UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4107
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
APRIL LYNN LOCKLEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (7:15-cr-00033-D-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 3, 2016
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
April Lynn Locklear pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to conspiracy to make false bank entries, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1005 (2012), and the district
court imposed a downward variant sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the
district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for
obstruction of justice. Locklear was informed of her right to
file a pro se informal brief, but chose not to do so. The
Government moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appeal
waiver provision in Locklear’s plea agreement. For the reasons
that follow, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
“We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and
will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is
within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Copeland, 707
F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the
right to appeal.” United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169
(4th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a waiver is knowing and
intelligent, we examine “the totality of the circumstances
. . . , including the background, experience, and conduct of the
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accused.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally,
if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver
of appellate rights during the [plea] colloquy and the record
indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of
the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The language of the appeal waiver in Locklear’s plea
agreement is clear and unambiguous, and the record reveals that
Locklear understood the full significance of the waiver. The
court also confirmed that Locklear was competent to plead guilty
and was entering her plea in the absence of threats, force, or
promises outside of those contained in the plea agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude that Locklear’s appeal waiver is valid
and enforceable.
We also conclude that Locklear’s challenge to the
obstruction of justice enhancement falls squarely within the
scope of the waiver. We have thoroughly reviewed the record in
accordance with Anders and have identified no potentially
meritorious issues that fall outside the scope of the appeal
waiver. We therefore grant the Government’s motion and dismiss
Locklear’s appeal. This court requires that counsel inform
Locklear, in writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Locklear requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
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petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Locklear. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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