NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 31, 2016*
Decided November 1, 2016
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐1499
RONALD J. GRASON, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 15‐2138
JAY STEWART, Harold A. Baker,
Defendant‐Appellee. Judge.
O R D E R
Ronald Grason appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Jay Stewart, the director of the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation, violated his due process rights by revoking his medical license
without a hearing. We affirm.
* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because
the issues have been authoritatively decided. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).
No. 16‐1499 Page 2
This is Grason’s second appeal from lawsuits alleging improper suspension of
his medical activities. See Grason v. Burwell, No. 16‐1462, 2016 WL 4533407 (7th Cir.
Aug. 30, 2016) (non‐precedential) (upholding summary judgment for Secretary of
Health and Human Services in challenge to revocation of his Medicare billing
privileges). In the complaint at issue here, Grason claimed that Stewart denied him due
process by approving the suspension of his license because of unpaid state income taxes
without a hearing. Grason wanted a hearing because he disputed that he owed taxes for
two of the nine years identified by the Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation. But after Grason submitted an order from the Department of Revenue
Board of Appeals denying him relief from the tax liability, an administrative law judge
for the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation struck his request for the
hearing and indefinitely suspended his medical license.
The district court dismissed the suit because Grason failed to state a claim that
his right to due process was violated. As the court explained, there was no basis for a
hearing once the Department of Revenue concluded that Grason owed taxes because
under those circumstances Illinois law required Stewart to suspend the license.
See 20 ILCS 2105/2105‐15(g).
On appeal Grason maintains that the Department’s decision to suspend his
license without a hearing violated due process. But the district court correctly
concluded that no hearing was warranted: Grason disputed his liability for only 2 out of
the 9 years that the Department of Revenue said he owed taxes, and, as long as taxes
were due, the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation was required by
Illinois law to suspend Grason’s license. See 20 ILCS 2105/2105‐15(g). “[W]hen there is
no factual dispute over a condition with dispositive significance, the state need not
supply a fact‐finding process.” Mid‐Am. Waste Sys., Inc. v. City of Gary, Ind., 49 F.3d 286,
290 (7th Cir. 1995). Moreover, Grason was afforded due process to contest the extent of
his liability through the Department of Revenue proceedings that he pursued at the
Board of Appeals, and which he could have challenged in state court. See 35 ILCS 5/908,
5/1201; 735 ILCS 5/3‐103. He is not constitutionally entitled to have a second hearing
before the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation to pursue the same
arguments. See Crum v. Vincent, 493 F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.