FILED
Oct 12 2016, 8:53 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Phillips Terry G. Farmer
Boonville, Indiana Daniel R. Robinson, Jr.
Bamberger Foreman Oswald &
Hahn, LLP
Evansville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brenda K. (Layman) Smith and October 12, 2016
John C. Smith, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Plaintiffs, 82A05-1509-CT-1635
Appeal from the Vanderburgh
v. Circuit Court
The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Dunn Hospitality Group Judge
Manager, Inc. d/b/a Comfort Trial Court Cause No.
Inn, 82C01-1309-CT-444
Appellee-Defendant.
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellants-Plaintiffs, Brenda K. (Brenda) and John C. Smith (collectively,
Smiths), appeal the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Appellees-
Defendants, Dunn Hospitality Group Manager, Inc. d/b/a Comfort Inn
(Comfort Inn) on the Smiths’ allegations of negligence pursuant to the
Innkeeper Statute.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] The Smiths raise two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:
Whether the Comfort Inn was negligent as a matter of law pursuant to the
Innkeeper Statute, Ind. Code Ch. 32-33-7.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On August 7, 2012, the Smiths became guests at the Comfort Inn, located in
Evansville, Indiana, following a fire in their residence. They brought certain
personal property with them that had survived the fire, including an insurance
draft, a coin collection, and sports memorabilia. On August 8, 2012, the Smiths
delivered the insurance draft to the management of the Comfort Inn for storage
in the safety deposit box. On August 18, 2012, the Smiths were arrested and
taken into custody for approximately two weeks before making bail. While the
Smiths were in custody, their room rental was paid and their occupancy was
not terminated.
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[5] During the Smiths’ incarceration, employees of the Comfort Inn allowed
Daniel Crawley (Crawley) access to the Smiths’ room. The Smiths had not
given any permission to the Comfort Inn to let Crawley enter their room. After
gaining access to the room, Crawley took all of the Smiths’ personal
possessions. Subsequent to allowing Crawley to access the Smiths’ room, the
Comfort Inn handed the contents of the safety deposit box to Luke Warren
(Warren). Warren was not authorized by the Smiths to receive these contents,
which included the insurance draft. The Smiths later recovered the insurance
draft from Warren.
[6] On September 9, 2013, the Smiths filed a Complaint alleging negligence by the
Comfort Inn for allowing Crawley to access their room and remove their
personal belongings. On January 14, 2015, the Comfort Inn filed its motion for
summary judgment, alleging that there was no genuine issue of material fact
that its “maximum liability, if any, to the [Smiths] [is] capped at one hundred
dollars,” pursuant to I.C. Ch. 32-22-7. In their response in opposition to the
Comfort Inn’s motion, the Smiths claimed that the statute was not applicable as
the Comfort Inn’s act was a criminal act and it had failed to protect the Smiths
from the intentional tort of the third party. On March 31, 2015, the Comfort
Inn filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Brenda and Robert Phillips, which
was subsequently granted by the trial court.
[7] On August 25, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Comfort Inn’s
motion for summary judgment. On September 2, 2015, the trial court issued its
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“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment Entry,”
concluding, in pertinent part:
The [Comfort Inn] has no liability to [the Smiths] or any other
party for any money, jewels, ornaments, furs, bank notes, bonds,
negotiable security, or other valuable papers, precious stones,
railroad tickets, articles of silver or gold, or other valuable
property of small compass belonging to or brought in by [the
Smiths] since [the Smiths] failed to deliver any such property to
the person in charge of the office for deposit in a safe. I.C. [§] 32-
33-7-2.
Any liability of the [Comfort Inn] for loss or damage to any
personal property brought into the hotel by [the Smiths] shall not
exceed two hundred dollars ($200). I.C. [§] 32-33-7-[3].
(Appellant’s App. pp. 12, 13).
[8] The Smiths now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[9] Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the
outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth . . . , or if the undisputed facts
support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756,
761 (Ind. 2009).
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[10] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the
shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to
affirm or reverse summary judgment. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley,
891 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we
must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether
the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. at 607-08. In doing so, we
consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id. at 608. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment
has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court’s ruling was
improper. Id. When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must
show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff’s
cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative
defense that bars the plaintiff’s claim. Id. Accordingly, the grant of summary
judgment must be reversed if the record discloses an incorrect application of the
law to the facts. Id.
[11] We observe that in the present case, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its judgment. Special findings are not required
in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal.
AutoXchange.com. Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004). However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the
trial court’s rationale and facilitate appellate review. Id.
II. Innkeeper’s Statute
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[12] The common law rule imposed a strict rule of liability upon an innkeeper and
was founded upon the public policy of an earlier day. This imposition of strict
liability found its origin in the conditions existing in England in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries. Minneapolis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Matson Navigation
Co., 352 P.2d 335, 337 (HI 1960). Inadequate means of travel, the sparsely
settled country, and the constant exposure to robbers left the traveler with the
inn practically his only hope for protection. Id. Innkeepers themselves, and
their servants, were often as dishonest as the highwaymen roaming the
countryside and were not beyond joining forces with the outlaws to relieve
travelers and guests, by connivance or force, of their valuables and goods. Id.
Under such conditions, it was purely a matter of necessity and policy for the
law to require the innkeeper to exert his utmost efforts to protect his guests’
property and to assure results by imposing legal liability for loss without regard
to fault. Id.
[13] And so, at common law, the innkeeper was practically an insurer of property
brought by a guest to his inn and he was relieved of liability for the loss of such
property only where the loss occurred through an act of God, through an act of
a public enemy, or through the fault of the guest himself. 37 A.L.R. 1276,
1279-80 (1971); Plant v. Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodge, 500 N.E.2d 1271, 1272
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied. This innkeeper’s liability extended only to
property that was “infra hospitium,” that is, property that was within the inn.
Plant, 500 N.E.2d at 1272. However, it was widely recognized that property
could be infra hospitium although it was not in the building used for the
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accommodation of the guests. Id. at 1272-73. Since the passing of years has
erased much of the need for such absolute liability, the modern innkeeper is
often permitted by statute to lessen his responsibility to certain limits. Id.
[14] In Indiana, the legislature addressed an innkeeper’s liability for the property of
its guests in the Indiana Code Chapter 32-33-7, also commonly referred to as
the Innkeeper’s Statute. This statute divides the liability that may be incurred
by an innkeeper into four different levels. The first level of liability involves
“money, jewels, ornaments, furs, bank notes, bonds, negotiable security, or
other valuable papers, precious stones, railroad tickets, articles of silver or gold,
or other valuable property of small compass belonging to or brought in by the
guests of the hotel.” I.C. § 32-33-7-2. If the hotel provides a safe and
convenient place for the storage of these items, and the guest fails or neglects to
deliver the property for placement in the safe, then the innkeeper incurs no
liability. I.C. § 32-33-7-2(3). However, if the items had been stored, then the
innkeeper is not liable for the loss or damage in any amount exceeding $600,
“whether the loss or damage is occasioned by the negligence of the [innkeeper]
or otherwise.” I.C. § 32-33-7-2(b).
[15] The second level of liability relates to “the loss or damage to personal property,
other than merchandise samples or merchandise for sale,” brought onto the
premises by guests. I.C. § 32-33-7-3. Here, the liability of the innkeeper is
capped at $200, regardless whether the loss or damage is occasioned by the
negligence of the innkeeper, “unless the manager or proprietor has contracted in
writing to assume greater liability.” I.C. § 32-33-7-3.
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[16] The third level of liability is capped at $300 and involves the loss of or damage
to any merchandise samples or merchandise for sale, whether the loss or
damage is occasioned by the negligence of the proprietor or manager or
otherwise, unless the parties agreed upon a higher value in writing. I.C. § 32-
33-7-4. The fourth and final level pertains to liability for the loss or damage to
any property left by a guest after the guest has departed from the premises. I.C.
§ 32-33-7-5. Here, the innkeeper’s liability is that of a “gratuitous bailee” and
may not exceed $100. I.C. § 32-33-7-5.
[17] Because the Smiths recovered the insurance draft from Warren, the only
provision applicable is I.C. § 32-33-7-3, relating to personal property, which
caps the innkeeper’s liability at $200. It is well settled that rules of statutory
construction require us to construe strictly those statutes which are in
derogation of common law. Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 580
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Moreover, when the legislature enacts a
statute in derogation of common law, we presume that the legislature is aware
of the common law, and does not intend to make any changes beyond what is
declared in express terms or by unmistakable implication. Id.
[18] The Smiths contend that the relevant provisions of the Innkeeper Statute are not
applicable because “[t]he Comfort Inn’s agents facilitated the theft of the
Smiths’ property.” (Appellants’ Br. p. 11). To support their argument, the
Smiths rely on a negligence theory to state that “[t]he fact that the Smiths’
personal property was removed from their room and disposed of without their
consent or financial benefit clearly establishes injury proximately caused by the
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Comfort Inn’s act in allowing an unauthorized third party access to the Smiths’
room.” (Appellants’ Br. p. 13). Nevertheless, besides the assertion in the
Complaint that the Comfort Inn allowed Crawley to enter their room, the
designated evidence is void of any indication that the Comfort Inn or its agents
conspired with Crawley to commit a theft of the Smiths’ property. In fact, by
specifically relying on a negligence theory in an attempt to establish an
intentional tort or criminal activity on the part of the Comfort Inn, the Smiths
place their situation squarely within the statutory provision of I.C. § 32-33-7-3.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact
exists that would prevent entering summary judgment in favor of the Comfort
Inn.
CONCLUSION
[19] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor
of the Comfort Inn.
[20] Affirmed.
[21] Barnes, J. concurs
[22] Bailey, J. concurs in result
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