J-S67034-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN STEVEN DREHER
Appellant No. 756 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered February 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0008821-2009
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2016
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County dismissing Appellant John Steven Dreher’s pro se
petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§
9541-9546, as untimely filed. PCRA appellate counsel has filed a petition to
withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518
Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa.Super. 1988). After careful review, we note that the PCRA court
failed to appoint counsel to properly assist Appellant with his first post-
conviction relief filing before dismissing Appellant’s petition as untimely filed.
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, vacate the PCRA court’s
order, and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S67034-16
In August 2009, Appellant was charged in connection with his
roomate’s allegations that Appellant had stolen several pieces of his jewelry
and various collectible items and sold them at a local pawn shop. On
September 13, 2010, Appellant pled to theft by unlawful taking 1 and the
lower court sentenced him to time-served to twenty-three months
incarceration to be followed by three years probation. On the same day, the
sentencing court paroled Appellant from the bench, noting Appellant had
been incarcerated for over a year since his arrest. Appellant did not file a
timely notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence.2
Thereafter, Appellant was subsequently charged on several occasions
with violating his probation and parole for various reasons, such as failing to
report to probation and parole officers, failing to maintain a verifiable
address, failing to pay fines and costs, and absconding from supervision.
Each time, after Appellant stipulated to the violation, his probation and
parole was revoked and he was resentenced to complete the remainder of
his sentences.
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1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a) (third degree felony).
2
On June 25, 2013, Appellant filed a vague notice of appeal to this Court.
Although Appellant did not identify the specific order or sentence from which
he was appealing, he indicated he wished to appeal his case “8821-09.”
Before the Court could address this filing, Appellant filed a praecipe for
discontinuance with the assistance of counsel on October 4, 2013. This
Court granted his requested relief and discontinued the appeal.
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On October 19, 2015, while the prosecution of Appellant’s most recent
probation violation was pending, Appellant filed a pro se petition entitled
“Wish to be Accorded Due Process and Appeal Original Sentence.” On
December 2, 2015, the lower court appointed the Montgomery County Public
Defender’s Office to review the petition. On December 14, 2015, the lower
court gave Appellant notice that it desired to dismiss the filing, which it
deemed an untimely PCRA petition, without a hearing pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
Although the public defender’s office had been appointed in this case,
Appellant filed numerous motions for the appointment of private counsel as
public defender’s office had not contacted him to discuss his petition. On
January 22, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se response to the PCRA court’s
notice of intent to dismiss, reiterating his request for private counsel. From
the docket, it appears the public defender’s office subsequently made an oral
motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. On February 4, 2016, the
trial court filed an order permitting the public defender’s office to withdraw.
Even though Appellant continued to ask for counsel to be appointed,
the PCRA court ignored his requests and denied his PCRA petition without a
hearing on February 12, 2016.3 Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal in
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3
Although the docket sheet labels this filing as the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court’s order dismisses
Appellant’s pro se petition filed on October 19, 2015.
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this Court, which was dated February 29, 2016 and placed in the mail on
March 3, 2016. As Appellant filed additional requests for counsel, the PCRA
court appointed Sean E. Cullen, Esq. to represent Appellant on March 4,
2016. The docket indicates that Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was
forwarded to the trial court, this Court, the district attorney, and Atty.
Cullen. On March 11, 2016, the PCRA court directed Appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). On March 22, 2016, Atty. Cullen filed a supplemental notice of
appeal and a request for transcripts. On April 1, 2016, Atty. Cullen filed a
1925(b) statement on Appellant’s behalf. On April 20, 2016, this Court filed
a per curiam order accepting the supplemental notice of appeal for filing.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction
over this appeal. “The timeliness of an appeal and compliance with the
statutory provisions granting the right to appeal implicate an appellate
court's jurisdiction and its competency to act.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 630 Pa. 169, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (2014). Our rules of appellate
procedure provide that generally a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30
days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P.
903(a). In this case, Appellant was required to file a notice of appeal within
thirty days of the PCRA court’s denial of his petition on February 12, 2016.
While Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of
his judgment of sentence, his appointed counsel did not file his supplemental
notice of appeal until after the thirty-day period had elapsed. As a result,
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we must determine whether Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was a valid
filing. As a general rule, our courts prohibit hybrid representation and do
not typically entertain pro se filings while an appellant is represented by
counsel. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 89, 10 A.3d 282, 293
(2010); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 180-81, 626 A.2d 1137,
1139–40 (1993). But see Commonwealth v. Cooper, 611 Pa. 437, 27
A.3d 994 (2011). Specifically, our procedural rules require that a pro se
filing submitted by a counseled defendant is simply noted in the docket and
forwarded to counsel. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1).
Nevertheless, we observe that at the time Appellant mailed his notice
of appeal from prison on March 3, 2016, he was not represented by counsel.
As the PCRA court denied Appellant’s repeated requests for counsel,
Appellant submitted a pro se appeal because he did not foresee that counsel
would be appointed on his behalf before the time period for filing a notice of
appeal expired. Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, a prisoner’s legal
documents are “deemed filed when placed in the hands of prison authorities
for mailing.” Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 330 EDA 2016 (Pa.Super.
filed August 24, 2016).4 Thus, Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was timely
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4
Our rules of appellate procedure similarly provide that:
[a] pro se filing submitted by a prisoner incarcerated in a
correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date it is delivered
to the prison authorities for purposes of mailing or placed in the
institutional mailbox, as evidenced by a properly executed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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filed on March 3, 2016, as evidenced by the date postmarked on the
envelope he sent from prison. As the PCRA court did not appoint Appellant
counsel until the following day, March 4, 2016, there are no concerns of
hybrid representation. Thus, we have jurisdiction to review this timely
appeal.
The parties agree that the trial court correctly characterized
Appellant’s October 19, 2015 pro se petition entitled “Wish to be Accorded
Due Process and Appeal Original Sentence” as a PCRA petition. We agree
that this filing falls under the ambit of the PCRA, which is the “exclusive
vehicle for obtaining post-conviction collateral relief.” Commonwealth v.
Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa.Super. 2001). When reviewing the
denial of a PCRA petition, we are guided by the following standard:
The standard of review for an order denying post-conviction
relief is limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court's
determination, and whether that decision is free of legal error.
The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Allen, 48 A.3d 1283, 1285 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence of the
date that the prisoner deposited the pro se filing with the prison
authorities.
Pa.R.A.P. 121.
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Before we proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s PCRA petition,
we must evaluate counsel’s petition to withdraw his representation:
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
proceed ... under Turner, supra and Finley, supra and ...
must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must
then submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on
appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's
diligent review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner
wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues
lack merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.
Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no
merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to withdraw;
and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed
pro se or by new counsel.
Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that ...
satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court —
trial court or this Court — must then conduct its own review of
the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
withdraw and deny relief.
Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007)).
We note that Appellant’s appointed counsel initially filed his petition to
withdraw on the basis of frivolity pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009). We accepted counsel’s Anders brief in lieu of a Turner-Finley
letter, as an Anders brief provides greater protection to criminal
defendants. See Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3
(Pa.Super. 2004). After reviewing the letter counsel sent Appellant
informing him of his intent to withdraw, this Court noted that counsel
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improperly framed Appellant’s ability to respond to this filing as contingent
on the granting of counsel’s petition to withdraw. Thus, on June 20, 2016,
this Court issued a per curiam order, expressly notifying Appellant that he
could file a pro se response or a response from privately retained counsel.
This Court also directed Atty. Cullen to send Appellant another letter
informing him of his immediate right to proceed in the appeal pro se or
through privately retained counsel. See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141
A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607
(Pa.Super. 2006). Atty. Cullen complied with this mandate. Appellant filed
a pro se response on July 13, 2016.
After reviewing the record and counsel’s petition to withdraw, we find
that PCRA appellate counsel complied with the technical requirements of
Turner and Finley, supra. In his “no-merit” letter, PCRA appellate counsel
detailed the nature and extent of her review, listed the issues which
Appellant raised in his pro se petition, and explained why he believed
Appellant’s petition was untimely filed and frivolous. Moreover, counsel
indicated that after his own independent review of the record, he could not
identify any meritorious issues that he could raise on Appellant’s behalf.
In our independent review of the record, we observe that Appellant
was never afforded counsel to assist him in filing his PCRA petition. As
noted above, after Appellant filed his initial pro se petition, the PCRA court
appointed the public defender’s office to represent Appellant. Instead of
filing an amended petition, the public defender’s office filed a petition to
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withdraw, citing a conflict of interest. The PCRA court did not appoint
Appellant new counsel until after it denied Appellant’s petition as untimely
and Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant is entitled to counsel to
represent him on his first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness
of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented.”
Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262.
Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the PCRA court’s order
denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and remand for proceedings consistent
with this decision. PCRA counsel should assist Appellant in determining
whether he can file an amended PCRA petition averring an exception to the
PCRA time limits and should examine if there are other issues that may be of
merit if Appellant's petition is timely. PCRA counsel may again elect to file a
Turner-Finley no-merit letter.
Order vacated. Petition to Withdraw denied. Appellant’s Motions filed
on August 11, 2016 and September 1, 2016 are denied as moot. 5 Case
remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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5
Appellant filed these pro se applications in response to counsel’s petition to
withdraw, providing further detail of the claims raised in his PCRA petition.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/12/2016
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Com. v. Dreher, J.
Combined Opinion