COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00159-CV
NADER DARYAPAYMA A/K/A APPELLANTS
NADER PAYMA AND 4 ANGELS,
INC.
V.
MYUNG ‘MICHAEL’ PARK APPELLEE
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FROM THE 96TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 096-233401-08
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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The question presented is whether the trial court ran afoul of the one-
satisfaction rule by rendering judgment against both Appellant Nader
Daryapayma a/k/a Nader Payma and Appellant 4 Angels, Inc. for the full amount
of the single financial injury that Appellee Myung ‘Michael’ Park suffered after
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
rendering separate default judgments in favor of Park and against Defendants
John Bogert and A-4 Supply & Parts, Inc. for the same damages. It did not. We
will affirm.
According to Park’s third amended petition, Daryapayma is the sole officer
and director of 4 Angels, Inc., a Texas corporation, and Bogert is the president
and sole officer and director of A-4 Supply & Parts, Inc., also a Texas
corporation. At some point, Daryapayma approached Park about purchasing
“Dapper Cleaners,” a dry-cleaning business located in Tarrant County.
Daryapayma made “a host of representations” and one or more promises about
the business.
In February 2008, Park executed a commercial contract for the acquisition
of the business. The agreement identified Park as the buyer, A-4 Supply & Parts
as the seller, Bogert as the “President” of A-4 Supply & Parts, and Daryapayma
as the “Seller’s Representative.” One of the agreement’s provisions provided
that Daryapayma had to “buy back” the business if Park was not satisfied with it
within six months after the closing, and an addendum required A-4 Supply &
Parts to return Park’s payment if a new lease contract was not in place within a
month after closing. Park paid $150,000 of the $190,000 total purchase price at
the closing and agreed to pay the remaining balance within six months. Park
alleged that the initial $150,000 payment was deposited into a business account
for 4 Angels but never transferred to A-4 Supply & Parts.
2
Park later sought a refund of the $150,000 payment because a new lease
was not obtained timely. He also requested that Daryapayma buy back the
business, having learned that “various representations that had been made to
him in connection with the sale . . . were false.” Daryapayma, however, did not
buy back the business, and A-4 Supply & Parts did not return the $150,000.
Park consequently sued Daryapayma, 4 Angels, Bogert, and A-4 Supply &
Parts to recover damages, punitive damages, additional damages, and attorneys’
fees resulting from the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the
business.2 After Bogert and A-4 Supply & Parts failed to file answers, the trial
court granted default judgments against them. Each then-interlocutory default
judgment awarded Park $173,844.88 and stated that of that amount, $150,000
consisted of contract damages.
Park’s suit against Daryapayma and 4 Angels eventually proceeded to
trial, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Park and against Daryapayma on
Park’s claims for fraud, violation of the DTPA, and negligent misrepresentation
and a verdict in favor of Park and against 4 Angels for money had and received.
2
Park averred in part,
Defendants set up A-4 Parts & Supply, Inc. as the “dummy”
seller in the hope that Park would have little or no recourse under
the Sale Agreement or Addendum. Defendants never had any
intention to honor their promises or agreements to repurchase the
business or refund the $150,000 payment if triggered. Defendants
knew Park would ultimately uncover the lies and deception and so
attempted to set up the sale with a “straw man” seller that would
have no or insufficient assets to satisfy any judgment against it.
3
The trial court’s final judgment awarded Park $150,000 against Daryapayma,
plus additional damages, attorneys’ fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
court costs.3 Against 4 Angels, the final judgment awarded Park $150,000, plus
attorneys’ fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, and court costs.4
Appellants argue in their first issue that the trial court violated the one-
satisfaction rule by awarding Park actual or economic damages totaling
$600,000—$150,000 against Daryapayma, 4 Angels, Bogert, and A-4 Supply &
Parts each—when Park alleged that the defendants had caused him a single
financial injury, albeit through technically different acts, in the amount of only
$150,000. Appellants complain that Park already obtained judgments against
Bogert and A-4 Supply & Parts totaling $300,000 and that awarding him
judgments against Appellants for an additional $300,000 in damages gives him a
prohibited windfall. Park responds that “until there is payment [i.e., some
satisfaction] the one-satisfaction rule is inapplicable and Appellants’ attempt at
credit is premature.” Park is correct.
The one-satisfaction rule prohibits a plaintiff from obtaining more than one
recovery for the same injury. Tony Gullo Motors, I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d
299, 303 (Tex. 2006). It applies when multiple defendants commit the same
3
Park elected to recover against Daryapayma under Park’s DTPA claim.
4
Bogert and A-4 Supply & Parts filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s final judgment but later moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which
this court granted.
4
acts, or when multiple defendants commit technically different acts that result in a
single injury. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000)
(op. on reh’g). If there is only one injury, even if it is based on several
overlapping and varied theories of liability, a plaintiff will only be permitted one
recovery. Buccaneer Homes of Ala., Inc. v. Pelis, 43 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see Foley v. Parlier, 68 S.W.3d 870,
883 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“The prohibition against double
recovery is a corollary of the rule that a party is entitled to but one satisfaction for
the injuries sustained by him.”). What may not be immediately apparent from
these well-established standards, but what the caselaw has squarely concluded,
is that the one-satisfaction rule does not bar a trial court from rendering a
judgment against one party when another judgment rendered against a different
party for the same injury or damages has gone unsatisfied.
It is well settled that an injured party may sue and proceed to judgment
against all joint tortfeasors together, or any number less than all, or each one
separately in successive suits; and that an unsatisfied judgment recovered
against one of them will not operate as a bar to an action against another;
provided however, the plaintiff may finally satisfy only one judgment. Krobar
Drilling, L.L.C. v. Ormiston, 426 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. denied). Indeed, “it is the satisfaction of a judgment, not the obtaining
of a judgment, that bars further suits.” Id. (emphasis in original); see T.L. James
& Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 n.1, 869 (Tex. 1977) (observing that an
5
unsatisfied judgment against one tortfeasor does not bar an action against
another and holding that the one-satisfaction rule prohibited plaintiff from
prosecuting a second suit against different wrongdoers because defendants in
first suit had satisfied judgment); Burchfield v. Prosperity Bank, 408 S.W.3d 542,
548‒49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that one-
satisfaction and double-recovery rules were inapplicable to judgment obtained by
bank against guarantor for deficiency on note because default judgment
rendered against other guarantor had gone uncollected); Ally v. Bank & Trust of
Bryan/College Station, No. 10-11-00080-CV, 2012 WL 662324, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Waco Feb. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op) (holding that summary-judgment
order against appellant did not give appellee double recovery because no
amount of agreed judgment obtained against co-defendant for full amount owed
on note had been paid); see also Shriro Corp. v. Ward, 570 S.W.2d 395, 397
(Tex. 1978) (citing T.L. James & Co. and stating that “this is not a case in which
the settlement or judgment in one suit is paid in an amount which equals or
exceeds one’s damages, in which instance the satisfaction doctrine will bar a
second suit.” (emphasis added)).
There is no evidence that any part of the default judgments rendered
against Bogert and A-4 Supply & Parts has been paid, nor do Appellants even
argue as much.5 See Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517
Appellants filed a partial reporter’s record that contains only the
5
proceedings for their motion for a directed verdict and the charge conference.
6
(Tex. 1988) (explaining that party asserting affirmative defense bears the burden
to plead, prove, and secure findings on the defense). In the absence of any
actual payment or satisfaction, the mere existence of the default judgments was
no bar to the final judgments rendered against both Daryapayma and 4 Angels.6
See Burchfield, 408 S.W.3d at 548‒49; Krobar Drilling, 426 S.W.3d at 112; Ally,
2012 WL 662324, at *11; see also T.L. James & Co., 558 S.W.2d at 868‒69.
Appellants fear that the multiple judgments entitle Park to a windfall, but
their concern is unfounded. See Nielsen v. Ford Motor Co., 612 S.W.2d 209,
211 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“There can be no doubt
that where a plaintiff obtains a judgment against one of several joint tort-feasors
and accepts satisfaction of such judgment, all other joint tort-feasors are thereby
released.”); Gentry v. McKnight Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Texarkana 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Restatement Law of Judgments
for the proposition that “‘[t]he discharge or satisfaction of the judgment against
one of several persons each of whom is liable for a tort, breach of contract, or
other breach of duty, discharges each of the others from liability therefor’”); Hunt
v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1925) (“It is a
universal rule that where there has been a judgment against one of two or more
6
Appellants complain that Park did not plead joint and several liability, but
insofar as he was required to do so, the matter was waived because the record
does not indicate that Appellants raised it in the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
90.
7
joint tort-feasors, followed by an acceptance of satisfaction, all other tortfeasors
are thereby released . . . .”), aff’d, 280 S.W. 546 (Tex. 1926).
The trial court did not violate the one-satisfaction rule in rendering
judgment against Appellants. We overrule their first issue.
Appellants argue in their second and third issues that the trial court
reversibly erred by denying their motion for a directed verdict and by awarding
Park $75,000 in additional damages against Daryapayma. Both issues are
expressly premised upon the same argument that Appellants raised in their first
issue. Having overruled Appellants’ first issue, we also overrule their second and
third issues.
Having overruled Appellants’ three issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DELIVERED: November 3, 2016
8
Nader Daryapayma A/K/A Nader Payma and 4 Angels, Inc. v. Myung 'Michael' Park
Combined Opinion