J-A12020-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CHELSEA M. PACE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL J. RANALLI
Appellant No. 1786 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order May 7, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): 15-80475
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 18, 2016
Appellant, Michael J. Ranalli, appeals from the order granting appellee,
Chelsea M. Pace, a final Protection From Abuse (“PFA”)1 order protecting her
from Ranalli. Ranalli raises several arguments against the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at the PFA hearing, as well as challenges to the PFA
court’s evidentiary ruling and the facial validity of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a).
After careful review, we vacate and remand.
The essential facts of this case are undisputed. Pace and Ranalli are
parents of a minor child. During the relevant period of time, there was no
court order governing the custody arrangements followed by the parties. It
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
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is undisputed that Pace had primary physical custody of the child, with
Ranalli exercising partial physical custody, primarily on weekends.
On April 12, 2015, Ranalli and Pace had a disagreement over the
informal custody arrangements. After the disagreement, neither Pace nor
Ranalli’s father (“Grandfather”) could contact Ranalli. Grandfather contacted
Pace and forwarded her texts that Ranalli had sent him in December 2014
and sometime in February or March 2015.
The December 2014 text read, “I want to drug Chelsea so she dies. I
was seeing spots earlier when I was texting her. She literally makes me
mentally sick.” N.T., PFA Hearing, 5/7/15, at 12-13. Grandfather testified
that the second text exchange occurred sometime in February or March
2015. See id., at 9. In this text message, Ranalli told Grandfather, “I
promise if I am ordered to pay one more penny I will go to jail over her.”
Id., at 10. Furthermore, he texted, “She gives me murderious/suicidal [sic]
thoughts. If she wins I am going to do something. This is horse she [sic].
Greedy peace [sic] of shit. I wish somebody would feed her rat poison or get
cancer in her fucking vagina.” Plaintiff’s exhibit 1.
It is undisputed that Ranalli was referencing a March 2015 support
hearing when he texted “If she wins…” PFA Hearing, 5/7/15, at 24-25. After
the hearing, Ranalli’s support obligation was increased. See id., at 25.
After Grandfather sent these texts to Pace, she responded, “Thank
you, they will really help[.]” Plaintiff’s exhibit 1. Pace subsequently filed the
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instant PFA petition. After the PFA court entered the final PFA order, Ranalli
filed this timely appeal.
Our standard of review of a protection from abuse order is as follows:
When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence was not
sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner
and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences,
determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1255 (Pa. Super.
1995) (citations omitted). This Court defers to the lower court’s credibility
determinations as to witness credibility. See Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720,
724 (Pa. Super. 2004). “If a trial court erred in its application of the law, an
appellate court will correct the error.” Viruet ex rel. Velaszquez v.
Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 593 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted).
Ranalli raises several issues, but we need only address his third issue,
concerning the PFA court’s evidentiary ruling. “[T]he admission of evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only
upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2012).
During the hearing, Pace presented evidence regarding the dispute
that triggered Grandfather’s transmission of the text messages to Pace. See
N.T., PFA Hearing, 5/7/15, at 6-7. When Ranalli sought to explore the
circumstances of this dispute further, the PFA court ruled that such
circumstances were irrelevant. See N.T., PFA Hearing, 5/7/15, at 34. In
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direct contrast, however, the PFA court based its decision that Pace was in
“fear of imminent bodily injury”2 in part upon the fact that “[Ranalli] had
withheld custody of [the child], failed to abide by the informal custody
arrangements that had been in place between [Pace and Ranalli], and had
refused to disclose the location of [the child] to [Pace or Grandfather.]” PFA
Court Opinion, 7/9/15, at 10.
Clearly, a court abuses its discretion if it relies on facts to reach its
decision that it had previously deemed irrelevant. If the PFA court wishes to
rely on the circumstances of the custody dispute to support its finding, it
cannot preclude Ranalli from addressing those circumstances on relevancy
grounds. On the other hand, if the PFA court is able to find that Pace
suffered from a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury in the
absence of consideration of the custody dispute, then its relevancy ruling
can stand.
In any event, we are constrained to vacate the final PFA order and
remand for further proceedings in accordance with this memorandum.
Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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2
We note for clarification purposes that not only must the fear be imminent,
it must also be reasonable. Thus, the PFA court must not only find that Pace
had a subjective fear of imminent serious bodily injury, but also that such
fear was also reasonable. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a), “Abuse.”
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2016
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Pace, C. v. Ranalli, M.
Combined Opinion