UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7980
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANA LEE GRAY, a/k/a Mook,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00949-JMC-12)
Submitted: May 23, 2016 Decided: November 7, 2016
Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Dana Lee Gray, Appellant Pro Se. Beth Drake, Acting United
States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dana Lee Gray appeals the district court’s orders denying
his motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) (2012), and his motion for reconsideration. * We
grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss in part, and
affirm in part.
In criminal cases, the defendant must file the notice of
appeal within 14 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(1)(A); see United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 3582 proceeding is criminal in
nature and Rule 4(b)(1)(A) appeal period applies). With or
without a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, the district court may grant an extension of up to 30
days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4);
United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985).
The district court entered its order denying the motion for
reduction of sentence on September 1, 2015. Gray filed the
notice of appeal, at the earliest, on December 14, 2015, after
*We construe Gray’s notice of appeal as encompassing both
the § 3582 dismissal order and the text order denying
reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); Jackson v.
Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e construe
. . . [R]ule [3(c)] liberally and take a functional approach to
compliance, asking whether the putative appellant has manifested
the intent to appeal a specific judgment or order and whether
the affected party had notice and an opportunity fully to brief
the issue.”).
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the appeal and excusable neglect periods expired for the
September 1 order. Consequently, Gray’s appeal of the § 3582
order is untimely, and we dismiss this portion of the appeal.
As to the district court’s order denying Gray’s motion for
reconsideration, in United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233 (4th
Cir. 2010), we held that a district court lacks authority to
grant a motion to reconsider its ruling on a § 3582(c)(2)
motion. Id. at 234. Under Goodwyn, Gray had only one
opportunity to seek, through a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the benefit
of Amendment 782. See id. at 235-36. Once the district court
ruled on Gray’s initial motion, it lacked authority to consider
subsequent relief based on the same Amendment, either by way of
a second § 3582 motion or a motion for reconsideration of the
initial order. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction
over the motion for reconsideration, and we affirm the district
court’s order denying that motion.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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