Motion Granted and Trial Court’s Order Reversed; Opinion Filed October 20, 2015.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-15-01117-CV
DWIGHT BELL, DEBORAH BELL, AND BOB BELL, Appellants
V.
KAREN LYNN HARRIS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-00107-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
Appellant, Dwight Bell, seeking to proceed in this appeal without prepayment of costs as
contemplated under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1, has filed a motion for review of the
trial court’s order sustaining the court reporter’s contest to his September 14, 2015 affidavit of
indigence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(a),(j). The court reporter timely contested Bell’s affidavit on
September 17, 2015, two days after the district clerk filed her contest. See id. 20.1(e)(1). Only
the court reporter’s contest was argued at the hearing.
We review a trial court’s order sustaining a contest to an affidavit of indigence for abuse
of discretion. Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). We will conclude the trial court abused its discretion if it
acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles or in an arbitrary and unreasonable
manner. See id. When, as here, multiple contests to an affidavit are filed, the trial court has ten
days from the filing of the first contest to sign an order either sustaining the contest or extending
the time for hearing it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(i)(2),(4); Ramirez v. Packer, 807 S.W.2d 728,
729 (Tex. 1991). If the trial court fails to do either within the ten day period, the allegations in
the affidavit are deemed true, and the party filing the affidavit of indigence is allowed to proceed
on appeal without prepayment of costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(i)(4).
Based on the September 15th filing date of the district clerk’s contest, the trial court had
until September 25th to sign the order sustaining the contests or extending the time for hearing
them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(i)(2),(4); Ramirez, 807 S.W.2d at 729. The trial court, however,
did neither. Rather, the trial court signed the order sustaining the court reporter’s contest
October 6, 2015.
Because the trial court ruled on the contest outside the permissible time period, the trial
court abused its discretion in sustaining the contest and Bell is allowed to proceed with this
appeal without advance payment of costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1(i)(4). We grant Bell’s
motion and reverse the trial court’s order.
/Craig Stoddart/
CRAIG STODDART
151117F.P05 JUSTICE
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