NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 7 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NORA LAVERY-PETRASH, No. 15-16759
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01520-GEB-
DAD
v.
CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST, AKA MEMORANDUM*
Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Nora Lavery-Petrash appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her employment action alleging retaliation and discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Title VII, and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d
1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
age discrimination claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether she was discriminated against on the basis of her age.
See id. at 1248 (prima facie elements of age discrimination claim under ADEA);
Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l., Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000) (prima facie elements of
age discrimination claim under FEHA).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
sex discrimination claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
not allowing her to perform certain tasks were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha
Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth Title VII sex
discrimination claim and explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where
defendant did not establish “a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Metoyer v.
Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (Title VII framework applies to
FEHA claims).
2
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
retaliation claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant’s stated reasons for the adverse actions were
pretextual. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2004) (listing elements of a retaliation claim and explaining that circumstantial
evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial, and that timing alone is
insufficient to establish pretext); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123,
1130 (Cal. 2005) (same analysis applies to FEHA retaliation claims).
Lavery-Petrash’s contentions regarding her expert witness report are
unpersuasive because the record reflects that after Lavery-Petrash requested
guidance from the court, the magistrate judge ordered her to provide defendants
with her expert witness report, but she failed to do so.
Lavery-Petrash’s contentions that the district court delayed her case based
on issues with her counsel and that this prejudiced Lavery-Petrash are
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3