UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1006
RAFAEL COPPOLA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
DYLAN CLARK; EVAN G. FORD; ZAC TRAUTMAN; TROY M.
GREENSFELDER; MAGGIE DESMOND; LARS N. NOLEN; KIRBY MARTIN;
TYLER WASSERMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KARPATHOES, INC., d/b/a Fratellis Italian Restaurant; GEORGE
SAKELLIS; ROULA RIGOPOULA SAKELLIS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:14-cv-00824-ELH)
Submitted: September 20, 2016 Decided: November 1, 2016
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Howard Benjamin Hoffman, Rockville, Maryland; Stephen Jon
Springer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Unsatisfied with an award of attorney’s fees and costs,
Rafael Coppola seeks to appeal the district court’s reduction in
the amount of his requested fees. We dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely
filed.
Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the
district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). We
have a duty to examine our jurisdiction sua sponte. See United
States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2011).
On July 8, 2014, the district court entered judgment in
favor of Coppola based on Coppola’s acceptance of Defendants’
Offer of Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Although the
court’s order did not “mechanically recite” the words “no just
reason for delay,” Crostley v. Lamar Cty., 717 F.3d 410, 420
(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and although
an “explanation . . . undoubtedly would have been helpful” in
understanding the district court’s determination, Fox v. Balt.
City Police Dep’t, 201 F.3d 526, 532 (4th Cir. 2000), we
3
conclude that the Rule 54(b) certification was unmistakable and
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. *
Contrary to Coppola’s arguments, “a Rule 68 judgment
inherently possesses a significant degree of finality” due to
its self-executing nature. Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273,
1279 (6th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the parties clearly
intended the Rule 68 judgment to be final. Coppola accepted
Defendants’ offer for the full amount that he sought, and the
remaining plaintiffs immediately amended the complaint to remove
Coppola as a party. The fact that the judgment left unresolved
the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded Coppola
did not deprive it of finality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a); Ray
Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 777
(2014).
The district court resolved the attorney’s fee issue in an
order entered on February 19, 2015. As the district court had
already entered a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Coppola
had 30 days from entry of the February 19 fee award to note an
appeal of that order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The notice
*
The judgment entered by the district court, titled “Order
of Judgment,” was on a form submitted to the court by counsel
for Coppola.
4
of appeal was filed on December 31, 2015, well beyond the 30-day
period.
Because Coppola failed to file a timely notice of appeal
and did not obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal
period, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
5