NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRIN BLACK; ROGER J. MIRACLE; No. 14-35170
ANN M. MIRACLE; VIRGINIA LOUISE
BLEEG; HAROLD S. MACLAUGHLAN; D.C. Nos. 3:12-cv-02213-HU
REBECA MACLAUGHLAN, 3:12-cv-02221-HU
2:12-cv-02222-HU
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
RICK HASELTON; REX ARMSTRONG;
ELLEN ROSENBLUM; PAUL DE
MUNIZ; WILLIAM MICHAEL
GILLETTE; ROBERT D. DURHAM;
THOMAS A. BALMER; RIVES
KISTLER; VIRGINIA L. LINDER; JACK
L. LANDAU; DEBBIE SLAGLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 4, 2016**
Portland, Oregon
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: CLIFTON, MURGUIA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit on the ground that the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative,
on the ground that Defendants were entitled to absolute judicial immunity. We
hold that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ suit from proceeding and
Defendants are immune from Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.
2007) (“We may affirm on any ground present in the record.”).
Plaintiffs initiated this action against three judges on the Oregon Court of
Appeals, the justices of the Oregon Supreme Court, and Debbie Slagle, a county
circuit court clerk. All Defendants are sued in their official capacities. Plaintiffs
alleged that the Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate state trial court
judgments previously entered in their favor, and the Oregon Supreme Court’s
denial of review of this decision, violated the Due Process Clause, the Takings
Clause, and numerous other state and federal constitutional provisions. As relief,
Plaintiffs sought, among other things, an order declaring that they had
constitutionally protected property interests in the state trial court’s judgments and
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that those interests were “taken by unconstitutional state action” when the Oregon
Court of Appeals vacated the judgments. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief in
the form of a Writ of Mandamus directing Slagle to reinstate nunc pro tunc the trial
court’s judgments. Defendants sought dismissal of Plaintiffs’ suit on several
grounds, including that their action was barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine
and Defendants were immune from the suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment
and the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. The district court agreed that the
action was barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and Defendants were entitled
to judicial immunity and dismissed Plaintiffs’ case with prejudice.
1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
district court’s dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Carmona v.
Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine
prevents federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by
state-court losers” challenging “state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609,
616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred the
plaintiff’s claim because the alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s
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purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief he sought “would require the
district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus
void”); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If a
plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state court judgment, Rooker–Feldman
requires that the district court dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”). Here, the district court properly concluded that the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine barred Plaintiffs’ action because it is a forbidden de facto appeal
of the Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision. Plaintiffs’ claims are all based on their
argument that the Oregon Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted Oregon law
when it determined that their state court claims were no longer justiciable and that
it retained the authority to vacate the trial court judgments. These attacks on the
state court proceedings constitute a de facto appeal of the state court judgment
because they require the federal court to review both the merits of the Oregon
Court of Appeals’ decision and its jurisdictional determination. See Henrichs, 474
F.3d at 616; Olson Farms v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 936–37 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred suit where the alleged injury
was a state court’s incorrect jurisdictional determination). Indeed, Plaintiffs
expressly seek relief that would require the federal court to vacate the final state
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court judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. Plaintiffs’ remaining
claims are inextricably intertwined with the forbidden appeal.
2. Defendants are also immune from Plaintiffs’ federal suit pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment protects states and state officials
from claims brought by their own citizens in federal court, unless the state waived
its immunity or Congress abrogated the immunity pursuant to constitutional
authority. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); see also
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official
capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”). Neither exception
applies in this case. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit also does not avoid Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Ex parte Young doctrine because the relief they seek is
retrospective. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); see also Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (holding that Ex parte Young only
permits a suit against a state official to go forward “when that suit seeks only
prospective injunctive relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal
law.’” (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985))).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
and entering dismissal with prejudice. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine and
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Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity are each fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims
and it is clear that these deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See
Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. Because we need not assess the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, their Motion
Requesting Judicial Notice (Doc. No. 17) is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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