NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 7 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD, No. 14-16085
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-03131-WHO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT STORES NATIONAL
BANK; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Fareed Sepehry-Fard appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to a state court
debt collection case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s claims against
defendants Patricia M. Lucas, Mary Arand, and Mark H. Pierce on the basis of
judicial immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“Judges . . . are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in
their official capacities.”).
To the extent that Sepehry-Fard’s claims sought review of a prior state court
judgment, the district court properly dismissed those claims as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Rooker-Feldman bars de facto appeals of a state court decision and constitutional
claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision); see also Reusser v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one
in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or
require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural
rules” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Sepehry-Fard’s claims for declaratory
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relief, accounting, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law because Sepehry-Fard
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at
341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
Sepehry-Fard’s contentions that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this action, lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants, was
biased, or violated Sepehry-Fard’s rights to a jury trial, due process, or equal
protection by dismissing this case, are unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Sepehry-Fard’s pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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