14‐2192‐cr
United States v. Reyes
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL
EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of October, two thousand sixteen.
4
5 PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL,
6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
7 Circuit Judges,
8 EDWARD R. KORMAN,
9 District Judge.*
10 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12 Appellee,
13
14 v. No. 14‐2192‐cr
15
16 MIGUEL REYES, AKA JOSE CONTRERAS,
17 Defendant‐Appellant.
18 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
19
* Judge Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
1 FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: STEVEN Y. YUROWITZ, ESQ., Newman
2 & Greenberg LLP, New York, NY.
3
4 FOR APPELLEE: RAJIT S. DOSANJH, Assistant United
5 States Attorney (Wayne A. Myers,
6 Assistant United States Attorney, on
7 the brief), for Richard S. Hartunian,
8 United States Attorney for the
9 Northern District of New York,
10 Syracuse, NY.
11
12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
13 Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge).
14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
15 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
16 Defendant‐appellant Miguel Reyes appeals from a judgment of the United
17 States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.)
18 convicting him of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
19 cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, Reyes argues principally that
20 trial counsel was ineffective, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a
21 speedy trial, and that his constitutional right to due process of law was violated
22 when he was required to stand trial in leg restraints. Because Reyes did not raise
23 any of these arguments before the District Court, we review for plain error.
24 United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2012). We assume the
2
1 parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we
2 refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
3 Reyes contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) raise before the
4 District Court the speedy trial claim involving a nine‐and‐a‐half‐year delay
5 between indictment and trial; (2) object to the use of leg restraints throughout
6 trial; and (3) question the Government’s chief witness, federal agent Charles
7 Callioras, about his grand jury testimony that record checks indicated that
8 “Miguel Reyes” was an alias for “Jose Contreras.” Reyes separately argues that
9 the delay before trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that the
10 use of leg restraints during his trial deprived him of his due process rights. Both
11 arguments are closely tied to Reyes’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.1
12 Because “the record on appeal does not include the facts necessary to adjudicate”
1
As to the second argument, we note, parenthetically, that the District Court erred
when it failed to explicitly find that leg restraints were “a necessary last resort.”
United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 2013). After oral argument, in
response to our request, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of New York advised us that over the last three years approximately one
third of incarcerated defendants have been placed in shackles during trial. This
appears to us to be a strikingly high number. We reiterate our holding in
Haynes that shackling is appropriate only as “a necessary last resort.” And so
that the record is clear on appellate review, a trial judge who orders a defendant
shackled should also make an express finding as to whether, in light of any
precautions taken, the shackling was visible to the jury.
3
1 these arguments or the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, United States v.
2 Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2006), we decline to consider them on direct
3 appeal. Reyes may raise these arguments and claims in a petition for habeas
4 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 154; see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
5 500, 504 (2003).
6 But there is a sufficient record for us to reject the argument that the
7 Government constructively amended the indictment by failing to establish at trial
8 that Reyes used the aliases “Jose Contreras” and “Miguel Contreras,” as the
9 indictment indicated. In this case, the aliases listed on the indictment did not
10 “modify” an “essential element” of the crime charged – conspiracy to distribute
11 and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. See United States v. D’Amelio,
12 683 F.3d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 2012). And there is no question that the evidence
13 submitted to the grand jury, including the testimony of Callioras, established that
14 Reyes was the person the grand jury intended to indict.
15 Finally, Reyes argues that the District Court erred by improperly
16 instructing the jury that he was associated with an individual who had been
17 recorded on telephone calls with an undercover agent discussing a proposed
18 purchase of cocaine. In explaining to the jury that such records were lawfully
4
1 obtained and could be used as evidence, the District Court described them as
2 “recordings of the telephone calls with an associate of the defendant.” App’x at
3 90. Reyes’s argument on appeal is not without force because his defense was to
4 deny his association with that person and to assert the Government had
5 prosecuted the wrong man. Nevertheless, Reyes has not shown that he suffered
6 “ensuing prejudice” as a result of the instruction, United States v. Quinones, 511
7 F.3d 289, 313 (2d Cir. 2007), or that he can satisfy the plain error standard. Reyes
8 vigorously challenged the Government’s identification witness on
9 cross‐examination. Furthermore, the District Court’s jury instructions specified
10 that “[o]ne of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as a
11 person who committed the crime charged” in the indictment, and gave fulsome
12 instructions on considerations concerning witness identification testimony and
13 the requirement that the jury determine identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
14 App’x at 94‐95. The District Court warned the jury not to draw any inference “as
15 to what verdict I think you should render.” App’x at 88. In addition, Reyes
16 made no objection when the District Court proposed to give this instruction and
17 invited counsel’s comment. The jury would not have understood the District
18 Court’s instructions, taken as a whole, to mean that Reyes was in fact an associate
5
1 of the person discussing a drug transaction on the recorded telephone calls. We
2 therefore conclude that the challenged jury instruction was an “isolated
3 statement[] taken from the charge, seemingly prejudicial on [its] face, [that is] not
4 so when viewed in the context of the entire record of the trial.” United States v.
5 Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1018 (2d Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).
6 We have considered all of Reyes’s remaining arguments and conclude that
7 they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
8 AFFIRMED.
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
6