UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4161
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD MATTHEW GAINEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00245-NCT-3)
Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 3, 2016
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Matthew Gainey pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in
violation 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The district court sentenced
Gainey to 175 months’ imprisonment, a term below his 240-month
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal. The Government declined to file a brief.
Because Gainey did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Gainey] must show that
an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Gainey satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Gainey’s guilty
plea, which Gainey entered knowingly and voluntarily.
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Turning to Gainey’s sentence, we review a sentence for
procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We must first ensure that the district court did
not commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing
to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing
to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors,
or failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. If we find
the sentence procedurally reasonable, we then consider its
substantive reasonableness. Id. at 328. We presume on appeal
that a sentence within or below the properly calculated
Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). Such a presumption
is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006).
Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive
sentencing error by the district court. The district court
correctly calculated Gainey’s advisory Guidelines range, heard
argument from counsel, provided Gainey an opportunity to
allocute, and considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. We
have reviewed the record and conclude that Gainey’s below-
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Guidelines sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
Gainey filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting that the
district court erred in adjudging him permanently ineligible to
receive federal benefits. However, the district court made no
such ruling.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this
case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. This
court requires that counsel inform Gainey, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Gainey requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Gainey.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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