IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT
DANIAL M. RINEHART, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) WD78708
)
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) FILED: November 1, 2016
Respondent. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass County
The Honorable William B. Collins, Judge
Before Division One: Anthony Rex Gabbert, P.J., and Thomas H. Newton
and Alok Ahuja, JJ.
Daniel Rinehart was convicted in the Circuit Court of Cass County of felony
murder in the second degree, child endangerment in the first degree, statutory rape
in the second degree, two counts of incest, and two counts of abandonment of a
corpse. The charges stemmed from Rinehart’s long-standing sexual relationship
with one of his daughters, which produced four children, three of whom died
without receiving medical care. Rinehart’s convictions were affirmed by this Court
on November 13, 2012. State v. Rinehart, 383 S.W.3d 95 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).
Our mandate issued on December 5, 2012.
Rinehart filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Supreme Court
Rule 29.15 on March 7, 2013. Counsel was appointed and an amended motion was
filed on June 17, 2013. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the
motion on the merits on April 30, 2015. Rinehart appeals.
The State argues that Rinehart’s initial pro se post-conviction relief motion
was untimely, and that the circuit court therefore had no authority to address the
merits of Rinehart’s post-conviction claims. We agree.
In a motion filed pursuant to Rule 29.15, the movant must
allege facts showing a basis for relief to entitle the movant to an
evidentiary hearing. The movant also must allege facts establishing
that the motion is timely filed. The movant then must prove his
allegations. Rule 29.15(i); Rule 24.035(i) (“The movant has the burden
of proving the movant’s claims for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence.”). In addition to proving his substantive claims, the movant
must show he filed his motion within the time limits provided in the
Rules. The movant must allege facts showing he timely filed his
motion and meet his burden of proof by either: (1) timely filing the
original pro se motion so that the time stamp on the file reflects that it
is within the time limits proscribed in the Rule; (2) alleging and
proving by a preponderance of the evidence in his motion that he falls
within a recognized exception to the time limits; or (3) alleging and
proving by a preponderance of the evidence in his amended motion
that the court misfiled the motion.
Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2012) (citations omitted).
The State did not argue in the circuit court that Rinehart’s motion was
untimely, and the circuit court did not address the issue. Nevertheless, Dorris held
that “[i]t is the court’s duty to enforce the mandatory time limits and the resulting
complete waiver in the post-conviction rules – even if the State does not raise the
issue.” Id. at 268.
Given the issuance of our mandate on December 5, 2012, Rinehart’s initial
pro se Rule 29.15 motion was due no later than Tuesday, March 5, 2013. Rule
29.15(b). The file stamp on Rinehart’s original motion is dated March 7, 2013,
however.
Rinehart acknowledges in his Reply Brief that the motion appears to be
untimely based on the time stamp affixed by the circuit court. He argues, however,
that we should remand the case to the circuit court to determine whether or not his
motion was timely. Rinehart contends that the timeliness of his motion “is not
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completely clear from the record,” based on three circumstances: (1) the fact that
the trial court proceeded to address the merits of Rinehart’s post-conviction claims
without questioning the timeliness of his initial motion; (2) the fact that the copy of
the motion sent to the Public Defender’s office on March 18, 2013, did not bear a file
stamp; and (3) the fact that Rinehart’s signature on the motion was notarized on
February 27, 2013.
Neither Rinehart’s pro se motion, nor his amended motion, alleged facts to
demonstrate that his initial motion was timely, or that he fell within one of the
exceptions to the time limits recognized in Dorris. Even assuming that Rinehart
could allege such facts for the first time on appeal, none of the circumstances
described in Rinehart’s Reply Brief establishes a colorable basis to find that his pro
se motion was timely, or that the untimeliness of the motion should be excused.
First, although the circuit court addressed Rinehart’s post-conviction claims on the
merits, the court simply did not consider the timeliness of Rinehart’s initial pro se
motion (presumably because the State did not raise the issue). The circuit court’s
merits disposition does not constitute an implicit finding that Rinehart’s initial
motion was timely filed; indeed, the circuit court’s order explicitly finds that
Rinehart filed his original motion on March 7, 2013 – two days late. Second, the
lack of a file stamp on the copy of Rinehart’s motion provided to the Public Defender
likewise tells us nothing concerning the accuracy of the file stamp on the original
motion retained in the court file. Finally, the fact that Rinehart may have executed
the pro se motion on February 27, 2013, without more, does not tend to prove when
he actually dispatched the motion to the circuit court, much less when the court
received it (or how the court processed the motion upon receipt). None of the
circumstances discussed in Rinehart’s Reply Brief justifies a remand to the circuit
court.
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Because Rinehart’s pro se motion was untimely, “the motion court lacked
authority to review the merits of [his] claim and should have dismissed the motion
as untimely.” Dudley v. State, 459 S.W.3d 499, 502 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015); accord,
Green v. State, 481 S.W.3d 589, 591-92 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015); Lenoir v. State, 475
S.W.3d 139, 142 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). We accordingly vacate the circuit court’s
order and remand with directions to dismiss Rinehart’s pro se motion as untimely.
Alok Ahuja, Judge
All concur.
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