IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
PEDRO ANDRES BRAVO, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-4141
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed October 7, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
James M. Colaw, Judge.
Stephen N. Bernstein, Gainesville, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Following a ten-day jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree
murder, false imprisonment, poisoning, tampering with physical evidence, giving
false information to law enforcement concerning the commission of a capital
felony, giving false information to law enforcement concerning a missing person
investigation, and unlawful transportation of human remains, related to the death of
his friend. Appellant raises three issues on appeal which we reject.
We reject the Appellant’s first claim that the trial court erred in denying a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. At the evidentiary
hearing on the motion for new trial, Appellant did not meet his burden to show that
the purported newly discovered evidence was “of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla.
1991); see also Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 2010). Furthermore, to the
extent that Appellant’s claim of a Brady1 violation was preserved, we do not find
that any violation occurred.
We reject Appellant’s second claim that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress his inculpatory statements made to law enforcement. The
question of whether a suspect is in custody during interrogation is a mixed question
of law and fact. Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999). “A trial court’s
ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct.” Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d
1310, 1312 (Fla. 1993). The trial court made extensive factual findings on the
suppression issue and these findings were supported by competent, substantial
evidence. See Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2004). The trial court applied
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2
the correct law in determining whether Appellant was subject to custodial
interrogation. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that when
Appellant voluntarily spoke with law enforcement as part of his scheme to mislead
authorities as to the reason for Mr. Aguilar’s disappearance, Appellant was not
being subjected to custodial interrogation.
Finally, we reject Appellant’s claim of a Confrontation Clause violation
regarding testimony as to Appellant’s cell phone location. As we have previously
stated, “business records ‘by their nature’ are not testimonial.” Martin v. State,
936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 56 (2004)).
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, BILBREY, and WINOKUR, JJ., CONCUR.
3