NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IRENE TRITZ, an Individual, No. 14-56301
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:12-cv-02201-DOC-
RNB
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster MEMORANDUM*
General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 27, 2016**
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Irene Tritz appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her
employment action alleging discrimination, retaliation, due process, and related
tort claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tritz’s
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claim because they are
barred by res judicata, as Tritz raised, or could have raised, these claims against the
same defendant in a prior federal action in which there was a final judgment on the
merits. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting
forth the elements of the doctrine of res judicata, and explaining that res judicata
bars “any claims that were raised or could have been raised” in a prior action).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tritz’s due
process claim because Tritz failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the U.S. Postal Service denied her procedural due process in addressing
her 2009 complaint. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting
forth requirements for procedural due process). The district court also properly
granted summary judgment on Tritiz’s “abuse of power” claim as this claim is
derivative of her due process claim.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tritz’s Federal
Tort Claims Act claim because the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (a tort claim against the United States must be presented to the
2 14-56301
appropriate federal agency within two years after such a claim accrues).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tritz’s motion to
compel discovery because it failed to comply with the local rules. See Jorgensen
v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court is given broad
discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation[.]”).
AFFIRMED.
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