UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL EARL JORDAN,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 15-4797
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL EARL JORDAN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville and Raleigh. Malcolm J.
Howard, Senior District Judge. (4:15-cr-00039-H-1; 5:10-cr-00013-
H-1)
Submitted: October 18, 2016 Decided: October 20, 2016
Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed No. 15-4793, affirmed No. 15-4797 by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Michael Earl Jordan pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
to distributing a quantity of cocaine within 1000 feet of a
community college, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2012). The
district court sentenced Jordan to 36 months’ imprisonment, within
his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Based on this new
criminal conduct, the court revoked Jordan’s term of supervised
release for a prior felony drug conviction and sentenced him to a
consecutive term of 24 months’ imprisonment. Jordan appealed both
sentences, and we consolidated the appeals.
I.
In No. 15-4793, Jordan argues that the district court plainly
erred in calculating his criminal history category for the § 860
conviction. The Government seeks to enforce the appeal waiver in
Jordan’s plea agreement, by which Jordan specifically waived his
right to appeal a within-Guidelines sentence, including any issues
related to the establishment of the Guidelines range.
“We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within
the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d
522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.”
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005). To
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determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine
“the totality of the circumstances . . . , including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Generally, if a district court
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights
during the [plea] colloquy and the record indicates that the
defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the
waiver is valid.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The language of the appeal waiver in Jordan’s plea agreement
is clear and unambiguous, and our review of the record reveals
that Jordan understood the full significance of the waiver. We
conclude that the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable and that
Jordan’s challenge to the court’s calculation of his criminal
history category falls squarely within the scope of the waiver.
Accordingly, we dismiss Jordan’s appeal of his 36-month sentence.
II.
In No. 15-4797, Jordan challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his 24-month, consecutive revocation sentence.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence
upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a revocation
sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In making
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this determination, we first consider whether the sentence imposed
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Only when
the sentence is unreasonable will we determine “whether it is
plainly so.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court states
a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive
the sentence imposed. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440
(4th Cir. 2006).
We conclude that Jordan’s revocation sentence is not
substantively unreasonable. In choosing the revocation sentence,
the district court considered that Jordan is a drug addict but
also considered, among other aggravating factors, that Jordan
breached the court’s trust when he started selling drugs shortly
after serving his below-Guidelines sentence for another felony
drug offense. Breach of trust is a proper basis for the court to
impose sentence upon revocation of supervised release. See id. at
437-38. Accordingly, we affirm Jordan’s 24-month revocation
sentence.
III.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
No. 15-4793 - DISMISSED
No. 15-4797 - AFFIRMED
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