UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALLEN DONNELL STANLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00335-TDS-1)
Submitted: September 27, 2016 Decided: October 4, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Allen Donnell Stanley was convicted of violating several
terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to 24 months in
prison. Stanley now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel
questions, however, whether evidence at Stanley’s revocation
hearing supported a finding that Stanley possessed a firearm in
violation of the terms of his release and whether the sentence is
reasonable. Stanley was advised of his right to file a pro se
brief but has not filed such a brief. We affirm.
I
Stanley initially contends that there was insufficient
evidence upon which to find that he possessed a firearm. “We
review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
494 (2015). To revoke release, the district court need only find
a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). This “simply requires
the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592
F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
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revocation for clear error.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
Credibility determinations made by the district court at
revocation hearings are rarely reviewable. United States v. Cates,
613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010).
At Stanley’s revocation hearing, an officer testified that,
during a traffic stop, he ordered Stanley to exit the vehicle in
which he was a passenger. As he got out of the car, Stanley bent
over and had his back to the officer. Stanley began to flee but
was immediately apprehended. A handgun was discovered in the area
where Stanley had exited the vehicle. The officer testified that
the gun was not there when he initiated the stop. Records revealed
that Stanley had been charged three months earlier with possession
of the same firearm.
Based on this testimony, which the district court found
credible, the court determined that a preponderance of the evidence
established that Stanley had violated a term of his release by
possessing a firearm. After reviewing the record and giving due
deference to the district court’s credibility determination in
favor of the officer, we conclude that the court did not clearly
err in finding that Stanley violated the terms of release.
Further, in light of the statutory requirement that release be
revoked when the defendant possesses a firearm, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(g)(2) (2012), revocation of Stanley’s supervised release
was not an abuse of discretion.
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II
Stanley also contends that his 24-month sentence is
unreasonable. A sentence imposed following revocation of
supervised release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). Stanley does not
dispute that he received the maximum sentence to which he was
statutorily subject. We conclude that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable: the district court considered both the Chapter 7
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors that
it was permitted to consider. See id. at 438-40. Finally, we
hold that the sentence also is substantively reasonable. The
district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the
sentence, noting that Stanley possessed a firearm after having
been previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and that Stanley had absconded from probation twice. The
court expressed the need for deterrence and said that its
overarching concern was protecting the public.
III
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel inform his
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests that
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a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel=s motion must state that
a copy of the motion was served on his client. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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