In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
KIRIL HRISTOV VIDINSKI,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petitions for Review of Decisions of
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A096‐533‐945
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2014 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2016
____________________
Before WILLIAMS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 1
1 Judge Tinder was on the panel that heard oral argument. We held
these petitions for review after argument so that the parties could pursue
possible resolution, including through an exercise of prosecutorial discre‐
tion by the government. Over the summer of 2016, it became clear that an
agreed resolution was unlikely. In the meantime, Judge Tinder has retired
and did not participate in the decision. These petitions are being decided
by a quorum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
2 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Kiril Vidinski is a na‐
tive of Bulgaria. He entered the United States as a visitor in
1998 but overstayed his visa. He married a United States citi‐
zen, Constance Literski, in 2002, and in 2005 he and Ms. Li‐
terski filed petitions seeking legal permanent resident status
for him. Before those petitions were resolved, Ms. Literski
told an investigator for Immigration and Customs Enforce‐
ment (ICE) that the marriage had been a sham to obtain im‐
migration benefits for Vidinski (and money for her). Removal
proceedings resulted in a final order to remove Vidinski, and
the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal and
later denied his motion to reopen proceedings based on inef‐
fective assistance of counsel. He now seeks judicial review,
arguing primarily that he was entitled to cross‐examine Ms.
Literski, whose affidavit was critical to the marriage fraud is‐
sue. We dismiss in part and deny the remainder of the peti‐
tions on their merits.
There is no doubt that Vidinski is removable for having
overstayed his 1998 visa. Also, the Board denied his request
for cancellation of removal based on “exceptional and ex‐
tremely unusual hardship” to family members. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). That is a discretionary decision that we have
no jurisdiction to review unless it involves constitutional
claims or questions of law, Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d 673, 678
(7th Cir. 2009), and Vidinski presents no such claims or ques‐
tions. To the extent Vidinski seeks review of the Board’s de‐
nial of his hardship request, we dismiss for lack of jurisdic‐
tion.
We do have jurisdiction to consider the finding by the im‐
migration judge, affirmed by the Board, that Vidinski had en‐
gaged in marriage fraud, which results in a lifetime ban on
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 3
being able to return to the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(c). Vidinski has raised legal issues within the scope of
the jurisdiction authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In con‐
sidering these issues, we review both the written decision of
the immigration judge and the Board order adopting and af‐
firming that decision. Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 904
(7th Cir. 2010). We review the Board’s legal conclusions de
novo, but we defer to its factual findings, “reversing the Board
only if the record lacks substantial evidence to support its fac‐
tual conclusions.” Sayaxing v. INS, 179 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir.
1999).
I. Removal Proceedings
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), an alien who attempts to procure an immi‐
gration benefit by fraud or material misrepresentation—in‐
cluding marriage fraud—is subject to removal. The govern‐
ment must prove marriage fraud with clear and convincing
evidence. Surganova, 612 F.3d at 904; see generally Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966).
In Vidinski’s case, the government relied on the testimony
of an ICE agent who interviewed Ms. Literski as part of an
investigation into an extensive marriage fraud ring in Chi‐
cago.2 The central figure in the ring was Jeremy Starnes. A
man named Dion Liebich told the ICE agent that Starnes had
helped him arrange his own fraudulent marriage and that he
(Liebich) had referred Ms. Literski to Starnes. Following that
2 The investigation led to an indictment resulting in sixteen convic‐
tions and two fugitive defendants.
4 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
lead, the agent contacted Ms. Literski and interviewed her in
January 2011.
According to the agent, Ms. Literski admitted that her
marriage to Vidinski had been fraudulent. She said that
Liebich (her former boyfriend) told her she could make
money by entering into a sham marriage. Liebich arranged a
meeting among Starnes, Ms. Literski, Vidinski, and another
man. After that meeting, Ms. Literski and Vidinski married.
Ms. Literski was paid $1,000 the day of the marriage, with
promises of more payments to come. She told the agent that
Vidinski paid her a total of more than $5,000 over the course
of the marriage, but she never lived with him and never had
sexual relations with him. No criminal charges have been
filed against Ms. Literski, Vidinski, or Liebich.
Ms. Literski also told the agent that several photographs
that she and Vidinski had submitted to support their 2005 pe‐
titions for lawful permanent resident status had been altered
to appear to be pictures of the two of them together. Ms. Li‐
terski signed a sworn statement describing the fraudulent ar‐
rangement. Her statement is consistent with the agent’s re‐
port.
The agent also testified that he served notices to appear on
Vidinski and a Ms. Tzvetana Stanislavova, who had a child
by Vidinski in 2005 while he was still legally married to Ms.
Literski (and before Ms. Literski filed her I‐130 petition on his
behalf). Vidinski and Ms. Stanislavova are now married.
Additional documentary evidence supported the immi‐
gration judge’s finding of marriage fraud. Vidinski submitted
his federal and Illinois individual income tax returns for
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 5
twelve years, from 1998 to 2009. All indicated that he was sin‐
gle, even though he was married to Ms. Literski from 2002 to
2009. (The government submitted a different return for 2005
that listed Vidinski and Ms. Literski as married, filing jointly,
around the time of their interviews on her I‐130 petition. That
discrepancy has not been explained.) None of the documents
submitted in support of adjustment of status disclosed that
Vidinski had a son born in 2005 to Ms. Stanislavova.
The most unusual feature of this case, apparently unprec‐
edented in the experience of the veteran immigration judge,
was that in response to the government’s evidence about the
fraudulent nature of the marriage, Vidinski just refused to tes‐
tify at all. The judge provided ample warnings to Vidinski
and his counsel that he might draw adverse inferences from
that refusal. In his decision, the judge reasonably refused to
consider Vidinski’s affidavit claiming the marriage had been
bona fide. Vidinski also offered some records of a joint bank
account from 2004–06, around the time of the immigration pe‐
titions and interview, but he was not willing to testify to ex‐
plain those documents or any other facts relevant to the issue
of marriage fraud.
The immigration judge concluded that the government
had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Vidinski’s
marriage to Ms. Literski had been fraudulent. The judge
wrote that the agent’s testimony was detailed and consistent
and supported by his contemporaneous memorandum about
his interview with Ms. Literski. And he noted that Vidinski
had refused to testify and offered no rebuttal evidence. The
judge therefore denied Vidinski’s request for cancellation of
removal and ordered his removal to Bulgaria.
6 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
Vidinski sought review before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, which adopted the immigration judge’s decision
and dismissed Vidinski’s appeal in a June 20, 2013 order. The
Board denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings,
and Vidinski petitioned for judicial review of both decisions.
II. Analysis
On judicial review, Vidinski focuses on the fact that Ms.
Literski did not testify in person before the immigration
judge. He argues first that the government failed to meet its
burden to prove marriage fraud by clear and convincing evi‐
dence. See Surganova, 612 F.3d at 904. He argues second that
he was denied both statutory and constitutional rights to
cross‐examine adverse witnesses. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4)(B) (alien in removal proceedings shall have rea‐
sonable opportunity to examine unfavorable evidence, pre‐
sent favorable evidence, and cross‐examine adverse wit‐
nesses). “Evidence in removal proceedings need not conform
strictly to the Federal Rules of Evidence, but it must be proba‐
tive and its admission must be ‘fundamentally fair.’” Pouhova
v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2013), quoting Barradas
v. Holder, 582 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2009). We reject these ar‐
guments.
First, the Board and immigration judge did not err in con‐
cluding that the government had proven by clear and con‐
vincing evidence that Vidinski’s marriage to Ms. Literski was
fraudulent. Ms. Literski’s account of the fraud was presented
as hearsay through her sworn statement and the agent’s testi‐
mony concerning his interview with her. That hearsay had
sufficient indicia of reliability for use in these administrative
proceedings. Ms. Literski’s admissions of fraud were admis‐
sions against her own penal interest, making it unlikely that
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 7
she was lying. Also, her account was consistent with the avail‐
able documentary evidence, and the agent’s testimony was—
the judge found—detailed, internally consistent, and con‐
sistent with the documentary evidence. The use of this hear‐
say in this administrative hearing was permissible. See, e.g.,
Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2009) (al‐
lowing use of hearsay summaries of witness interviews to
prove marriage fraud where nothing suggested summaries
were inaccurate or unreliable beyond inherent risks of sum‐
maries); Duad v. Holder, 556 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (al‐
lowing use of reliable hearsay in immigration proceedings).
Perhaps most notable here is Vidinski’s choice not to tes‐
tify and not to offer any rebuttal evidence. The key evidence
the immigration judge heard was hearsay, but it was detailed
and consistent, with indications of reliability, and it was cor‐
roborated by available documentary evidence. To weigh
against that evidence there was essentially nothing. The im‐
migration judge did not err by finding that the government
had proven marriage fraud by clear and convincing evi‐
dence.3
3 The chronology did not obviously fit a story of marriage fraud.
Vidinski and Ms. Literski were married in 2002 with assurances, according
to the agent’s investigation, that the marriage needed to last only six
months. They did not file the I‐130 and I‐485 petitions until 2005, after
Vidinski’s son by Ms. Stanislavova had been born. They did not divorce
until 2009. We might speculate about various explanations for the timing,
but without any testimony or other evidence from Vidinski to rebut Ms.
Literski’s account of a fraudulent marriage, the immigration judge was not
required to find that the government had failed to meet its burden of
proof.
8 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
Second, Vidinski was not denied his statutory and consti‐
tutional right to cross‐examine the witnesses against him. Al‐
though Vidinski contends that the government did not make
reasonable efforts to have Ms. Literski or Liebich appear to
testify, Vidinski’s lawyer requested subpoenas for those wit‐
nesses, and the immigration judge issued those subpoenas.
Despite the subpoenas, the witnesses did not appear, and
there was apparently no further effort by anyone to require
their attendance. Vidinski’s lawyer told the immigration
judge that she had talked to Ms. Literski, who reportedly said
she was “told by the Government that she did not need to ap‐
pear.” There is no actual evidence backing up that vague as‐
sertion; even assuming the assertion is true, it does not estab‐
lish that the government took any affirmative steps to prevent
Ms. Literski from testifying at Vidinski’s hearing.
An immigration judge has the authority to issue subpoe‐
nas for witnesses and to impose sanctions for failure to com‐
ply with those subpoenas. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). A regulation
provides:
If a witness neglects or refuses to appear and
testify as directed by the subpoena served upon
him or her in accordance with the provisions of
this section, the Immigration Judge issuing the
subpoena shall request the United States Attor‐
ney for the district in which the subpoena was
issued to report such neglect or refusal to the
United States District Court and to request such
court to issue an order requiring the witness to
appear and testify and to produce the books, pa‐
pers or documents designated in the subpoena.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b)(6).
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 9
During the hearing, when it became apparent that Ms. Li‐
terski had not appeared in response to the subpoena, neither
attorney asked the immigration judge to follow through and
request enforcement through the district court. Nor did
Vidinski seek a continuance of the hearing so that further ef‐
forts could be made to compel Ms. Literski’s testimony. He
chose to argue instead that the government had simply failed
to meet its burden of proof and that Ms. Literski’s affidavit
and the report of her interview should be rejected as unrelia‐
ble hearsay. The record thus reflects a strategic decision to
forgo further efforts to obtain her actual appearance and to
rely on the legal argument we have rejected above.
We recognize that § 1003.35(b)(6) says the judge “shall” re‐
quest enforcement of the subpoena, but we do not read the
regulation as requiring the judge to do so in the absence of a
request from a party. The regulation would otherwise impose
additional unnecessary and useless delays and burdens on an
already overburdened network of immigration courts. Cf.
Malave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487–88 (7th Cir. 2010) (remand‐
ing where immigration judge refused alien’s request for issu‐
ance of subpoena to enable cross‐examination of ex‐husband
whose hearsay interview was used to prove marriage fraud).
Vidinski insists, however, that a remand is required under
Karroumeh v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2016), and Pouhova
v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2013). In both cases we
granted petitions where immigration judges ruled against al‐
iens on the basis of hearsay evidence. Both cases differ from
this one in important ways.
Karroumeh also involved marriage fraud and an ex‐spouse
who provided a sworn statement but did not appear to testify.
In Karroumeh, however, the government had not properly
10 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
subpoenaed the missing ex‐wife; a subpoena was prepared,
but it was for the wrong date and not even served. 820 F.3d at
897. Even more important, the hearsay statement was
“marked by contradictions and inconsistencies that call its re‐
liability into question.” Id. at 898. There is no comparable rea‐
son to doubt the reliability of Ms. Literski’s account in this
case, particularly where Vidinski himself chose not to testify
to rebut it.
The issue in Pouhova was not marriage fraud but smug‐
gling of other aliens, yet the government built its case on hear‐
say. The use of hearsay was unfair in Pouhova because there
were specific reasons to deem it unreliable. The interview
with the key witness was conducted in English because fund‐
ing shortages meant no interpreter was available, and there
was no indication of how well the witness understood or ex‐
pressed herself in English. 726 F.3d at 1009, 1012. Moreover,
the government did not even call the agent who had inter‐
viewed the witness, so the agent was not available for cross‐
examination on topics that might have affected the reliability
of the interview. Id. at 1015. His written report on the witness
was not prepared until seven years after the interview and
contradicted it in important details. Id. at 1013–14. Further,
Ms. Pouhova had testified in her case, id. at 1010, unlike
Vidinski, who declined the opportunity to testify about any
bona fide basis for his marriage to Ms. Literski.
When immigration authorities build their removal cases
on hearsay, they venture onto thin ice, as Karroumeh, Pouhova,
Malave, and numerous other cases attest. But challenges to
such use of hearsay call for close attention to the details of the
hearsay and the rest of the evidence in the case. In this case,
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 11
the hearsay accounts from Ms. Literski did not contain incon‐
sistencies or improbable details that would call their reliabil‐
ity into doubt, and Vidinski declined the opportunity to rebut
those accounts. Under these circumstances, we find no viola‐
tion of Vidinski’s statutory or due process rights. To the ex‐
tent we have jurisdiction over his petition for review of the
order of removal (No. 13‐2478), we deny that petition on the
merits.
Finally, we consider Vidinski’s separate petition for re‐
view (No. 13‐3263) of the Board’s denial of his motion to reo‐
pen proceedings based on the ineffectiveness of his counsel in
the initial appeal to the Board, a decision we review only for
abuse of discretion. See Patel v. Holder, 747 F.3d 493, 496 (7th
Cir. 2014). The Board found that Vidinski met the procedural
requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA
1988), for claims of ineffective counsel. The Board agreed that
Vidinski’s counsel in the initial appeal did not perform com‐
petently because he filed a brief with “a very limited argu‐
ment” on Vidinski’s behalf. The Board also found, however,
that Vidinski had failed to show prejudice because he did not
challenge the competence of his (different) counsel before the
immigration judge, whose factual findings were not clearly
erroneous.
Vidinski argues that prejudice should be presumed under
these circumstances, citing Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno,
232 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000), and Dakane v. U.S. Attorney Gen‐
eral, 399 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). These cases applied a re‐
buttable presumption of prejudice where counsel had failed
to file an appeal on time (Volkova) or failed to file any brief at
all (Dakane). Vidinski’s case, by contrast, was presented to the
12 Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263
Board in a timely appeal, but with only cursory development
of an argument.
We assume for purposes of this discussion that a pre‐
sumption of prejudice might apply where briefing before the
Board is truly deficient.4 But any such presumption has been
rebutted in this case. The Board found that Vidinski had failed
to show he was prejudiced by the inadequate argument in the
initial appeal. The Board noted that the judge had issued a
subpoena to Ms. Literski, that she had not appeared, that
Vidinski had chosen not to testify and not to present any re‐
buttal evidence on the marriage fraud issue, and that Vidinski
did not claim his counsel was ineffective before the immigra‐
tion judge. We find no error in the Board’s determination that
Vidinski was not prejudiced by the initially inadequate brief‐
ing. In his motion to reopen proceedings, Vidinski presented
the arguments he makes before this court, and the Board rea‐
sonably rejected them. We see no basis for ordering the Board
to consider the case a third time on the theory that the issues
were not adequately presented in the first round.
To sum up, we find no violation of Vidinski’s statutory or
constitutional rights. The removal proceedings here were fun‐
damentally fair. The stay entered on December 11, 2014 is
LIFTED; Vidinski’s petition for review in No. 13‐2478 is
DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction and DENIED on
4 This presumption would differ sharply from, for example, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas corpus cases under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, where a petitioner must show prejudice. Cf. Roe v. Flores‐Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 482–83 (2000) (stating general rule but presuming prejudice
where counsel simply fails to file appeal as directed by client).
Nos. 13‐2478 & 13‐3263 13
the merits as to its remainder; and Vidinski’s petition for re‐
view in No. 13‐3263 is DENIED on the merits.