of other preferred shareholders was somehow ineffective. 8RR 27 Mikkelsen under the Articles of Incorporation. See Ex. 9 (unconditional tender included $28,500 for redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value), $21,070.48 in unpaid dividends, $15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees). So, even if the 2006 redemption was invalid, the 2013 redemption and tender made Mikkelsen whole. See infra Section IV (demonstrating that maximum amount of recoverable attorneys’ fees is less than $40,000, and thus less than the amount provided for in the 2013 tender). In attempting to convince the trial court that the 2013 redemption was invalid, Mikkelsen made erroneous arguments that this Court should reject. First, Mikkelsen argued at the hearing on Defendants’ post-judgment motions that “[w]e still have serious questions about . . . whether the Mikkelsens were the only preferred shareholders” in 2013. 15RR 14:23-25. That conclusory assertion is contradicted by the record and Mikkelsen’s own testimony at trial. See 8RR 151:2-5. Moreover, while Mikkelsen may be attempting to call into question whether the other preferred shareholders were properly converted in 2006 before the redemption, he has no standing to make such a claim and cannot undermine the validity of the conversion, especially considering he was not eligible to convert his shares and he was not a third-party beneficiary to the conversion offer. See S. Tex. Water Auth. v. 152:13-153:2. Mikkelsen lacks standing to make such an assertion, and the trial court never invalidated the 2006 conversion. See infra Section II.B.1. 28 Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007) (noting that courts presume that a noncontracting third party has no justiciable interest in a contract); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 1999) (noting presumption against conferring third-party-beneficiary status on noncontracting parties). In any event, there was no evidence at trial that any other preferred shareholder complained about the 2006 conversion or redemption, or challenged the validity of either. 8RR 159:24-163:15. In fact, Mikkelsen conceded at trial that he is “not complaining about what happened to anybody else” during 2006 and affirmed that his only complaint is that he should have been given the option to obtain common stock. 8RR 163:16-23; see also supra Section II.A. (explaining that Mikkelsen had no right to convert his shares under the Articles of Incorporation). Second, Mikkelsen’s suggestion that the 2006 conversion and redemption somehow prevent the 2013 redemption from being valid is wrong. 15RR 14:19-23 (asserting that the 2013 redemption “was really sort of an extension of the invalid 2006 redemption”). As an initial matter, the trial court never called into question the validity of the 2006 conversion or redemption as regards other shareholders (or otherwise, set those transactions aside), meaning that any alleged invalidity of the 2006 conversion or redemption does not prevent the 2013 redemption from being valid. Moreover, Mikkelsen cannot point to any authority to support the proposition that an invalid redemption of stock taints a subsequent redemption such that the 29 stock never can be redeemed. In fact, the case cited time and again by Mikkelsen at trial—Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), overruled by Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d 856, stands for the opposite proposition and confirms that the validity of a subsequent redemption does not depend on whether a prior redemption was effective. Id. at 704 (considering the validity of a subsequent redemption independently from the validity of a prior redemption, and holding that the second redemption was void only because the purported shareholder did not receive proper notice). Because (1) all former preferred shareholders (other than the Mikkelsens) were converted or redeemed in 2006, (2) those conversions and redemptions (except as to Mikkelsen) never were invalidated by the trial court, and (3) Mikkelsen lacks standing to challenge them, the 2013 redemption necessarily is separate from the 2006 redemption, and Mikkelsen cannot use any alleged invalidity related to the 2006 redemption to undermine the 2013 redemption. The 2013 redemption was valid and complied with the Articles of Incorporation. The trial court erred in deciding to the contrary as a matter of law and/or fact. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s findings are not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. 2. The 2013 Tender Is Valid. Mikkelsen claims that the 2013 tender is invalid or otherwise not sufficient, but his arguments are belied by the record. The 2013 tender was for $115,548.24, 30 which more than covered the value of Mikkelsen’s preferred shares, unpaid dividends, interest, and attorneys’ fees related to the breach of contract claim. The trial court erred to the extent it held, as a matter of law and/or fact, that the 2013 tender was invalid, and its findings are not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. At the very least, there are fact issues related to the tender that a jury should decide.11 Mikkelsen asserts that the 2013 tender cannot be effective because Herring Bancorp sent Mikkelsen a cashier’s check instead of depositing funds in an escrow/deposit account. See 15RR 15:1-17. This formalistic argument about the mechanics of payment, however, does not call into question the validity of the tender. See 1CR437. The Articles of Incorporation do not require Herring Bancorp to redeem preferred shares by depositing funds in an escrow/deposit account; the Articles of Incorporation only specify that depositing funds in an escrow/deposit account is an acceptable method of effectuating a redemption. Ex. 5, art. IV(d). The Articles also state that shares can be redeemed “by paying in cash,” which is the equivalent of a cashier’s check. Id., art. IV(c); see Dilling v. Nationsbank, N.A., 897 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1996) (calling a cashier’s check “a cash equivalent”); Ex parte Ellis, 279 11 As noted, even though the trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue, it refused to instruct and to ask the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender. See supra Facts Section V; see also 11RR 14:9-17:12; Ex. 10. 31 S.W.3d 1, 25 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008), aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (same). As these provisions suggest, the key language in the Articles of Incorporation is that the transfer of funds/payment associated with a redemption be “irrevocable” and “available” to the preferred shareholder on the redemption date. Ex. 5, art. IV(c)-(d). The 2013 tender (in the form of a cashier’s check) met those criteria, and thus was an effective mechanism of payment. See Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (noting that a tender is an unconditional offer); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). Mikkelsen also incorrectly claims that the tender is invalid because the cashier’s check is payable to both Mikkelsen and his brother, Mallory, even though Mallory Mikkelsen purportedly assigned his shares to John Mikkelsen in 2008. See 15RR 15:2-10. As an initial matter, Mikkelsen is wrong that the purported assignment of Mallory Mikkelsen’s shares was effective as to Herring Bancorp. The tender correctly listed both John Mikkelsen and Mallory Mikkelsen because that was how the shares were listed on Herring Bancorp’s books. See 4RR 37:3-7; 10RR 158:18-22 (Jack Hall, Herring Bank’s CFO, testifying that John and Mallory Mikkelsen were both shareholders of record in 2013, assuming the 2006 redemption was invalid). Under Herring Bancorp’s Bylaws, “[s]hares of stock of the 32 Corporation shall be transferable only on the books of the Corporation by the shareholders thereof . . . . Upon surrender to the Corporation . . . of a certificate representing shares duly endorsed or accompanied by proper evidence of succession, assignment, or authority to transfer, the Corporation . . . shall issue a new certificate to the person entitled thereto, cancel the old certificate, and record the transaction upon its books.” 12RR, PX-3, § 7.05 (emphasis added). Mikkelsen never properly presented the purported assignment to Herring Bancorp, never surrendered any stock certificates to Herring Bancorp, and never received any new stock certificates from Herring Bancorp.12 Thus—assuming that Mikkelsen and his brother remained shareholders after 2006—the purported assignment was not effective, and the old certificates remained valid under the Articles of Incorporation. Herring Bancorp was required to make the tender based on its books and records, meaning that the tender was effective regardless of any purported assignment. In any event, Mikkelsen has never argued (and has put forward no evidence to suggest) that his brother is unwilling to sign the cashier’s check, or that Mikkelsen is prevented in any way from negotiating the tender. Finally, to the extent that Mikkelsen argues that the tender amount is insufficient, that argument is wrong. There never has been a dispute about the 12 Nothing in the Bylaws suggests that producing a purported certificate of assignment in litigation is sufficient to comply with Section 7.05. 33 amount paid for the shares or the amount of unpaid dividends, which means that the 2013 tender was sufficient to redeem Mikkelsen’s shares. See 12RR, PX-16 (showing Mikkelsen’s calculations). 13 Accordingly, the only contested issue is whether the tender covers any remaining amounts owed to Mikkelsen.14 The only other possible amounts owing to Mikkelsen are attorneys’ fees, interest amounts, and damages. The tender more than covers these amounts, assuming the Court finds the 2006 redemption invalid. First, Mikkelsen only incurred about $40,000 in attorneys’ fees related to his breach of contract claim, see infra Section IV.B., which is $10,000 less than the amount for attorneys’ fees provided in the 2013 tender. See Ex. 9 at 2.15 Second, Mikkelsen has put forward no evidence showing that the interest calculation in the 2013 tender is less than what is owed, and the tender includes $10,000 more in interest than the amount of prejudgment interest in the Final Judgment. See Ex. 1 at 2; Ex. 9 at 2. Third, the only damages that Mikkelsen was awarded in the Final Judgment “represent[] preferred dividends,” which the 2013 tender covered. See Ex. 1 at 2; see also Ex. 9. Mikkelsen 13 Because Mikkelsen only was entitled to the par value of his shares and any unpaid dividends under the Articles of Incorporation, because those amounts are not in dispute, and because the tender covered those amounts, Mikkelsen has received all amounts necessary to redeem his shares. 14 If the 2013 redemption and tender are effective, Mikkelsen is not entitled to any dividends after the date of the 2013 redemption. See infra note 16. 15 If the Court finds that the 2006 redemption was valid, Mikkelsen is not entitled to any attorneys’ fees because he will not have prevailed on his breach of contract claim, see infra Section IV.A., and the Court will not need to decide whether the 2013 redemption and tender are valid. 34 has not disputed Defendants’ dividend calculation in the 2013 tender, and the tender even covers the extra $2,041.52 awarded for unpaid dividends in the Final Judgment16 because the tender included more than $10,000 in excess attorneys’ fees and an excess amount of interest. See infra Section IV.B.; compare Ex. 1 at 2 (awarding $23,112.00 in damages based on unpaid dividends and $5,222.25 in prejudgment interest), with Ex. 9 at 1 (tender includes $21,070.48 in unpaid dividends and $15,997.26 in interest). While Mikkelsen appears to have resisted accepting the 2013 tender because it did not include all damage amounts he originally sought, 8RR 137:6-9, the jury was not asked to award and did not award any actual damages above the amounts of unpaid dividends, see Ex. 2 at 12-30. Moreover, the jury failed to find “malice” and did not award any punitive damages. Ex. 2 at 13-16, 20-23, 27-30. And, for the reasons stated in Sections I and III, Mikkelsen’s tort claims fail as a matter of law. Thus, the tender covers all damages owed to Mikkelsen. For these reasons, the tender is effective both to redeem Mikkelsen’s shares and to cover all amounts he is owed. This Court should reverse the trial court’s finding that the 2013 redemption was invalid, hold that the 2013 tender redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares and sufficiently covered all amounts owed to Mikkelsen, and 16 The unpaid dividend amount in the Final Judgment is slightly higher than in the tender because more dividends accrued between November 2013 and June 2015. 35 render judgment in favor of Defendants. Alternatively, there is, at the very least, a fact issue related to whether the amount of the tender is sufficient, requiring a new trial on the declaratory judgment claims. See Ex. 10. 3. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Refusing to Instruct and Ask the Jury About the 2013 Redemption and Tender. As noted, the trial court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion, motions for directed verdict, and post-judgment motions related to the 2013 redemption and tender. See supra Section II.B. While the record shows no motion or request from Mikkelsen that the trial court issue a directed verdict in his favor about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender, the trial court appears to have issued such a ruling, 11RR 16:20-17:8; 2CR294, and refused to let the jury decide these issues, Ex. 10. To the extent a fact issue prevents this Court from rendering judgment in Defendants’ favor, it should conclude that the trial court’s findings are not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence, as argued supra in Sections II.B.1.-2., and that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not submitting instructions and questions to the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender. Defendants’ requested questions and instructions were substantially correct. See supra Section II.B.2; Ex. 10. The trial court’s failure to ask the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender is reversible error because it prevented the jury from rendering a proper verdict and because it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. 36 Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. 2000); Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). C. Regardless of the Validity of the Two Redemptions, Mikkelsen Cannot Show Any Damages Resulting from Defendants’ Actions. Mikkelsen has received payment for all he is owed for any breach of the Articles of Incorporation. See supra Sections II.A.-B. In 2006, Herring Bancorp deposited in escrow the par value of Mikkelsen’s preferred shares plus any unpaid dividends. 13RR, DX-26 at 2; 13RR, DX-32. In 2013, Herring Bancorp sent Mikkelsen a tender, in the form of a cashier’s check (No. 120987), for $115,548.24, which included $28,500 for redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value), $21,070.48 in unpaid dividends, $15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees. See Ex. 9. If the 2006 redemption is valid, then Mikkelsen is entitled to the amount in escrow; if the 2006 redemption is invalid, then Mikkelsen is entitled to the tender amount paid in 2013. Either way, Mikkelsen has received payment for the value of his preferred shares and any unpaid dividends, which means that he no longer is a shareholder of Herring Bancorp. Ex. 5, art. IV(c)-(d). And, as explained, the tender also included amounts for interest and attorneys’ fees which, to the extent those amounts are required, more than cover what Mikkelsen is owed. See supra Section II.B.2.; see infra Section IV.B. Mikkelsen thus cannot show any damages to support his breach of contract claim. 37 D. Even Assuming a Breach, Mikkelsen Is Not Entitled to Remain a Shareholder in Perpetuity; He Only Is Entitled to the Par Value of His Preferred Shares Plus Unpaid Dividends. Mikkelsen has asserted that, because he considers the 2006 redemption invalid, Herring Bancorp is incapable of redeeming his preferred shares, and he can hold those shares and exercise his alleged rights to inspect the corporate books and records in perpetuity. That argument finds no support in the Articles of Incorporation or in Texas law. Regardless of the validity of the 2006 redemption, Herring Bancorp has the right to redeem and/or repurchase Mikkelsen’s shares at any time, and Mikkelsen only is entitled to the value of his shares plus any unpaid dividends. Specifically, Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation allows Herring Bancorp to redeem all preferred shareholders at any time, and Article XII allows Herring Bancorp to “purchase, directly or indirectly, its own shares” at any time and without submitting that decision to a shareholder vote. Ex. 5, art. IV, XII. Herring Bancorp redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares twice (in 2006 and 2013). The trial court erroneously held that the 2006 redemption was invalid, and Mikkelsen convinced the trial court to deny summary judgment on the 2013 redemption and to take this issue away from the jury based on the incorrect assertion that the 2013 redemption was improper simply because Mikkelsen did not “think the [2006] redemption was proper.” 4RR 36:4-19. Mikkelsen already has received what he was 38 owed under the Articles of Incorporation—both in 2006 through the amount deposited in escrow and in 2013 through the tender. See supra Section II.C. Accordingly, even if the Court determines that Herring Bancorp breached the Articles of Incorporation, it must reverse the Final Judgment insofar as it declared that Mikkelsen remains a preferred shareholder with the right to inspect Herring Bancorp’s books and records. At a minimum, and to the extent the redemptions and tender were invalid, this Court should reverse and remand the action for the trial court to determine the proper amount that Herring Bancorp must pay Mikkelsen to redeem his shares. III. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against C.C. Burgess for an Additional Reason Than the One Found by the Jury. The jury found that only C.C. Burgess breached fiduciary duties he allegedly owed to Mikkelsen but awarded no damages based on that finding. Ex. 2 at 17-23. The jury’s breach of fiduciary duty finding was not specifically incorporated into the Final Judgment, which denied all relief “not expressly herein granted.” Ex. 1 at 3. The trial court correctly did not award relief on the jury’s breach of fiduciary duty finding in the Final Judgment because no damages were awarded on that claim. Additionally, there should have been no liability finding as to C.C. Burgess because (1) directors, officers, and majority shareholders of a corporation do not owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as a matter of law, and (2) the evidence at 39 trial was not legally or factually sufficient to show that C.C. Burgess violated any alleged fiduciary duty to Mikkelsen. Defendants address why the jury’s finding that C.C. Burgess breached his fiduciary duties is wrong as a matter of law and fact only out of an abundance of caution. A. C.C. Burgess Owes No Fiduciary Duties to Mikkelsen Under Texas Law. Texas law is clear that officers and directors do not owe formal fiduciary duties to individual shareholders—including minority shareholders; the only fiduciary duties they owe are to the corporation as a whole. See, e.g., Somers ex rel. EGL, Inc. v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“A director’s fiduciary duty runs only to the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders.” (citation omitted)); Grinnell v. Munson, 137 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied). Texas law also is clear that shareholders in closely held corporations do not owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders, even where the relevant relationship is between a majority and minority shareholder. See Opperman v. Opperman, No. 07-12-00033-CV, 2013 WL 6529228, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 9, 2013, no pet.); Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). Thus, under well-established Texas law, C.C. Burgess owed no formal fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen. 40 While courts have, on occasion, held that an informal fiduciary relationship can arise from “a moral, social, domestic or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence,” Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex. 1998), such relationships are not inferred or created “lightly,” Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Tex. 1997); see also Jones v. Thompson, 338 S.W.3d 573, 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (“Texas courts are reluctant to recognize informal fiduciary relationships.”). Indeed, “[t]o impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business transaction, the special relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and apart from, the agreement [underlying] the suit.” Associated Indemnity Corp., 964 S.W.2d at 288. Here, Mikkelsen has not pleaded, let alone shown, the existence of any special relationship with C.C. Burgess that would create an informal fiduciary relationship between the two of them. See 2CR153-61. And there is no evidence in the trial record to support the existence of such a relationship. Despite these precedents, the trial court erred and instructed the jury that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as a matter of law. Ex. 2 at 17-18; see also 11RR 20:1-22:9 (objecting to instructions regarding fiduciary duties). This instruction was erroneous under the authorities cited above. The jury’s “$0.00” damage finding justified the trial court’s denial of the relief Mikkelsen requested on his breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because C.C. Burgess 41 owed no fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen as a matter of law, the Court should render judgment in favor of Defendants on the breach of fiduciary duty claim for this additional reason. Certainly, the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction and question prevents the rendition of judgment against C.C. Burgess on this claim, as does the insufficiency of the evidence discussed below. B. Alternatively, the Evidence Was Not Legally or Factually Sufficient to Show That C.C. Burgess Violated Any Purported Fiduciary Duties. Even if C.C. Burgess somehow owed Mikkelsen a fiduciary duty (which he did not), insufficient evidence was introduced at trial for the jury to conclude that C.C. Burgess breached any such duty. C.C. Burgess’s involvement (as relevant here) was limited to his participation on the Herring Bancorp Board subcommittee that selected the two neutral criteria for deciding which preferred shares could be converted and which shares would be redeemed—i.e., whether the preferred shareholder had a banking relationship with Herring Bank, and whether the preferred shareholder would own at least 50 shares of common stock after the conversion, 13RR, DX-19 at 1. Formulating these criteria cannot form the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the evidence at trial showed that these criteria were adopted because the Herring Bancorp Board believed that they were in the best interests of the Corporation. See 9RR 27:17-30:5 (C.C. Burgess stating that the reason for adopting the 50-share threshold was the concern that as the bank grew, new shareholders would need to be attracted and the bank needed “to maintain as 42 many openings . . . for inviting those shareholders to join the bank”); 10RR 121:15-122:18 (Todd Clark testifying that, in his view, “[y]ou want people to have a reasonable investment in the bank, be customers in the bank if they are going to own shares in the bank”). In any event, Defendants presented unrefuted evidence at trial that these criteria were not developed to affect Mikkelsen, or otherwise breach any purported fiduciary relationship with Mikkelsen. See 9RR 28:3-6 (“Q. Did [the 50-share threshold] have anything to do with the number of shares [Mikkelsen] would have after a conversion . . . . ? A. Absolutely not.”); 9RR 33:4-11 (“It was never our intent to ostracize Mr. Mikkelsen in any way.”); 10RR 91:18-94:2 (Susan Couch discussing that the two criteria were approved by outside legal counsel); 10RR 107:22-108:16 (Todd Clark testifying that he did not know whether Mikkelsen met the two criteria until this lawsuit was filed). In sum, Mikkelsen failed to introduce legally or factually sufficient evidence at trial to justify the jury’s liability finding on the breach of fiduciary duty claim as to C.C. Burgess. In the unlikely event that the Court reverses the Final Judgment on this claim, at least a new trial is warranted for the reasons stated above. IV. The $127,442 Fee Award Should Be Reversed. A. Because Mikkelsen Cannot Prevail on His Breach of Contract Claim, He Is Not Entitled to an Attorneys’ Fee Award. As explained, see supra Section II, Mikkelsen should not have prevailed on his breach of contract claim that the trial court decided on summary judgment in 43 2011. And because the breach of contract claim was the basis for Mikkelsen’s fee award, see 10RR at 54:17-19 (basing claimed fee amount on “the contract claim”), reversing the trial court’s Final Judgment on the breach of contract claim requires this Court to reverse the fee award as well and render judgment in favor of Defendants. See, e.g., Harrison v. Williams Dental Grp., P.C., 140 S.W.3d 912, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (“[W]e have reversed the trial court’s judgment as to the breach of contract claim, so we cannot uphold the award of attorney’s fees based on that claim.”). B. Alternatively, if Mikkelsen Is Entitled to Some of His Fees, the $127,442 Award Cannot Stand Because It Is Unsupported and Because Mikkelsen Did Not Segregate His Attorneys’ Fees Properly. Texas law is clear that, in order to recover attorneys’ fees, a party must establish the amount of time/expenses incurred pursuing claims which allow for attorneys’ fees, and must segregate that time/expense from the time/expense incurred pursuing claims which do not allow for attorneys’ fees. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006). While Mikkelsen’s attorney generally stated at trial that 80% of his time and expenses should be recoverable because they were “tied” with the contract claim, this generalized claim is not sufficient for segregation purposes and is belied by the record. See 10RR 53:6-58:7. 44 First, under Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014), a ballpark percentage guess about the amount of time spent pursuing a specific claim is not sufficient for segregation purposes; the party seeking its fees must present “evidence of the time spent on specific tasks” to show proper segregation. Id. at 255; see also Enzo Invs., LP v. White, 468 S.W.3d 635, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (holding that attorney’s statement that 95% of the attorney time in a case was attributable to a breach of contract claim was insufficient evidence of segregation). While Mikkelsen may claim that he provided more evidence than a ballpark percentage guess because his fee invoices were admitted into the record, a review of those invoices demonstrated that the 80% ballpark guess was not accurate. In fact, Defendants’ trial counsel conducted an “audit-like” review of Mikkelsen’s invoices and, based on that review, he testified at trial that Mikkelsen’s reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees related to the breach of contract claim were at most $39,545.87. See 10RR 180:12-183:24. Thus, far from an 80% ballpark guess, an accurate, audit-like review showed that Mikkelsen only incurred about $40,000 in attorneys’ fees pursuing the breach of contract claim—roughly 25% of the total fees incurred. Id. Second, while Mikkelsen’s counsel suggested that 80% of his fees could not be segregated because the claims at issue were “inextricably intertwined,” 10RR 54:25-55:19, this assertion is contradicted by binding authority. The Texas Supreme 45 Court has held that segregation between claims is not required “only when legal services advance both recoverable and unrecoverable claims . . . .” A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer, 235 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. 2007) (citing Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14) (emphasis added); see also 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488, 509 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“If any of the component tasks relate solely to a cause of action for which legal fees are not recoverable, the claimant must segregate the fees.”). Since Mikkelsen’s contract claim was decided on summary judgment in 2011—almost four years before trial—time and expenses incurred after that claim was decided as a matter of law cannot have “advanced” that claim, and thus Mikkelsen’s contract claim is not “inextricably intertwined” with his tort claims that proceeded to trial. When Mikkelsen’s contract claim was decided as a matter of law in 2011, Mikkelsen had incurred less than $50,000 in attorneys’ fees litigating this case. See 12RR, PX-50. While it is possible that 80% of those fees were spent pursuing the contract claim (which would comport with the “audit-like” review of Mikkelsen’s invoices, see 10RR 180:12-183:24), that same percentage cannot hold for the remaining fees that Mikkelsen incurred from 2011 through trial, almost four years after the contract claim was decided on summary judgment. Indeed, even a cursory review of Mikkelsen’s invoices demonstrates that the fees and expenses incurred after 2011 did not relate to the breach of contract claim. See, e.g., 12RR, 46 PX-50 at MIK0087 (time entries for motion to compel not related to breach of contract claim); id. at MIK0107-0108 (time entries related to Defendants’ Third Motion for Summary Judgment on tort claims only).17 In sum, Mikkelsen failed to segregate his fees properly, and the record demonstrates that the fee award is unsupported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. Under Tony Gullo, should this Court affirm the trial court’s finding on Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim, it must reverse the fee award and remand for a new trial on that issue. C. Defendants Are Entitled to Their Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees Spent Pursuing Their Declaratory Judgment Claim. As explained, the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ declaratory judgment claim on the 2013 redemption and tender. See supra Section II.B.2. Under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009, Defendants are entitled to their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees spent pursuing this claim—specifically, $5,500 in reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees through trial plus $12,500 in conditional 17 To the extent Mikkelsen asserts that his fee award is based on the cross-declaratory judgment claims as well as the contract claim, that argument is belied by the record. See 10RR 55:17-19 (asserting that 80% of the time is “tied with the contract claim”). Further, even if Mikkelsen’s fee claim relates to his cross-declaratory judgment claim as well, Mikkelsen never accounted for the large gap of time between when the contract claim was decided on summary judgment in 2011 and when he pleaded his cross-declaratory judgment claim in 2015. See 2CR158. While Mikkelsen may attempt to claim that the fees he incurred defending against Defendants’ declaratory judgment are rightfully included in a fee award, it is telling that Defendants sought only $5,500 in fees based on that claim. 10RR 186:25-191:6. Finally, Mikkelsen fails to account for the fact that several time entries on his attorneys’ invoices from late 2013 through trial had nothing to do with the contract claim or cross-declaratory judgment claims. See, e.g., PX-50 at MIK0107-0108. 47 appellate fees. See 10RR 186:25-191:6. Accordingly, if this Court agrees with Defendants that the 2013 redemption and tender are valid, then it should award Defendants the attorneys’ fees they spent pursuing their declaratory judgment claim, or alternatively, remand for further proceedings on these fees. V. To the Extent the Court Does Not Render Judgment in Favor of Defendants, a New Trial Also Is Warranted Because the Trial Court Impermissibly Commented on the Weight of the Evidence When It Instructed the Jury That Herring Bancorp Had Breached its Articles of Incorporation as a Matter of Law. As Defendants have argued, judgment should be rendered in their favor on all of the issues raised in this appeal. All of Defendants’ arguments about new trial and remand are alternative arguments and apply only if the Court finds that it cannot render judgment in Defendants’ favor. To the extent the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the contract or tort claims, a new trial also is required given the trial court’s prejudicial comment on the weight of the evidence in its jury instructions. As noted, Mikkelsen presented this case to the jury as a breach-of-contract dispute. See supra Facts Section V. Yet, when the jury received its instructions, the trial court erred and abused its discretion and told the jury that it already had determined the breach-of-contract claim as a matter of law in Mikkelsen’s favor. Ex. 2 at 7 (“You are instructed that the Court has previously determined, as a matter of law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply with the Articles of Incorporation of 48 Herring Bancorp when it purported to involuntarily redeem Mikkelsen’s preferred shares in 2006.”). The trial court gave this instruction over repeated objections, see 8RR 203:20-220:8; 11RR 9:22-13:11; 2CR259, and this prejudicial statement infected the jury charge with error and probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; Redwine v. AAA Life Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (“Reversal is required if an improper comment on the weight of the evidence is one that was calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.”); Seymore v. Dorsett, No. 07-03-0175-CV, 2005 WL 2849061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31, 2005, no pet.). Several appellate courts have reversed judgments where the trial court gave similar “instructions” that amounted to improper comments on the weight of the evidence. For example, in Redwine, the Dallas Court of Appeals explicitly held that, “[a]lthough the assumption of an uncontroverted fact in the jury charge is generally not held to be a comment on the weight of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the instructions given in the instant case concerning issues decided as a matter of law . . . were not comments on the weight of the evidence.” 852 S.W.2d at 16. In reaching this conclusion, the Redwine court reviewed the holdings of other courts of appeals and noted that those “courts held that jury instructions concerning issues decided as a matter of law were improper comments on the weight of the evidence because they 49 suggested to the jury how the remaining issues should be resolved.” Id. Similarly, in American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ), the court held that instructing the jury about a prior ruling was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence, was not “helpful to the jury in answering any of the questions in the court’s charge,” and “tended to imply to the jury that the trial judge thought the law and the facts were in favor” of one party over the other. Id. at 435; see also First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo v. Jarnigan, 794 S.W.2d 54, 61-62 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (“[A]nything which does not aid the jury in answering the jury questions submitted . . . must be excluded from the charge.”); Mader v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 683 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (“The trial court, in effect, informed the jury on a finding which it had made as a matter of law. This was error. . . . [W]e believe that the instruction strongly suggested to the jury that [it] should answer the accompanying issue [in favor of one party] . . . . We can see no useful purpose for the instruction other than to steer the jury . . . . As such, we find that the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence . . . .”); Bd. of Regents v. Denton Constr., 652 S.W.2d 588, 594-95 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“We are at a loss to determine why this instruction was included in the charge. . . . [T]his instruction was not explanatory of anything, except that the court had [made a ruling] as a matter of law . . . . We think this tended to imply to the jury that the court 50 thought the law and the facts were with the appellee, and as such, the instruction was erroneously prejudicial.”). These cases demonstrate that comments about prior rulings do not aid the jury and can improperly influence the jury’s deliberations. That is especially true where, as here, Mikkelsen framed the trial such that the breach-of-contract claim was the focus. See 7RR 16:12-14 (“[T]his case is about the breach of a covenant.”); 7RR 22:2-5 (“If they had been all redeemed, we would not be here today because that complied with the covenant, the Articles of Incorporation.”); 11RR 32:23-34:2 (“I told you in our opening that I believe the evidence would show that the covenant, the Articles of Incorporation had been broken . . . . Now, in our closing arguments, this is our chance to summarize for you what we think the evidence has shown. . . . First and foremost in this charge, on page seven, is the following: Finding by the Court that the Articles of Incorporation were violated.”). Indeed, where the entire trial is framed as a question about whether the Articles of Incorporation were breached, and then the Court instructs the jury that it previously found that the Articles were breached, it is difficult to imagine a more prejudicial instruction. This erroneous instruction likely had spillover effects and affected the jury’s deliberations regarding the minority oppression and breach of fiduciary duty claims (despite the trial court’s addition that “failure to comply with the Articles of Incorporation, standing alone, is 51 not sufficient to constitute minority oppression or breach of fiduciary duty”). Ex. 2 at 7. The trial court’s instruction regarding its prior ruling on Mikkelsen’s summary judgment motion was erroneous and likely caused the rendition of an improper judgment. To the extent the Court determines that it cannot render judgment in Defendants’ favor, the Court should reverse the Final Judgment and remand for a new trial for this additional reason. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER For the reasons stated, Defendants respectfully pray that this Court reverse the trial court’s Final Judgment and render judgment in favor of Defendants. Alternatively, Defendants respectfully pray that this Court reverse the Final Judgment insofar as it awards Mikkelsen relief and remand the case for a new trial to resolve any disputed fact issues. Defendants also pray for any further relief to which they are justly entitled. 52 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275 CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez 1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760 Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap 940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563 940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75201 214.220.7700 214.999.7792 (facsimile) tleatherbury@velaw.com mberrelez@velaw.com sgilstrap@velaw.com Attorneys for Appellants Herring Bancorp, Inc.; C.C. Burgess; and C. Campbell Burgess CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief of Appellants complies with the applicable word count limitation because it contains 12,940 words, excluding the parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, the undersigned has relied on the word-count function in Microsoft Word 2010, which was used to prepare this brief. /s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury Thomas S. Leatherbury 53 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served upon the following counsel of record via electronic filing on November 20, 2015: Lee F. Christie Michael L. Atchley, II Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP 500 West 7th Street, Suite 600 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 817.332.3245 817.877.4781 (facsimile) lfchristie@popehardwicke.com matchley@popehardwicke.com /s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury Thomas S. Leatherbury 54 INDEX OF APPENDIX MATERIALS (1) Final Judgment (June 16, 2015) (2CR472-507) (2) Jury Verdict (January 30, 2015) (2CR228-58) (3) Orders Denying Defendants Post-Judgment Motions (August 19, 2015) (2CR409-10) (4) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (August 4, 2011) (1CR306-07) (5) Herring Bancorp Articles of Incorporation (13RR, DX-1) (6) October 31, 2006 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-18) (7) Acceptance of Subchapter S Status by IRS (13RR, DX-31) (8) October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-33) (9) November 22, 2013 Tender (13RR, DX-35) (10) Refused Jury Instructions Related to 2013 Redemption/Tender (January 30, 2015) (2CR260-61, 2CR267) (11) Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) US 3776991 55 EXHIBIT 1 472472472472472 NOW • . .1„ . . • - " . • • CAUSE NO: 24,955. • JOHN MIRK:EISEN, § • IN THE Disnutil acting solely in his capacity as Trustee trie / to cifqq. 5 •• § of the John Mildcelsen Trust § At 3 tio047_M :§. Plaintiff § aeri5 Dist Court Wifbarger Co. . HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, § Defendants. § 445TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FINAL JUDGMENT On January 30, 2015, this cause came on to be beard, and John Nfildrelsen, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff; appeared in person and by attorney of record and announced ready for trial, and. Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess, Defendants, appeared in person or by, attnrney.of record and, announced ready for trial, and a jury having been previously demanded, a'jury consisting of 12 qualified jurors was duly empaneled and the case proceeded to trial. The Court, by granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Suminary JudgMent on August 4,.. 2011, granted Plaintiff's breach of contract claim in Count One of Plaintiffs First Amended Original Petition, and the Order granting Plaintiff's Motion, which is copied and aitached hereto as Exhibit "A," is incorporated herein. With respect to Count Four of Plaintiff's First Amended Original Petition, which alleged that an. October 2006 purported redemption of Plaintiff's preferred shares in Herring Bancorp, Inc. constituted unlawful oppression of a minority shareholder, the Court submitted said issue to the jury, and the jury returned its verdict in accordance with the instructions of the Court. The charge of the Court and the verdict of the jury are copied and FINAI-JtmcktErir PAGE 472 473473473473473 "MI attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated for all purposes by reference. Bprause the Court found for Plaintiff and it appears to the Court that the verdict of the jury was for the Plaintiff and against Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess, the Court finds that judgment should be rendered as herein provided. It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff John Mikkelsen have and recover from this Court a declaratory judgment whereby this Court declares, pursuant to the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act and the jury's verdict, tbat the purported October 2006 and November 2013 redemptions of the preferred shares of Plaintiff John Mikkelsen were void and of no force or effect, and did not deprive Plaintiff of his status as a preferred shareholder of Herring Bancorp, Inc. Accordingly, Plaintiff at all times had and has the right to inspect the books and records of Herring Bancorp, Inc. The Court further finds that Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc. breached its Articles of Incorporation and that Defendants C.C. Burgess and C. Campbell Burgess wrongfully engaged in oppressive conduct towards Plaintiff, as found by the jury. In connection therewith, the Court further finds, and it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Plaintiff remains a preferred shareholder of said Herring Bancorp, Inc., is entitled to have and recover of and from Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess, jointly and severally, judgment in the amount of $23,112.00, representing preferred dividends on Plaintiff's preferred shares in Herring Bancorp, Inc. from and after October 31, 2006, through December 31, 2014, plus prejudgment interest thereon through the date' of judgment rendered herein in the amount of $ )jk '•• *-- "t --- 1 is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff John Mikkelsen should have and recover of and from the Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc. judgment for his reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees, as awarded by the jury, in the amount of $127,442.00 for preparation FINAL JUDGMENT PAGE 2 473 474474474474474 and trial of this cause., and the additional sum of $25,000.00 for an appeal to the Court of Appeals, $10,000.00 for representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas, $10,000.00 for representation at the merit briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas, and $10,000.00 for representation through oral argument and completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all costs of court should be and hereby are taxed jointly and severally against Defendants Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the contract award of $23,112.00 shall bear interest from the date this Judgment is signed at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until paid. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the other monetary awards shall bear interest from the date this Judgment is signed at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum until paid. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all relief not expressly herein granted is denied, and this is intended to be a final, appealable judgment. SIGNED this 14 day of d , 2015. A( DAN MIKE IRD, T DIS CT; GE PAMitiothcAPIck6nesTroposl Flnal limigrutrn dx FINAL JUDGMENT PAGE 3 474 475475475475475 FILED The`+ day of___011 o'clock ill: o'clo Brenda Paterson CAUSE NO. 24,955 0 Dist. C Ey JOHN MUCKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff, v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, Defendants. 46Th JUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDF12. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion") came on for hearing on April 18, 2011. The Court finds Plaintiff's Motion was timely filed and that notice of Plaintiffs Motion and the hearing thereon was duly and properly given_ The Court also finds thAt Defendants' Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the parties, and hereby grants leave to file and serve the Motion on less than. 21 -days' notice prior to the hearing. The Court also fords that Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the. parties, and hereby grants Plaintiff leave to file and serve the Response and the evidence attached thereto, including discovery products, within seven days of the hearing. After considering Plaintiff's Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering Defendants' Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering the admissible summary judgment evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion should be granted and Defendants' Motion should be denied. ORoER PACE I EXHIBIT A 475 476476476476476 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in its entirety. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Special Exceptions and Plea in Abatement are overruled and denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted in all respects. The Court further finds as a marte.r of law that (1) the purported redemption of Plaintiff's 300 shares of preferred stock of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") was undertaken in violation of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and is void and (2) that Plaintiff is, and continues to be, the holder of 300 shares of the Company's preferred stock, and has all the rights appurtenant thereto, including the right to inspect Company's books and records. SIGNED on the day of 2011. udge Approved as to form: Lee F. Christie, Counsel for Plaintiff James W. Bowen, Counsel for Defendants ORDER PAGE 2 476 477477477477477 021021ZOI5 ADIS 12:26 wax R1002/041, CAUSB NO. 24,915 JOHN MIKKELSEN, Acting Solely in his IN TEE 46Th DISTRICT COURT Capacity as Trustee of the John Mil:ire/5w That, PiainfziBiColutter Defendant, IN AND FOR BEERRING. BANCORP, INC, C.C. BIJR.OESS and C CAMPBELL BURGESS, Ddraulants/Coanter-Plaizeffs. WI:LRAM:0Z COUNTY, TEXAS CHAR( TO TIM JURY LAWS AND GENTLE/MI OF MB JURY: This cese is submitted to you by esktog quesfions aboigibt fist; vibirtt you must deride from the evidence you have heard in Cids nisi_ You are the sole j4.Ligcb of the creditegy of the wit: rases end the %eight to be given their lesEmsony, baton mash: of law, you roust br governed by the instructions in this chatge. 5icrisharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe qrt {be instrunfions which have previously been given you. I shalt now give you additional instructions which you should razthlly and strictly follow doting your deliirsaftons. L Do not let bias, ptejurke at sympathy play toy pad in your deliberations. IL arriving at yoga ansvarits, oonsicier only the evidence introduced here undet oath sod such etchilais ' , if any, as have beta introduced for your considerafiern labia the nefings of the Cour4 that whet you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the kw as gives you by fire Court_ CHARGE TO THE JURY PACE I OF 30 EXHIBIT B 477 478478478478478 02/0212015 1l4Y 1_24 26 ail', taossioss In your&aerations, you will not consider or discuss anything that Es not manse:And by the evidence In this case. DI ghtre every answer that is enquired by the charge is irafaxmot, no juror shanid state or coosider that any requhrd answer is not important. You must not decide vela) you think should win, and then by to EUIVAPet the questions accadingly. Simply answer de questicas, sod do not discuss tor coon= yourselves vrith the effect ofyour =Wens. V. You will not decide ilse =won to a (Reit:ion by lot or by drawing straws, or by may other method &chance. Do not return. a quotient verdict. A quot4 tat vertfiet means that the jurors agree tri abidc b9 them& to be mooted bY eataS together each jam* Ego:mond cfivkling by themtanber of knots to get an average. Do not do any herring mar stoss that is, are; juhn thouid not agree to answer a. =slain question one way Toth= will agree to answer another qnassion mother VI. You may rendet your watt upon the vote of ten or more menthol of the jusy. Tito same test or mote of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the cadre meter. You will net, thembotr, enter into en agreernemt to be holm! by a taajocity many other vote &less than ten jusons. If thre verrhst and al:loft:beans-wets therein are reached by is mores agreement, am presidiod tutor stata sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any jtartt disagrees as to any answer made by the Vetilta, eflARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 2 08 30 478 479479479479479 .41•11," • 2/o 2/ 2 011 max 12,24 rxx 00 0 4 / t141 those jurors wbo agree to all f =flogs shall each sif,n the verdict. VII. These instractiors are given to you because your conduct is subject to review theca= as that of the witnesses, parftes, attorneys and the judo Ifit should be found dud you have cilsreganied any of these instructions, it will be Jury mioxindoct and it may require another tried by arrotheritay; then all of our fune will have been wasted. VB1 The presicrrog juror or any of= yam observes iotation of the Courts instractions abaft immediately warn the one who is violating tie same and elm the juror not to do so 'win IX. When weeds are used in this chums in a sense which wake from tee eletremcnalytraciastood running, you =givens proper legal defurifion, orb ich you are bound to scoeptin place of any other meaning. X. Answer by checking "Yes' or "No" to all questions realm otherwise to mated. A "Yes" answer mast be based on a prepoodesonce of the kA, ;lack- Ifyou do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports tt'Yesr server, then answer 'No." Tithe question directs you to give an answer area than ''Yes" or 'No," you must still base your taw= on a preponderance of the evidence with respect to each mutter inquired about in the question. Preponderance of the evidence means the greater Weight and degree of orecilble testimony or evidence inhodoced before you and admitted in evidence io this cam Kt. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 3 OF 30 479 480480480480480 02/02/ZOIS 2aYS L2427 MX asfo at Atter your refire to the jury room, yon. will stlect your own presithngiuror. The first thing the ;merit:fin:dreg will do is to have/Ns complett charge readdoral together with the accompanying instructions and If= you will deliberate upon your answers to the ate:stir:0s asked in the verdict them. It is the duty of the presiding juror to: (I) ?reside daring your deliberations. (2) See tbatyour clebirensfmns art conducted in an adz:4 manner and in accordance with the insirractions in this charge. (3) Vidtt out and bard to the bailiff any communkatians c000nrag the ease that you desire to have dethvered to the Mgt. (4) Coodort voting on each cyoeseron. (5) Write your agiVictill to the questions in the spaces provided. (6) Certify to your verdict in the space provided for tht dding juror's ;Agostino, or to obtain the signatures of all the jut= who agree with the yenfict if your verdict is tern than pnaninioas. XEL. Yousliop3drot thacasewithanyone,notaveaioaidlibthermembessb€ffiejury,turners all aria are present and gasembled ia the jury morn_ Should foryoos attempt to talk to you also* the cast beft4e the yet dict Is returned, whether at the covutlxxise, or your home, or elsewhere, plena inform fits Judge of this fact XL When you have calsweutd aid foe questions you 618 LeyUhed to =MtUnder the instroefions of the Judge and your presirthog juror has placed yr= answess tbe spaces provided end signed the venikt as pueskrang juror or obtained the signatures, you will infectra the bairiffat the door of the jury CBARCE TO MR JURY PA043 4 OF 30 480 481481481481481 22/22/2015 CM U.:27 sax moocieu room that you're nada a ittdiat, aid bayou will retam Igo Cow with par teem SIGNED this "50 day of Isaagy.201.5. &NORMA ai BMW 40 Maid Coat/edge Med /1301/ .vi-9:90 A AT e /130//5- at 5 0 PM 4 7 CHARGE TO TEM JURY PAGE 5 On° 481 482482482482482 02/02/2115 wa i2:21 1.2X e007/041 DliFiNTIJONS AND INSTRUCTIONS You are instructed that when wads are used in the Questions in a sense which varies from the meaning commonly tradevasooci, you will be given in this Charge a proper legal de6nitton what yea ECFC bound to swept in (he place of any other inanition or =anatg. in answering the Questions you she give the following terms the following meanings: 1. The trim "pm:tender:are of the evidence" means the greeter weight of ontale evidence presented In this case. 'fru do not freed that a pep:We:rat= of the evidence supports a "yes" answer, then answer "no.' A prepondentoce of the evidence is not measured by the =her of or by the number of documents admitted in tvidenot. For a fact to be proved by a preponderance of tie evidence, you must find that the fact. is tams likely tate-than not tree. A fact may be estabftsined by direct wide:toe or by tai evidence, or both. A fact is established by rrtnect evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or herd fin words spoken, A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other feats pawed. 2. A Mot may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both- A fact is established by &cot evidence wiesPiand by dootnnentnry evidence or by witneists who sem the at done or beard the words spoken. A feet is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from ofttee facts proved. 3. "htikkelscen" means Plaintifflohn Pet313relsen, acting palely bids capaohy asTrustee of the Joint KA:then Trust end his agents, thaneys, and repnesentatives noting in the nausea and scope of their ageney or artployment CLIARG13 TO THB JURY PAGE 6 OF 30 482 483483483483483 OZ/02/2015 MOS 12127 WILX Hit ogle 4. 'Herring Bancorp" means Eferang Brmoorp, Inr—, and its agents, attorneys, employees, officers, directons, and representatives acting in the comseancl scope of theiragencyor ertspioymmt. S. "C.C. Mugu." menus C.C. Burgess and his agents, atimneys, and representatives tiding En the ea= and recce of their irgency or eraployment . 6. 'Campbell Blare' mews C. Campbell Hanes; and Ws ages* attorneys, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment 7. The 'Articies of Incorpootioe m and refers to the Ankles of Incorporation of Herring (Plaintiff's ExhibitDr. INSTRUCTION REGARDING BREA_CH OF Ali I1CLES OF INCORPORATION You are instructed that the Carat lust previously determined, as a matter of law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply with tl>w Articles offacorferatine of Fleming Bancorp when it pmyoiD d to involuntarily redeem ms's prefecOnd shares in 2006. However, this fare to comply with the Axticies of Incorporation, standing alone, Is tat sufficient to consffinte adnority oppression or breach of fiduciary duty. CHARGES TO THE JURY PAGE 7 OF 30 483 484484484484484 0 7 /02/701S ION 12:77 FAX W09/041 .Q.ICMON NO 1; What is a reasonable fee for the =unary services oflelikkeisea's attorney in coniection . n? with the Mute of Herring Bancorp to comply with the Articles of incorporatio In answering this Question, you /we to consider the attomoy's fees and expenses beamed said reasonably anticipated to be armed by MIkielvert in eaforoing his rights in this action and any appeal thereof In dercrosium ' g the amount of attorney's fits and expanses, yon are to cons der the fallowing • (heti= and Ink( involved, the novelty and dittionhy of the cinestires involved, and the skill required to pal= the legal services properly; • the Edahlood that the arxeptarece of the particular =Nap:Dent will preclude other employment by the lawyer, • the fee castaroactly charged in the locality fix shinier legal service ▪ the amount involved and the results obtaineck • the time limitations imposed by the client or the circurnstancen • the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; • the experlencr., teiiutation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers pedorming the servicosc and • whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained of moccrtsirty of collection before the legal seevioes have been rendered. CHARGE TO THE IVRY PACE $ Of 30 484 485485485485485 • 02102/2015 KOJI 11-. 129 PAS ;bras/cat Answer with an amount for each of the folkiwing: a. For preparation in the trial court. ANSWER: ia 7/ eede.ob b. For representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals, ANSWER: di; nor, c. For representation at the pelf:Sion for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: I OP €13 d_ For represizitalion at the merits briefing stage in the Supra= Court of Tares. ANSWER: /,3(f • e. Far rtprescniafron *sough oral argnmast and the corapletien of proceedings in rho Srpreine Coast ofTeadia. ANSWER: /6 iv° sA CHARGE TO `MB JURY ?AC 9 OF 30 485 486486486486486 02/02/20LS 1H3Y 12t2t rxx 11011/0+1 Do yon find that C. C. Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsm? `Ocpimtve conduce rams harsh, or wrongful conduct a. Lxic of probity end fair &sling in the company's affairs to [Iv prejuc6oe of =re metubessti cc a via 4e departure from the standards of fair dealing and aviolation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely. Lt also means unfair treatment of minority peers by the directors or those in control tiL corporation, Answer 'yes" or "no." Answer: MARGE 10 THE JURY PA.0310 OP 30 486 487487487487487 487487487487487 02/D2 / 2015 x0if 12121 714.1C WIZ/041 00E87TON NOV. 3: Do you furl runt Campbell Burgess talgagod in oppressive conduct toward ladosism? "Oppressive conduct" axams banicoscane, busk orwroagEol Conduct a lack of probity and fair deeding in the compsay's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from ' g and aviolaffrai affair play on which each shareholder is endtlecrto rely. the standards of fair &din Ii abo mons mfr traatroerd of mhxrrity sbantholdess by the di:redoes or those In control of the corporation, Answer "yes* or 'mi." Answer: 'bp MARGE TO THE ,may PAGB 11 OF 30 487 488488488488488 02/ 0 2/ 20 i5 DIVI4 12324 )]X Rs rats at gc 'tie* tve e-e ‘‘Yr.-6 • - Y g-f dot 0Mk-110N NO. 4: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and eensonobly comperadet Mfickelsen for his damages, if emy, that proximately resulted from such oppressive conduct, if any, you have formd? Consider Etas following elements of damages, if any, and none othm.: The lost crrvidend became on lakelsea's prefeized shares from November 21, 2006 tmtil Jeattary 26, 201S. Answer tin dollars and cents. Answer: S 3, azy,50 CHARGE TO THB JURY PAGE 12 OF 30 488 489489489489489 489489489489489 02/02/2015 NO10 L2:23 FAX OVESTION)40. 5: Answer the following quiesfion rely if yen; nraiinnoosly answered 'yes" to Q nNo. 2_ Ofinerwlft, do not answer the folk:owing question. To amwer "Yes" it, the mowing cEnr-stkri, your answer must be ILMOILLE0713. Yon may answer 'Nos to the following titration only upon a vole of ten Or more :FM& Otherwise, you most not answer the folkwring question. Do you find by clear and convimoing etiderrne that the basin to lackelsen resalied from rEtiine? "Clear and =mincing evidence" means flys measure or degree of prooftbat produces a fox/ baler or ocen4o6 on oldie troth of the allegatinna recraghi to be estabUsikel. `Malice means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelaen. Answer "y or 'no." Answer: __716 CHARGE TO Tht JURY PAGE 13 OP 30 489 490490490490490 490490490490490 02(02/2011 12r2t rIX Upis/041 OUBSTtON NO. 6: Answer the following question May if you tmaniamusly answered 'yes* to Questa) * No.3. Otherwise, do sat answer tbe following question_ To sumer "Yes" to the following question, your answer mist be manimma. You may answer "No" to the following question only upcat a vote of tea or =Tejo:mini. Otherwise, you most not answer the fallowing question. 1) you furl by clear and comb:icing ovtdence that the ha= to hfillre/sen revolted from malice? `Clear and =wincing evidence' roe= the measure or degree ofproof that produces a fiat belief or =victims of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. 'Malice" mesas a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause sob Gal injury or harm to Mika/sista. Answer "yes" or 'rm." n toll6r; 2 (MARGE TO TE113 JURY PAM 14 OF 30 490 491491491491491 491491491491491 \NI OZ/02/205 ,mar 12r28 raz WRI6/641. QUESTICRNINO, 7: Answer the foikrwing question cdy if you tmanimiattify answered ^yes" to QuesdonNo. 5. You must rataninumsfy agree on the tonctaut deny award of exemplary damages. Whet scan of money, Vasty, paid now in cash, aitordd be assessed against C.C. 13nrgess and awarded to M5dcelvat as entrtnplaiy daraagns, raw, for the cordnet frnmd In response to Question 2? "Exemplary damages" means an amp Oast you may in your dLscretion tward eta penalty or by way of great Factors to be conaered in awartilng exemplary dantr.ges, if any, are— a. The nature of the b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpabirdy of C.C. Burgess. d. Ibe situation and semulalities of tile patties comexced. e. Ile Went to ?Aria Jamb conduct offends a pobrvc sense of justice wad propriety. f. The net worth of C.C. Earwig. Answa in dolists sad onits, [fray. Answtc $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE1S OF 30 491 492492492492492 492492492492492 vow 02/02/201S SOX 12:21 sat tan?/061 OLIMION NO. 8: Answer tbe farming questim only ifyou ttaanimonsly areweeetryee to Queeitoo 143.6. You imat neenimonsly 8106 an the amount of any award of exemplar] damages. What sum of roomy, ffany, paid now in Garb, alma be assessed against Campbell s and awarded b Wel:a= as exemplary clan-Agee, if any, for the conduct &mod in respotec b Question 3? lactophri damages' means an amount that rat may In yaw discretion award es a pcm/ty or by way of ponishroart. Factors to be considered in away troempitry damages, if paly, aro— a. 7Ls nature of the wrong, b. The amen= of the coodnct Involved. The degree of cripabffdy of Campbell Bur&ess. cl. Tie situation and amatTsties of the partles =calmed, e. The orient to which sow ecinduet of a public same a:tint:lion end propriety. The not Rath of Campbell Dorms. Answer in &tiros end oats, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 16 OF 30 492 493493493493493 Vow, 01/02/20LS BOX 12+29 TAX Z0111/041. 11113.? OUPWION NO, 9: Do yoo find dart C. C. atagess used his peasonal control ofIleviug Banoshares to breach fiduciary duties owed to latelsca? In connection withthe foregoing qmasf on, you are instractorl that a majotity sltareholrier of a. Cettparatio . n owes fiduciary duties to a minority stiacchold= and to show compflance with these duties roust thaw be acted fairly told equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous honesty, folly and fairly disclosing ail important information to a minority tharebolder such as Wiricelseu Answer "yes" or 'no." Answer: CHARGE TO Tim JURY PAGE 17 OF 30 493 494494494494494 %MI 02102/2015 NMI Iz 29 nix la 9 / 0 41 OUESTIONNO. 10: Do you find that Campbell Burgess usedbis personal coatrol ofHerring Bauosblues to breach fidnAlry duties owed to With/see In connection with tho foregoing question, you are instracted that a majority almachokier of a corparafion crams 5-h3ciary &ties to a minority shareholder and to show compilanoe with those dailies mast show he robed fairly and equitably. in thc utmost good faith wili2 tilt most scrapnions honesty. folly and fairly di,r4rudng all important information to a minority charehokler such as Mikkalsee. Answer 'yes" or 'on." Av CHARGE TO 1TM JURY PAGE 18 OF 30 494 495495495495495 Vow 02l12/ 2015 104 12:2) PltX 020/041 • -I frvt Wel e-cr "Xci5 -A-4e l(7) q n S Pee4s- 67.174-11/v1-0.-4 de---ftri-7;:k.,45"4,Y QUESTIONNO.ii: What tam of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reesorobly =rpm:cafe KIdaisegi for bia *we*, if soy, that pnxdmitely math &mists& treacIrs of fiduciary duties, if any you have hood? Consider The fonerv.ing elements of damn if any. and nom other: The kost clividtxx1 income on Mikkehen's plefeExed shares from November 2l, 2006 until Ison=y 26, 2015. Answer in dollars end cents. Anmec S 0,00 CHAIM TO THE JURY PAGE 19 OF 30 495 496496496496496 132/c2/2015 fl 12129 1,11- 0.21/e41. . Ilowiclgques6om only ityou tmardirensty answmed 4yes" to Quad:1°04a. iiEt Answer the So Otherwise, do not answer the following questruu. To answer 'Yea" to the following cinesSrm, yorcr answer must be unanimous. You may answer lie to the following qiics6cm only upon wrote of ten or more juircs. O•ticerwi=, yea must not answer the following graistion. Do yon find by clear and convincing evidence gad the harm to Mildialsen resalted from malice? 'Clear and convine gevidence'meanstbe:meoedegczeofpcooftineproduces a firm Wit( or conviction of the truth. of the allegations sought to be establiebed. "Malice" means a specific best by C.C. Burgess to e:asso substantial injury cc lemon to italcefacn. Answa. "yes' or "no." Amcvez CIJA.R.013 TO TE03 JURY PAGE 20 OF 10 496 497497497497497 497497497497497 0 2 / 112/ 2 01.5 ical 12:2, ru Salo 221:41 OUESTION NO. 13; Amwerthe following question ooly ifyou ttaanimueslyanswered`yes- Quesflon Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer 'Yee to the following question, your ansWer most be unanimous. Yost may answer lice to the following question only noses a voitof bat or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. . g evidence That d harm to liiiiirkelsen resulted from Do you find by clear and eunvinein malice? `Clear and ear:miming evirlascer means the measure cr degree of proof that produces alarm belief or eouvidicm of the truth of the allegations sought to be eskl,lishe-fl `Mace mews a specific iotem by Campbell Burgess to came substantial inOry or hann to Mik1eiien. ARSVCI "yes' or 'no." Anse n CHARM TO THE JURY PACE 21 OF 30 497 498498498498498 0210212915 WM 1.2129 rax D1023 /001 QVXDON NO. 1 t Answertbe foBowing.questionoffly Wye's mumirnously ranweeeyea" to QuestianNo. 12. You aunt raurOnwArily agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of mussy, If any, paid now inoush, shonld be assessed aglinst C. C. Burgess and KWIII4ed to MBIelsen as exemplary dataages, Lenny, for the coorinr:t found in response so Question 97 "Exemplary damages" means an amounithat you may in your &action award as aptaalty or by way of punisturreect. Factors So be considered is awarding exemplary damages, if any, aro— a.. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the ccmdz invoired. The degree of cralpahalty of C. C. Burgess. d. The situation and sertsibilifses of the patties concerned. a. The ecterst to which snob conduct cis a public sense ogre:nee and propriety. £ The net worth DIG C. Burgess. Answer in doll= and cents, if any. Answer S ClfARGE TO -173B JURY PACE 22 OF 30 498 499499499499499 07/0 2/ 2015 MOW 2.2329 FAX 2024/041 QUESTION NO, Sr &Inlet fb, following question onlyifyon unanisMonstr answered 'yes" to OnestionNo. 13. YOU LIMA TIFIAtemowly agree on the amount of any Rivard of exemplary damages. Whatemn of mooey, ifany, paid now itt cash, slmuld be asse.ssed against Campbell Burgess and awarded to Milescisen as exemplary damages, if an for the =duct found in response In Question le? 'glary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as speciality • or by way of pa :Inhalant. Pact= ta be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, en,— a. Thene of the wnang. b. "Fhb obararsOz of tins txmcluct involved. o. The degree of calpatelity of Campbell Burgess. d. The sittatraon and searitalities ofthe patties cxmcemed. a The extent to which such conduct offeadat pub& sense of justice and propriety, f The net wrath of Campbell Brag= Answer in dodos and carts, if any Answer. S CHARM TO TDB JURY PACE 73 OF 30 499 500500500500500 i 02102/2015 1011.12:30 PEI zs1oat OUESTJON NO. 16: Answer the fallowing Question only if you have answered "yes" to Questicus 2 or 9. Was C. C. Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive igfildoelsen of his preferred shares in Ilming Enamor?? To be part of a conspiracy, C. C. Burgess arid another person or persons mast have had. knondedge of agreed to, and irdended a common objective or course of ex4on that resulted in damages to Mildrelsen. One or mare persons involved in the conspiracy must have perforroM some ant or nets to further the conspiracy. Answer 'yes" or "am" Answer: /45 (MARGE TO TEE TJRY PAGE 24 OP 30 500 501501501501501 02/02/24115 NOW 12t30 rkz ao2i/Oat OUBSTION NO. 17: Answer the following Qnestion only era had ansvdered "yes" to Questions 3 be 10. Was Campbell Burgess pact of a conspiracy to WIDogli2lly deprive lvfildmisen of his preferred shares in Herring Bancorp? Tb be part ofa conspiracy, Campbell But = and another pawnor pasins must have had Imowledgc of agreed to, and intended a couture objective or course of action that resulted in damages to hfildrelseu. One or morepersons involved in thecorripiracy must have pedal-rued some act or acts to Sather tbsconspiracy. Answer 'yes" or 'no.' Anst.ier: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 25 OF 30 501 502502502502502 02/02/2 025 )N 124 30 Pas 0027/o4i 71,/- ji(k /6-,77 W/. 7,1 •Gb-rki 91=1-211KJI: What anal of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fitly and nessonably comp-stoop. NEddieisen fur his damages, daisy, that west plea :minty caused by such conspiracy? Consider the follow* Ammts of druirk,r, if any, and none oil= The lost dividend income on la's preferred sin= limn November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015. Answer in dollars and cents. Affirm S CBAIt To TEE1 JURY PAGE 26 OR 30 502 503503503503503 02/112/21315 110X 17-1311 FAX 2021io4t • OUESTIONNO. 19: Answertie falkavingqoestion only &you nnanimottslyeasw=aryte to Qrstsfunt Ha. 16. Offal-wise, do nct wawa the kollawingemestion. To answer 'Yee to the following goserion, your extwer mast be unanimous. You may answer "Ho" to thofollowing.goestion on/yr:No a vote of ten or [melons's.. Otherwise, youncust not =wet the following quest/On.. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to heathen resulted from =lire Clear and convincing evidence" means Ilse measure °ree ofprooftbst prodoces a frort belief or couviction old= truth eat allegaliort anaght to be established. "Malice" means a aixcific interzt by Cc. Bargees to maze substan641 initty or harm to hfiliasixa Answer "yea" or 'on." Answec CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 27 OF 30 503 504504504504504 02/02/2015 SOS 12r 31 IJX Tinsfiost. WEST/9N NO- 20! Answertirefolkrwing questio ' nonly Ifyounnanimonsly answIserl'yee Que.:IirazNo. 17. Otherwise, do not answer the Moving question_ To answer 'Yes" to the folicsiving question, yaw answer must be unanimous. You may answer"No" to the following question only upon &vete of ten or marejorors. Otherwise, lotto:east not answer the Mowing question. Do you fad by al= sod convincing evidence that the Iona to Mild:elsen resulted from "Clear and convineing evidence means the measure or degree ofprooftind panda= a firm beUef or conviction of the troth of the alkgstions naught to be etfabrtihrel: MaEct" mesas a specifto intent by Campbell Burgess tottc= ,zrrbusuni,'sl injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer-yes" or "no.' Answer CHARGE TO THE JURY" PAGE 28 OF 30 504 505505505505505 02/0212015 101 /2.00 ris 0030/04/ QUESTiON NO, 21: Answer thefoLlo wing qtasstinti only ifyourtustabourly answered 'yet° QuestionNo. 1.9. You must urestrimondy agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages- Wbat sum ofrocasery, If any, paid uow ta cash, shook' be assessed against C. C....Burgess sad awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, radix conduct fbnad in response to Question 16? 'Exemplary damages" mcansatt amount tbayou =yin your dist:mental EONIZITI as apepally or by way of ',mistimed. Faritors to be considered in marring exemplary damages, if may, are— a. The rem of the wrong. b. The ohs actor of the conduct involved. e. Tie degree of culpelatzy of C. C. Bin= 4. The tide= end attasibiftties of tie parties mod. e. The extent to wbich such oombxt offends s public muse of uatiee and propriety. £ The net worth of C. C Burgess. . Answer in dollats and cents, if any. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 29 OF 30 505 506506506506506 -- , 02/02/ZY15 taro 12:30 Pi2 fite 311 041 OUBSTION NO, 22: Answertbe folio " question only ifyou unanimously answered 'yes' to Question No. 20. You mast unanimously agree on the amt ofMU sward of exemplary damages. What cora °frac:my, nay, paid now in cash. should be assessed ag2dast Caropbetl Burgess and marled to Mikkeisca as exemplary ;Images, if nay, fee the corduct found in response to Quesgon 17? "Exemplary &saws" means- an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of putibisment_ Fact= to be considered in awarding exemplary Awl, if any, ape— a_ The nal= of the wrong. b, The &natter af the conduct involved- o. The degree ofixdpetality of Campbell Burgess. d. The sib and senstisilifxs atilt pastie ' s oonctsned. The extent to which snub condeot atkods a public seam of justice and propriety. t The net wren af Campbell Burgess- Answer in dolls= and casts, if any. Answer 506 507507507507507 507 EXHIBIT 2 228228228228228 CAUSE NO. 24,955 JOHN MIKKELSEN, Acting Solely in his § IN THE 46TH DISTRICT COURT Capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen § Trust, § § Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, § § v. § IN AND FOR § HERRING BANCORP., INC., C.C. § BURGESS and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, § § Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs. § WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS CHARGE TO THE JURY LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: This case is submitted to you by asking questions about the facts, which you must decide from the evidence you have heard in this trial. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but in matters of law, you must be governed by the instructions in this charge. In discharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe all the instructions which have previously been given you. I shall now give you additional instructions which you should carefully and strictly follow during your deliberations. I. Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part in your deliberations. II. In arriving at your answers, consider only the evidence introduced here under oath and such exhibits, if any, as have been introduced for your consideration under the rulings of the Court; that is, what you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the law as given you by the Court. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 1 OF 30 228 229229229229229 In your deliberations, you will not consider or discuss anything that is not represented by the evidence in this case. HI. Since every answer that is required by the charge is important, no juror should state or consider that any required answer is not important. IV. You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the questions accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern yourselves with the effect of your answers. V. You will not decide the answer to a question by lot or by drawing straws, or by any other method of chance. Do not return a quotient verdict. A quotient verdict means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reached by adding together each juror's figure and dividing by the number of jurors to get an average. Do not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not agree to answer a certain question one way if others will agree to answer another question another way. VI. You may render your verdict upon the vote of ten or more members of the jury. The same ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict. You will not, therefore, enter into an agreement to be bound by a majority or any other vote of less than ten jurors. If the verdict and all of the answers therein are reached by unanimous agreement, the presiding juror shall sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any juror disagrees as to any answer made by the verdict, CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 2 OF 30 229 230230230230230 those jurors who agree to all findings shall each sign the verdict. VII. These instructions are given to you because your conduct is subject to review the same as that of the witnesses, parties, attorneys and the judge. If it should be found that you have disregarded any of these instructions, it will be jury misconduct and it may require another trial by another jury; then all of our time will have been wasted. VIII. The presiding juror or any other who observes a violation of the Court's instructions shall immediately warn the one who is violating the same and caution the juror not to do so again. IX. When words are used in this charge in a sense which varies from the commonly understood meaning, you are given a proper legal definition, which you are bound to accept in place of any other meaning. X. Answer by checking "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless otherwise instructed. A "Yes" answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "Yes" answer, then answer "No." If the question directs you to give an answer other than "Yes" or "No," you must still base your answers on a preponderance of the evidence with respect to each matter inquired about in the question. Preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you and admitted in evidence in this case. XI. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 3 OF 30 230 231231231231231 After you retire to the jury room, you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing the presiding juror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud together with the accompanying instructions and then you will deliberate upon your answers to the questions asked in the verdict form. It is the duty of the presiding juror to: (1) Preside during your deliberations. (2) See that your deliberations are conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with the instructions in this charge. (3) Write out and hand to the bailiff any communications concerning the case that you desire to have delivered to the Judge. (4) Conduct voting on each question. (5) Write your answers to the questions in the spaces provided. (6) Certify to your verdict in the space provided for the presiding juror's signature, or to obtain the signatures of all the jurors who agree with the verdict if your verdict is less than unanimous. XII. You should not discuss the case with anyone, not even with other members of the jury, unless all of you are present and assembled in the jury room. Should anyone attempt to talk to you about the case before the verdict is returned, whether at the courthouse, or your home, or elsewhere, please inform the Judge of this fact. XIII. When you have answered all the questions you are required to answer under the instructions of the Judge and your presiding juror has placed your answers in the spaces provided and signed the verdict as presiding juror or obtained the signatures, you will inform the bailiff at the door of the jury CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 4 OF 30 231 232232232232232 room that you have reached a verdict, and then you will return into Court with your verdict. SIGNED this day of January, 2015. HONORABLE DAN MIKE BIRD 46'h District Court Judge f f;/eel I / 3 0 b (I 7 //30//5— cd- 5- so Ptid h7 1/4,-"I te CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 5 OF 30 232 233233233233233 DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS You are instructed that when words are used in the Questions in a sense which varies from the meaning commonly understood, you will be given in this Charge a proper legal definition which you are bound to accept in the place of any other definition or meaning. In answering the Questions you shall give the following terms the following meanings: 1. The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible evidence presented in this case. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "yes" answer, then answer "no." A preponderance of the evidence is not measured by the number of witnesses or by the number of documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true than not true. A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, or both. A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other facts proved. 2. A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both. A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other facts proved. 3. "Mikkelsen" means PlaintiffJohn Mikkelsen, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust and his agents, attorneys, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 6 OF 30 233 234234234234234 4. "Herring Bancorp" means Herring Bancorp, Inc., and its agents, attorneys, employees, officers, directors, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment. 5. "C.C. Burgess" means C.C. Burgess and his agents, attorneys, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment. 6. "Campbell Burgess" means C. Campbell Burgess and his agents, attorneys, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment. 7. The "Articles of Incorporation" means and refers to the Articles of Incorporation of Herring (Plaintiff's Exhibit "2"). INSTRUCTION REGARDING BREACH OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION You are instructed that the Court has previously determined, as a matter of law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply with the Articles of Incorporation of Herring Bancorp when it purported to involuntarily redeem Mikkelsen's preferred shares in 2006. However, this failure to comply with the Articles of Incorporation, standing alone, is not sufficient to constitute minority oppression or breach of fiduciary duty. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 7 OF 30 234 235235235235235 QUESTION NO 1: What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Mikkelsen's attorney in connection with the failure of Herring Bancorp to comply with the Articles of Incorporation? In answering this Question, you are to consider the attorney's fees and expenses incurred and reasonably anticipated to be incurred by Mikkelsen in enforcing his rights in this action and any appeal thereof. In determining the amount of attorney's fees and expenses, you are to consider the following: • the time and labor involved, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly; • the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; • the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; • the amount involved and the results obtained; • the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; • the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; • the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and • whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 8 OF 30 235 236236236236236 Answer with an amount for each of the following: a. For preparation in the trial court. 1 ANSWER: /X / rra oo b. For representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals. ANSWER: j- ' Ma OV c. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: 4 00, di d. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: /4./ ave. at, e. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas. ANSWER: /D/oc,e7 ' el) CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 9 OF 30 236 237237237237237 QUESTION NO. 2: Do you find that C. C. Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen? "Oppressive conduct" means burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair dealing in the company's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely. It also means unfair treatment of minority shareholders by the directors or those in control the corporation. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 10 OF 30 237 238238238238238 QUESTION NO. 3: Do you find that Campbell Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen? "Oppressive conduct" means burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair dealing in the company's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely. It also means unfair treatment of minority shareholders by the directors or those in control of the corporation. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 11 OF 30 238 239239239239239 ace 5 14, 6-1. a-4 ')/e_.5 61-4.-"•-'2‘/--- id no QUESTION NO. 4: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that proximately resulted from such oppressive conduct, if any, you have found? Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015. Answer in dollars and cents. Answer: $ 3, 3/e( ffo CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 12 OF 30 239 240240240240240 QUESTION NO. 5: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 2. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: X0 CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 13 OF 30 240 241241241241241 QUESTION NO. 6: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 3. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." 4 115'tlfra n) C1 CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 14 OF 30 241 242242242242242 QUESTION NO. 7: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 5. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C.C. Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 2? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of C.C. Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of C.C. Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 15 OF 30 242 243243243243243 QUESTION NO. 8: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 6. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 3? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 16 OF 30 243 244244244244244 JURY QUESTION NO. 9: Do you find that C. C. Burgess used his personal control of Herring Bancshares to breach fiduciary duties owed to Mikkelsen? In connection with the foregoing question, you are instructed that a majority shareholder of a corporation owes fiduciary duties to a minority shareholder and to show compliance with those duties must show he acted fairly and equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous honesty, fully and fairly disclosing all important information to a minority shareholder such as Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 17 OF 30 244 245245245245245 OUESTION NO. 10: Do you find that Campbell Burgess used his personal control of Herring Bancshares to breach fiduciary duties owed to Mikkelsen? In connection with the foregoing question, you are instructed that a majority shareholder of a corporation owes fiduciary duties to a minority shareholder and to show compliance with those duties must show he acted fairly and equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous honesty, fully and fairly disclosing all important information to a minority shareholder such as Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: /VA CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 18 OF 30 245 246246246246246 qn w"61" / OUESTION NO. 11: 5WW, What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that proximately resulted from such breaches of fiduciary duties, if any you have found? Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015. Answer in dollars and cents. Answer: $ 0. 00 CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 19 OF 30 246 247247247247247 OUESTION NO. 12: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. Ht. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: N6 CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 20 OF 30 247 248248248248248 OUESTION NO. 13: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 10. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 21 OF 30 248 249249249249249 QUESTION NO. 14: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 12. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C. C. Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 9? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of C. C. Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of C. C. Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 22 OF 30 249 250250250250250 QUESTION NO. 15: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 13. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 10? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 23 OF 30 250 251251251251251 OUESTION NO. 16: Answer the following Question only if you have answered "yes" to Questions 2 or 9. Was C. C. Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Mikkelsen of his preferred shares in Herring Bancorp? To be part of a conspiracy, C. C. Burgess and another person or persons must have had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course of action that resulted in damages to Mikkelsen. One or more persons involved in the conspiracy must have performed some act or acts to further the conspiracy. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: ifiel CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 24 OF 30 251 252252252252252 OUESTION NO. 17: Answer the following Question only if you had answered "yes" to Questions 3 or 10. Was Campbell Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Mikkelsen of his preferred shares in Herring Bancorp? To be part of a conspiracy, Campbell Burgess and another person or persons must have had knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course of action that resulted in damages to Mikkelsen. One or more persons involved in the conspiracy must have performed some act or acts to further the conspiracy. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: A CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 25 OF 30 252 253253253253253 y ep-‘,1 / 5 "/.1411;. QUESTION NO. 18: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such conspiracy? Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015. Answer in dollars and cents. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 26 OF 30 253 254254254254254 OUESTION NO. 19: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 16. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote often or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 27 OF 30 254 255255255255255 QUESTION NO. 20: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 17. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from malice? "Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. "Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to Mikkelsen. Answer "yes" or "no." Answer: CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 28 OF 30 255 256256256256256 QUESTION NO. 21: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 19. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C. C. Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 16? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of C. C. Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of C. C. Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 29 OF 30 256 257257257257257 QUESTION NO. 22: Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 20. You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages. What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 17? "Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment. Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are— a. The nature of the wrong. b. The character of the conduct involved. c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess. d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned. e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety. f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess. Answer in dollars and cents, if any. Answer: $ CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 30 OF 30 257 258258258258258 258 EXHIBIT 3 409409409409409 08/19/ 2 015 13:19 8178774781 POPE HARDWICKE PAGE 02/03 FILED The \ C1 day of Ct.L.A_c , 20 15 At I 55 o'clock p _NA: o'clock Brenda Peterson ,lerk Dist. Court Wilbarger Co. CAUSE NO. 24,955 By Deputy JOHN M1KKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff, V. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, Defendants. 46TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DRDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOR REMITTUR AND TO MODIFY, CORRECT AND/OR REFORM THE JUDGMENT CAME ON FOR HEARING on August 19, 2015 the Motion of Defendant/Counter- Plaintiffs Herring Bancorp, Inc., C. C. Burgess and C. Campbell Burgess for a New Trial, for Remittur, and to Modify, Correct and/or Reform the Judgment. The Court, having considered the Motion and the arguments of counsel, finds that the Motion should be DENIED. it is so ORDERED. SIGNED on the /? day of , 2015. Dan Mike Bird, Judge Presiding Mikitc15 »=wings \ Order Denying Tzial,Doc ORDER PAGE 1 409 410410410410410 FILED The 1 ci day of auk.% 20 15- At I". 5 5 o'clock_p M: o'clock Brenda Peterson CAUSE NO. 24,955 Jerk Dist. Court Wilbarger Co. By JOHN MIKKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff, v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, Defendants. 46th JUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND ADDITIONAL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT Came on for consideration Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Additional Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (the "Motions"). The Court, having reviewed and considered the Motions, any related responses, and the arguments of counsel, is of the opinion that the Motions should be DENIED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is hereby DENIED. IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED that the Additional Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is hereby DENIED. SIGNED this, the 1i day of HON. DAN MIKE BIRD, DISTRICT JUDGE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND ADDITIONAL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT--PAGE 1 410 EXHIBIT 4 306306 FILE The Lday ot OAA-1, At ul b O'CIOCKILM: O'CiOCK Brenda Peterson k Dist.Cov4 ilibarget Co. . CAUSE NO. 24,955 De- JOHN MIKKELSEN, • IN THE DISTRICT COURT acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff, v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, Defendants. 46TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDER Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion") came on for hearing on April 18, 2011. The Court finds Plaintiffs Motion was timely filed and that notice of Plaintiff's Motion and the hearing thereon was duly and properly given. The Court also finds that Defendants' Motion Was timely filed and served by agreement of the parties, and hereby grants leave to file and serve the Motion on less than 21-days' notice prior to the hearing. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the parties, and hereby grants Plaintiff leave to file and serve the Response and the evidence attached thereto, including discovery products, within seven days of the hearing. After considering Plaintiff's Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering Defendants' Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering the admissible summary judgment evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion should be granted and Defendants' Motion should be denied. ORDER PAGE 1 306 307307 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in its entirety. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Special Exceptions and Plea in Abatement are overruled and denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted in all respects. The Court further finds as a matter of law that (1) the purported redemption of Plaintiff's 300 shares of preferred stock of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") was undertaken in violation of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and is void and (2) that Plaintiff is, and continues to be, the holder of 300 shares of the Company's preferred stock, and has all the rights appurtenant thereto, including the right to inspec the Company's books and records. SIGNED on the day of , 2011. udge residing Approved as to form: Lee F. Christie, Counsel for Plaintiff James W. Bowen, Counsel for Defendants ORDER PAGE 2 307 EXHIBIT 5 ILED • sr 1 • Or the Arrexas ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION DEC 9 1983 OF HERRING BANCORP, INC. Clerk E Corporations Section I, the undersigned natural person of the age of eighteen (18) years or more, acting as an incorporator of a corporation (hereinafter called the "Corporation") under the Texas Business Corporation Act, do hereby adopt the following Articles of Incorporation for the Corporation: ARTICLE ONE: NAME The name of the Corporation is Herring Bancorp, Inc. ARTICLE TWO: DURATION The Corporation's period of duration is perpetuaL ARTICLE THREE: PURPOSE The purpose or purposes for which the Corporation is organized are: (a) To act as a bank holding company; (b) To transact any and all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under the Texas Business Corporation Act; (c) To do each and every thing necessary, suitable, or proper for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or for the attainment of any one or more of the objects herein enumerated or which at any time appear conducive to or expedient for the protection or benefit of the Corporation. The foregoing clauses shall be construed as powers as well as objects and purposes, and the matter expressed in each clause shall, unless herein otherWise expressly provided, be in nowise limited by reference to or inference from the terms of any other clause, but shall be regarded as independent objects, purposes and powers, and shall not be construed to limit or restrict in any manner the meaning of the general terms or the general powers of the Corporation. ARTICLE FOUR: STOCK The Corporation is authorized to issue two classes of shares to be designated respectively "preferred" and "common." The total number of shares which the Corporation is authorized to issue is 125,000 shares. The number of HERR 000075 preferred shares authorized is 25,000 shares, and the par value of each such share is $95.00. The number of common shares authorized is 100,000 shares, and the par value of each such share is $20.00. (a) The holders of the preferred shares shall be entitled to receive dividends, out of any funds legally available therefor, at the rate of ten percent (10.0%) per annum of the par value thereof, and no more, payable in cash semi-annually, or at such intervals as the Board of Directors may from time to time determine. Such dividends shall accrue from the date of issuance of the respective preferred shares and shall be deemed to accrue from day to day whether or not earned or declared. Such dividends shall be payable before any dividends shall be paid, declared, or set apart for the common shares, and shall be cumulative so that if for any dividend period such dividends on the outstanding preferred shares at the rate of ten percent (10.0%) per annum of the par value thereof are not paid or declared and set apart therefor, the deficiency shall be fully paid or declared and set apart for payment, without interest, before any distribution, by dividend or otherwise, shall be paid on, declared, or set apart for the common shares. (b) On any voluntary or involuntary liquidation of the Corporation, the holders of the preferred shares shall receive an amount equal to the par value of such shares plus any dividends declared and unpaid thereon, and no more, before any amount shall be paid to the holders of the common shares. If the assets of the Corporation should be insufficient to permit payment to the preferred share- holders of their full preferential amounts as herein provided, then such assets shall be distributed ratably among the outstanding preferred shares. Subject to such preferential rights, the holders of the common shares shall receive, ratably, all remaining assets of the Corporation. A consolidation or merger of the Corporation with or into any other corporation or a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the Corporation shall not be deemed a liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the Corporation within the meaning of this paragraph. (c) The Corporation, at the option of the Board of Directors, may at any time redeem the whole, or from time to time redeem any part, of the preferred shares outstanding by paying in cash therefor the sum of $95.00 per share, plus all dividends declared but unpaid thereon as provided in this Article Four to and including the date of redemption, hereinafter referred to as the "redemptive price," and by giving to each preferred shareholder of record at his last known address, as shown on the records of the Corporation, at least twenty (20), but not more than fifty (50), days' prior notice personally or in writing, by mail, postage prepaid, stating the class or series or part of the class or series of shares to be redeemed and 2 HERR 000076 the date and plan of redemption, the redemptive price, and the place where the shareholders may obtain payment of the redemp- tive price on surrender of their respective share certificates, hereinafter called the "redemption notice." Should only a part of the outstanding preferred shares be redeemed, such redemption shall be effected by lot, or pro rata, as prescribed by the Board of Directors. On or after the date fixed for redemption, each holder of shares called for redemption shall surrender his certificate for such shares to the Corporation at the place designated in the redemption notice and shall thereupon be entitled to receive payment of the redemptive price. Should less than all the shares represented by any surrendered certificate be redeemed, a new certificate for the unredeemed shares shall be issued. If the redemption notice is duly given and if sufficient funds are available therefor on the date fixed for redemption, then, whether or not the certificates evidencing the shares to be redeemed are surrendered, all rights with respect to such shares shall terminate on the date fixed for redemption, except for the right of the holders to receive the redemption price, without interest, on surrender of their certificate therefor. (d) If, on or prior to any date fixed for redemption of preferred shares as herein provided, the Corporation deposits with any bank or trust company in Texas, or any bank or trust company in the United States duly appointing and acting as transfer agent for the Cor- poration, as a trust fund, a sum sufficient to redeem, on the date fixed for redemption thereof, the shares called for redemption, with irrevocable instructions and authority to the bank or trust company to publish the notice of redemption thereof, or to complete such publication if theretofore commenced, and to pay, on and after the date fixed for redemption or prior thereto, the redemptive price of the shares to their respective holders on surrender of their share certificates, then from and after the date of the deposit, even though such date may be prior to the date fixed for redemption, the shares so called shall be deemed to be redeemed and dividends on those shares shall cease to accrue after the date fixed for redemption. The deposit shall be deemed to constitute full payment of the shares to their holders and from and after the date of the deposit, the shares shall be deemed to be no longer outstanding, and the holders thereof shall cease to be shareholders with respect to such shares and shall have no rights with respect thereto, except the right to receive from the bank or trust company payment of the redemptive price of the shares, without interest, on surrender of their certificates therefor. (e) Shares redeemed by the Corporation shall be restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares of the Corporation. (f) Except where otherwise provided in these Articles of Incorporation or by law, the holders of the common shares shall have the 3 HERR 000077 exclusive voting rights and powers, including the exclusive right to notice of shareholders' meetings. ARTICLE FIVE: PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS DENIED No holder of any shares of common stock or preferred stock shall have any preemptive or preferential right to receive, purchase, or subscribe to (a) any unissued or treasury shares of any class of stock (whether now or hereafter authorized) of the Corporation, (b) any obligations, evidences of indebtedness, or other securities of the Corporation convertible into or exchangeable for, or carrying or accompanied by any rights to receive, purchase, or subscribe to, any such unissued or treasury shares, (c) any right of subscription to or right to receive, or any warrant or option for the purchase of, any of the foregoing securities, or (d) any other securities that may be issued or sold by the Corporation. ARTICLE SIX: COMMENCING BUSINESS The Corporation will not commence business until it has received con- sideration for the issuance of its shares amounting to One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) in value and consisting of money, labor done, or property actually received. ARTICLE SEVEN: CUMULATIVE VOTING Cumulative voting for the election of directors is prohibited. ARTICLE EIGHT: VOTING Except where otherwise provided in these Articles of Incorporation or the bylaws of the Corporation, the holders of the common stock shall have the exclusive voting rights and powers, including the exclusive right to notice of shareholders' meetings. ARTICLE NINE: ADOPTION OF BYLAWS The Board of Directors of the Corporation shall adopt the initial bylaws of the Corporation and may thereafter alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws of the Corporation or may adopt new bylaws, subject to the shareholders' concurrent right to alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws or to adopt new bylaws. The shareholders may provide that any or all bylaws altered, amended, repealed, or adopted by the shareholders shall not be altered, amended, reenacted, or repealed by the Board of Directors of the Corporation. 4 HERR 000078 ARTICLE TEN: INTERESTED PARTIES A contract or transaction between the Corporation and any other Person (as used herein the term "Person" means an individual, firm, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, corporation, political subdivision or instrumentality, or other entity) shall not be affected or invalidated by the fact that (a) any director, officer, or security holder of the Corporation is also a party to, or has a direct or indirect interest in, such contract or transaction; or (b) any director, officer, or security holder of the Corporation is in any way connected with such other Person or with any of its officers or directors. Every person who may become a director of the Corporation is hereby relieved from any liability that might otherwise exist from contracting with the Corporation for the benefit of himself or of any Person in which he has any interest, whether or not the interested director's presence at a meeting or his vote or votes were necessary to obligate the Corporation in such transaction, if such interest shall have been disclosed to, or known to, the Corporation's directors or shareholders who shall have approved such transaction. ARTICLE ELEVEN: INDEMNIFICATION Section A. The Corporation shall indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened with being made a party to any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative (all such actions, suits, and proceedings and accompanying modi- fiers being comprehended by the term "Proceeding") (excluding actions by, or in the right of, the Corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a director or officer of the Corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another Person. Such indemnification may be made only against those expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with such Proceeding if (i) he is successful on the merits or otherwise; or (ii) he acted in the transaction which is the subject of the Proceeding in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the Corporation, and, with respect to any criminal Proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any Proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the Corporation, nor, with respect to any criminal Proceeding, that he had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. Section B. The Corporation shall indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened with being made a party to a Proceeding by or in the right of the Corporation by reason of the fact that he is or was a director or officer of the Corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another Person. Such indemnification may be made against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably 5 HERR 000079 incurred by such person in connection with the defense or settlement of such Proceeding if (1) he is successful on the merits or otherwise; or (ii) he acted in the transaction which is the subject of the Proceeding in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the Corporation. However, no indemnification may be made in respect of any claim, issue, or matter in relation to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the Corporation. Notwithstanding the foregoing exception, indemnification may be made to the extent that the court in which such Proceeding was brought shall determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification for such expenses as the court of appropriate jurisdiction shall deem proper. Section C. Any indemnification under Section A or Section B of this Article (other than one ordered by a court) may be made by the Corporation only upon a determination that indemnification of such person is proper in the circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in such Section. Such determination shall be made by the Board of Directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not parties to such Proceeding; or, if such a quorum is not obtainable (or, even if obtainable, if a quorum of disinterested directors so directs), by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or by the shareholders of the Corporation; or through such procedures as shall be authorized in the bylaws of the Corporation. Section D. Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal Proceeding may be paid by the Corporation in advance of the final disposition of such Proceeding as authorized by the Board of Directors or other appropriate body or party in the manner provided in Section C of this Article only when the Corporation has received an undertaking by or on behalf of the person who is to receive such payment to repay such amount unless it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be indemnified by the Corporation as authorized in this Article. Section E. In determining whether the standard of conduct set forth in Section A or Section B has been met, it may be determined that a person has met the standard as to some matters but not as to others, and the amount of indemnification may be accordingly prorated. Section F. The indemnification provided by Sections A through E shall not be exclusive of any other rights to which a person may be entitled by law, bylaw, agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise. Section G. The indemnification provided by Sections A through E shall inure to the heirs, executors, and administrators of any person entitled to indemnification under this Article. Section H. The Corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on any person who is or was a director or officer of the Corporation or is or was serving at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of 6 HERR 000080 another Person against any liability incurred by him in any such position, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the Corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability under Sections A through E. ARTICLE TWELVE: REPURCHASE OF STOCK The Corporation is authorized to purchase, directly or indirectly, its own shares to the extent of the aggregate of the unrestricted capital surplus and unrestricted reduction surplus available therefor, without submitting such pur- chase to a vote of the shareholders of the Corporation. ARTICLE THIRTEEN: AUTHORITY TO BORROW The Board of Directors is expressly authorized, without the consent of the stockholders, except so far as such consent is herein or by law provided, to issue and sell or otherwise dispose of, for any purpose, the Corporation's bonds, debentures, notes or other securities or obligations, upon such terms and for such consideration as the Board of Directors shall deem advisable and to authorize and cause to be executed mortgages, pledges, charges and liens upon all or part of the real and personal property rights, interest and franchise of the Corpor- ation, including contract rights, whether at the time owned or thereafter acquired. ARTICLE FOURTEEN: INITIAL OFFICE AND AGENT The address of the initial registered office of the Corporation is 1900 Pease Street, Vernon, Texas, and the name of its initial registered agent at such address is H. W. Dozier. ARTICLE FIFTEEN: INITIAL DIRECTORS The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors of the Corporation is five and the names and addresses of the persons who are to serve as directors until the first annual meeting of shareholders, or until their respective successors are elected and qualified, are: NAME ADDRESS Robert B clew 2603 Mansard Street Vernon, Texas 76384 C. C. Burgess Suite 1000 Amarillo National Bank Bldg. Amarillo, Texas 79101 H, W. Dozier 1102 Hillcrest Drive Vernon, Texas 76384 7 HERR 000081 NAME ADDRESS Curtis D. Johnson 2230 Hilltop Vernon, Texas 76384 John Mikkelsen 2801 Gordon Street Vernon, Texas 76384 ARTICLE SIXTEEN: INCORPORATOR The name and address of the incorporator is: NAME ADDRESS Tonia T. Kittelson 4700 InterFirst Two Dallas, Texas 75270 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this document as of the /4 tL day of aete,...bet- , 1983. \77 Tonia T. Kittelson STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF DALLAS S I. ..ler)cxy , a Notary Public, hereby certify that on this n day `tot C eir 1983, personally appeared before me Tonia T. Kittelson, who, being first duly sworn by me, declared that he is the person who signed the foregoing document as incorporator and that the statements contained therein are true. AWAY K GOEBtL, Notary Public in and for the State of Texas My commission expires Feb 19, 1986 Nota Pub is id nd fod exas 8 HERR 000082 EXHIBIT 6 UZ/UVUY VYLA HE C. C. Burgess kmaiumem4fe*A.d Notice of Redemption 2201 Crpic Circle, Salsa 1001 Amarillo, IX 79109 October 31, 2006 for 9900 Amarillo, TX 791054900 Dear Preferred Stock. Shareholder: (809 375-3921 Phone (8019 3724230 Fax This letter is to notify you that the board of directors (the "Board') cebargees@kerringbantcom of Herring Bancorp, Inc_ (the "Coneeleeny") has called for the retiene0oe (the "Redemption") of your outstanding shares of Preferred Stock (the "Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 20, 2006. Ae you know on July 26, 2006, our Board approved taking the necessary acts for the Company to become an "S corporgon" under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. In order to become eligible to reeve the Subchapter S election, the Company is. 9nly allowed to have one class of outstanding capital stock, and voting rights between shares of stork are disregarded for determining whet & a company has more than one bass of stock. At the current time, the Company has a number of outstanding classes of stock, which include your Preferred Stock shares, as well as Class A Nonvoting Common. Stock, Class A-Series 2 Nonvoting Common Stock, and Class B Nonvoting Common Stook (collectively, the "Nonvoting Shares"). Therefore, we must currently consolidate our Nonvoting Shares into one class_ The Class A Nonvoting Common Stock and the Class B Nonvoting Common Stock will be allowed to exchange their shares for Common Stoek-Sefies A, and the Class A-Series 2 Nonvoting Common Stock will be converted into a subordinated debetnere, As a result of this process, the Board appointed a committee to recommend the criteria for determining which Preferred Stock shareholders would be offered to exchenge their shares for the Company's common stock (the "Common Stock"), the nonvoting Common Stock- Series A (the "Common Stook-Series A") or to have their s_res redeemed. The Board's criteria for making this determination iriehlde4 whether the Preferred Stock shareholder heti a bererie5 relationship with Herring Bank (the "Bank"), and whether they would own at least 50 shares of Common Stock won the wnversion. If these criteria were met, the Board offered the Preferred Stock shareholders the option to exchange their shares for the Common Stock If the Prefened Stock shareholder did not meet these criteria, the Board determined the Preferred Stock shareholders would be redeemed_ Additionally, if the Preferred Stock shareholder did not have a banking relationship with the Bank, we would offer them the option of either e:cchanging their shares for the nonvoting Common Stock-Series A or having their shares redeemed. From our Defendants' 111.1.1111111111111Eni exeme M 0003 02/01/07 13:55 FAL conversations with you Mid the Board's determinations regarding our classes of seock, your Preferred Stock will be redeemed. The Redemption will take plate after 5:00 pm on November 20, 2006 (the "Redemption Date"). The price to be paid for each share of Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an amount equal to all dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to the date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of the Redemption, the Company will pay you $95,00, in cash, for the shares of Preferred Stock you hold that will be redeemed.. Prior to or at the open of beefiness after 5:00 p.m. on November 20, 2006, the Company will deposit with Herring Bank, Amarillo, Texas (hereinafter the "Transfer Agent"), as a trust fund, an amount necessary to pay the aggregate Redemptive Price, together with hievocable instructions and authority to the Transfer Agent to pay, on or after the Redemption Date, the Redemptive Price to the holders of the Preferred Stock upon the Transfer Agent's receipt of the duly surrendered certificates representing their Preferred Stock. As a result of the ComiAny's deposit of funds with the Transfer Agent, you will cease to be a holder of shares of Preferred Stock as of the Redemption Date and will only be entitled to the receipt of the Redemptive Price. In order to receive the Redemptive Price, you should deliver to the Transfer Agent the following: (1) a duly executed Letter of Transmittal, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, and (ii) the stock certificate(s) representing your shares of Preferred Stock. The address of the Transfer Agent is Herring Bank, P.O. Box 9900, Amarillo, Texas 79105. The telephone number of the Transfer Agent is (806) 355-0153. Please follow carefully the instructions to the Letter of Transmittal when compleeing it Assuming the Transfer Agent receives the applicable doeriments from you prior to The Redemption Date (and assuming there is no problem with these documents), the Transfer Agent will hold. them in escrow for you until the Redemption Date, at which time you will receive payment for your shares. The Company will pay the Redemptive Price by check of same day funds. Please refer to the Letter of Transmittal provided herewith for further instructions on how to surrender certificates and receive delivery of the Redemptive Price. You may obtain additionnl copies of the Letter of Transmittal from the Company. Also, if any of your Preferred Stock certificates have been lost, stolen or misplaced, or if any of your shares are pledged or membered, you will need to make additional arrangements in order to receive the Redemptive Price for your shares_ Please contact the Transfer Agent for thriller details. MIK 0004 02/01/U7 13;55 YAA Preferred Stock Shareholder October 31, 2006 Page 3 Assuming that the Transfer Agent has received these documents from you on or before 5:00 p.m. on November 20, 2006 (and that there are no problems with your documents), you will be able to receive payment for your shares on the Redemption Date. You may pick up your check on the Redemption Date at Herring Bank, 2201 Civic Circle, Amarillo, Texas during regular business hours. If you will not be available to pick up your check in person at That time, please contact the Transfer Agent so that you can arrange an alternate method of delivery of the Redemptive Price for your Preferred Stock. If you do not pick up your check on the Redemption Date or contact the Transfer Agent to make other arrangements, the Transfer Agent will mail your check to you at the close of business on the Redemption Date. If your documents are not in order so that your check is not available on the Redemption Date.. your check will be mailed to you as soon as possible after your documents are received and approved. Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a taxable transaction for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state, local or foreign income or other tax consequences to the Redemption. You should consult your own tax advisor to determine the precise tax consequences of this transaction. If you should lave any questions in connection with any aspect of this letter, please feel free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921. Very truly yours, ITERRING BANCORP, INC. C.C. Burgess Chairman of the Board MIK 0005 EXHIBIT 7 11.., UU 000000 /.!,.n I.Y":".-nY.5-1)1.34.3-1 &ULM 177.7 .1.61 200729 061750 79109 IRS USBONLY 751922006 S13 0 Depai truant of the Treasury For assistance„ call' luteruut Revenue Service 1-800-829-0115 P.O. BOX 249 st MEMPHIS, Th36'01-0249 Notice Number: CP261 Date: July 30, 2007 Taxpayer Identification Number: 75-1922(106 051810.406213,0215.005 1 AB 0.341 530 Tax Form: Tax Pella!: HERRING BANCORP INC 2201 CIVIC CIR AMARILLO TX 79109-1817016 051000 Notice of Acceptance as an S Corporation We have accepted your election to be treated as an S corporation beginning January 1, 2007. Your accounting period will end in December. We would also like to take this opportunity to infonn you of your tax obligations related to the payment of compensation to shareholder-employees of S corporations When a shareholder-employee of an S corporation provides services to the S corporation, reasonable compensation generally needs to be paid, This compensation is subject to employment taxes. Tax practitioners and subchapter S shareholders need to be aware that Revenue Ruling 74-44 states that the Internal Revenue Service (as) will re-characterize small business corporation dividends paid to shareholders as salary when such dividends are paid to the shareholders in lieu of reasonable compensation for services The IRS may also re-characterize distributions other than dividend distributions as salary. This position has been supported in several recent court decisions If you have any questions about this notice or the action we have taken, please call us at the telephone number listed above. If you prefer, you. may write to us at the address shown at the top of this notice. If you write to us, please provide your telephone number and the most convenient time for us to call so we —can resolve y011linqUify.-PieaSe fel WM the Luit,;m-irant of this notice to help us identify your case. For tax forms, instructions and information visit www,irs,gov. (Access to this site will not provide you with your specific taxpayer account information.) Defendants' Exhibit DEPOSITION 31 IL% amommiL, t.t)2389 , au+ IV u.: 113.A.,0 TIN: XX-XXXXXXX Form: Tax Period: 0519 SO of CUT HERE _ _ Return this vat!cher with your payment or con-espandence. C3 Correspondence enclosed: • • Write your Taxpayer Identification Your Telephone Number. Best Time to Coll: Number, tax period and tax form number ( AM PM on your inquiry or correspondence SS 200729 29953-593-01343-7 • 261 Internal Revenue Service P.O. BOX 249 . MEMPHIS, TN 38101z-0249 HERRING BANCORP INC 2201 CIVIC CIR t 111111118111111111111 1(1 111 .1111,1111 AMARILLO TX 79109-1817016 751922006 IL HERR 00 2 000000 HERR 002390 EXHIBIT 8 HERRING i ANCORA INC. C. C. Burgess Chairman of the Board October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption John Mikkelsen and John Mikkelsen Trust Via Overnight Mail c/o Lee Christie POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP 306 West 7th Street, Suite 901 Fort Worth, TX 76102 Dear Preferred Stock Shareholder: This letter is to notify you that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") has called for the redemption (the "Redemption") of all shares of Preferred Stock (the "Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 22, 2013. The Redemption will take place after 3:00 p.m. on November 22, 2013 (the "Redemption Date"). The price to be paid for each share of Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an amount equal to all dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to the date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of the Redemption, the Company will pay you $95.00, in cash, for the shares of Preferred Stock you hold that will be redeemed. Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a taxable transaction for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state, local or foreign income or other tax consequences to the Redemption. You should consult your own tax advisor to determine the precise tax consequences of this transaction. If you should have any questions in connection with any aspect of this letter, please feel free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921. Very truly yours, HERRING BANCORP, INC. C.C. Burgess Chairman of the Board 2201 Civic Circle. Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109 RO. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900 (806) 373 3921 Phone (806) 372.8230 Far erburgess@herringbank.com HERRING BANCO►RP, INC. C. C. Burgess Chairman of the Board October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption Mallory Mikkelsen Via Overnight Mail do Lee Christie POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP 306 V►%est 7th Street, Suite 901 Fort Worth, TX 76102 Mallory Mikkelsen Via Overnight Mail 3912 Winter Park Road Addison, Texas 75001 Dear Preferred Stock Shareholder: This letter is to notify you that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") has called for the redemption (the "Redemption") of all shares of Preferred Stock (the "Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 22, 2013. The Redemption will take place after 3:00 p.m. on November 22, 2013 (the "Redemption Date"). The price to be paid for each share of Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an amount equal to all dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to the date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of the Redemption, the Company will pay you $95.00, in cash, for the shares of Preferred Stock you hold that will be redeemed. Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a taxable transaction for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state, local or foreign income or other tax consequences to the Redemption. You should consult your own tax advisor to determine the precise tax consequences of this transaction. If you should have any questions in connection with any aspect of this letter, please feel free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921. Very truly yours, HERRING BANCORP, INC. C.C. Burgess Chairman of the Board 2201 Civic Circle, Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109 P.D. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900 (806) 373.3921 Phone (806) 372,8230 Fax ccburgess@herringbank.com EXHIBIT 9 HERRING BA_NCORP, INC. C. C. Burgess Guthman of the Boolci November 22, 2013 John Mikkelsen Trust c/o Lee Christie Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP 306 West 7th Street, Suite 901 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Mallory Mikkelsen c/o Lee Christie Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP 306 West 7th Street, Suite 901 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Mallory Mikkelsen 3912 Winter Park Road Addison, Texas 75001 Dear Mr. John Mikkelsen and Mr. Mallory Mikkelsen: Herring Bancorp, Inc. is making the following unconditional tender in the amount of $115,548.24 ("Tender Amount"). The Tender Amount is calculated as follows and is shown on the attached worksheet: Preferred Stock Redemption Price $28,500.00 [$95/share X 300 shares] Unpaid Dividends $21,070.48 [($95/share X 300 shares) X 10%] ÷ 365 = $7.80/day Unpaid for 2006 Prior to November 21, 2006 $1,112.67 November 21, 2006 — December 31, 2006 $ 312.33 (40 Days X $7.80) January 1, 2007 — December 31, 2007 $2,850.00 January 1, 2008 — December 31, 2008 $2,850.00 January 1, 2009 — December 31, 2009 $2,850.00 January 1, 2010 — December 31, 2010 $2,850.00 January 1, 2011 — December 31, 2011 $2,850.00 January 1, 2012 — December 31, 2012 $2,850.00 January 1, 2013 — November 22, 2013 $2,545.48 (326 Days X $7.80) $21,070.48 2201 Civic Circle, Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109 P.O. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900 (806) 373.3921 Phone (806) 372.8230 Fax IiERR_3279 ccburgess@herringbank.com Interest $15,977.76 [5% per annum from the date due, compounded annually] Attorney's Fees $50,000.00 [Billing Statements Produced in the Lawsuit plus an additional amount] TOTAL $115,548.24 We are enclosing a cashier's check made payable to the order of John Mikkelsen Trust and Mallory Mikkelsen. The actual check is being placed in the envelope delivered to Mr. Christie. Very truly yours, HERRING BANCORP, INC. C.C. Burgess Chairman of the Board HERR_3280 Preferred Redemption Rate 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% Days 40 326 Int 2006 Int 2007 Int 2008 Int 2009 Int 2010 Int 2011 Int 2012 Int 2013 Total Total Int Preferred Stock 28,500.00 156.16 1,432.81 1,504.45 1,579.67 1,658.65 1,741.59 1,828.67 1,714.94 40,116.94 11,616.94 Dividends Days January 1, 2006- December 31, 2006 2,850.00 Less November 21, 2006-December 31, 2006 (312.33) Less paid Distributions Paid (1,425.00) Unpaid 2006 1,112.67 27.82 57.02 59.88 62.87 66.01 69.31 72.78 68.25 1,596.61 483.94 November 21, 2006-December 31, 2006 40 312.33 1.71 15.70 16.49 17.31 18.18 19.09 20.04 18.79 439.64 127.31 January 1, 2007- December 31, 2007 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 169.09 177.54 166.50 3,894.84 1,044.84 January 1, 2008- December 31, 2008 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 169.09 158.57 3,709.37 859.37 January 1, 2009- December 31, 2009 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 151.02 3,532.73 682.73 January 1, 2010- December 31, 2010 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 143.83 3,364.51 514.51 January 1, 2011- December 31, 2011 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 136.98 3,204.29 354.29 January 1, 2012- December 31, 2012 2,850.00 71.25 130.46 3,051.71 201.71 January 1, 2013- November 22, 2013 326 2,545.48 92.12 2,637.60 92.12 Distributions 21,070.48 29.53 143.97 293.68 450.86 615.90 789.20 971.16 1,066.52 25,431.30 4,360.82 Legal Fees 50,000.00 50,000.00 Total 115,548.24 15,977.76 Summary Preferred Redemption 28,500.00 Unpaid Dividends 21,070.48 Legal 50,000.00 5% interest from 11-21-2006 15,977.76 115,548.24 HERR_3281 CASHIER'S CHECK - CUSTOMER COPY MA3 November 22, 2013 120987 Purchaser: HERRING BANCORP $115,548.24 MIKKELSEN NON NE GOT I LE PAY TO THE ORDER OF: JOHN MIKKELSEN TRUST AND MALLORY MIKKELSEN Notice to'Customer If:this .check is lost, destroyed,_or stolen, the bank rill not accept a replacement request on the check until 90 days after the iSsue.date and then only with the issuance of a "beciaration of Loss" certification. WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS MULTIPLE SECURITY FEATURES. RE/Ma REVERSE SIPE FOR FULL DISCLOSURE. CASHIER'S CHECK •:-' ,'HERk11\1G BANK tttice to Customer Member FOle idf this'Cheotis lost destroyed, or stolen, the bati, 2201 C1,k Clnie • Amoral*. TX • 79109 (806)677-7000 tnot accept ,p.replae'rrient reciuest on the check Oil. r.90 days after the issue date and then only with the:,. issuance of a "Declaration of Loss" certification ' MA3 November 22, 2013 120987 PutChaser: HERRING BANCORP MIKKELSEN $115,548.24 0nalitndred- Fifteeri. ThotisandFiye Hundred Forty.:Eight Dollars And 24/100************* .• , 7 PAY TO THE JOHN MIKKELSEN TRUST AND MALLORY MIKKELSEN ORDER OF: Must Piave 2 ignatures Authorized Signature THIS AREA CONTAINS A DISAPPEARING BACKGROUND. RUB TO AUTHENTICATE. L 2098 7" L L L 30 284 61: Hs 704 S 3 28ng HERR_3282 EXHIBIT 10 260260260260260 If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. Otherwise, proceed to Question No. 4. OUESTJON NO. 2 Did Herring Bancorp. make a full tender to John Mikkelsen on November 22, 2013? You are instructed that a full tender is an unconditional offer by Herring Bancorp., the debtor, to pay John Mikkelsen, the creditor, a sum of money not less than the sum due Mikkelsen at the time the tender is made. Answer "Yes" or "No" Answer: Authority: Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet denied)(citing Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963)); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). Given 0 Given as modified 0 Refused Ii' Date FIL D H. orable Dan ike Bird The day of 20 /5 46th District Court Judge At o'cl M: o'clock A" Brenda Pete qleyk Disf CVlb 0. (2) By (---kb(--id Deputy DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED CHARGE QUESTIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS PAGE 8 OF 25 LATcm1Herring Bank-5998WIcadings\Jury ChArgel,wpc1 260 261261261261261 If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. Otherwise, proceed to Question No. 4. OUESTION NO. 2 Did Herring Bancorp. make a full tender to John Mikkelsen on November 22, 2013? You are instructed that a full tender is an unconditional offer by Herring Bancorp., the debtor, to pay John Mikkelsen, the creditor, a sum of money not less than the sum due Mikkelsen at the time the tender is made. Answer "Yes" or "No" Answer: Authority: Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet denied)(citing Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963)); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). Given 0 Given as modified 0 Refused EV VILED The.W____day of \• Zoe Honorable Dan Mike Bird o'clock M: o'clock 46th District Court Judge At 2 '.0 0 Brenda Peterson perk pist. Court ilbarger Co. By Deputy DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED PROPOSED CHARGE, QUESTIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS PAGE 9 OF 26 laem1Herring Bank-5998 Tleadings\lury ChargeI a.wpd 261 2E5 /2b I:Iti 145 145 267267267267267 If you answered "No" to Question No. 2, then answer Question No. 3. Otherwise, do not answer Question No. 3. QUESTION NO. 3 Do you find that all sums due to John Mikkelsen under the Articles of Incorporation have been tendered or paid in full by Herring Bancorp? Answer "Yes" or "No" Answer: Authority: See Pierce v. Baker, 238 S.W. 699, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1922, no writ). Given D Given as modified 0 Refused Date FILED the day o 20n L At 3I sr)-- o'cl ck M: o'clock Honorable Dan Mike Bird 46th District Court Judge Brenda Peterson iqerk C.ipyq arger Co. EWA- Li LLUI:.( Deputy DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED PROPOSED CHARGE, QUESTIONS. 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