UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4667
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE LAMAR CARR, a/k/a Lil Bud,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:15-cr-00095-D-1)
Submitted: August 9, 2016 Decided: November 8, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elisa Cyre Salmon, THE SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Lamar Carr appeals his conviction and 204-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). On
appeal, Carr’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether Carr’s
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and whether the district
court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Carr has filed a pro se
supplemental brief challenging two Sentencing Guidelines
enhancements imposed by the district court. The Government has
declined to file a response brief. Following a thorough review
of the record, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must
conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charges to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum penalties he faces, and the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
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The court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea is
voluntary and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3).
Because Carr did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise preserve error in the plea proceedings, this Court
reviews the adequacy of the plea colloquy for plain error.
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009).
Carr establishes plain error by demonstrating that (1) the
district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). In the guilty plea context, a
defendant establishes that an error affected his substantial
rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would
not have pled guilty but for the error. Massenburg, 564 F.3d at
343. Even if these requirements are met, we will exercise our
discretion to “correct the error only if it seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381
(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The record reveals that the court substantially complied
with the requirements of Rule 11, ensuring that Carr’s plea was
knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual
basis. Although the district court made minor omissions during
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the plea colloquy, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A), (J),
nothing in the record suggests that Carr would not have pled
guilty but for these omissions. See Massenburg, 564 F.3d at
343. We therefore conclude that Carr’s guilty plea was knowing
and voluntary.
We review Carr’s sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must first “ensur[e] that
the district court committed no significant procedural error,”
including improper calculation of the Guidelines range,
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, or inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
If we find no procedural error, we examine the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to satisfy
the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume
on appeal that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively
reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014). Carr bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by
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showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
We conclude Carr’s sentence was reasonable. Carr
challenges Guidelines enhancements imposed by the district court
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(2) (2014) and
USSG § 3C1.2. Section 3C1.2 provides for a two-level
enhancement “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the
course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” USSG
§ 3C1.2; see United States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 347 (4th Cir.
2015). “[A]cts are considered reckless when [the defendant] was
aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of
such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise in such a situation.” United States v.
Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Section 2D1.1(b)(2) also provides for a two-
level enhancement “[i]f the defendant used violence, made a
credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of
violence.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(2).
Because Carr did not object to these enhancements in the
district court, we review his unpreserved Guidelines challenges
for plain error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292
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(4th Cir. 2012); see Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1126-27
(describing standard); United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448,
451 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining defendant’s obligation to
object to presentence report); United States v. Love, 134 F.3d
595, 606 (4th Cir. 1998) (recognizing defendant’s obligation to
affirmatively show that information in presentence report is
inaccurate). Our review of the record and Carr’s supplemental
brief leads us to conclude that the district court did not
plainly err in imposing these enhancements.
The district court properly calculated Carr’s applicable
Guidelines range, considered the parties’ arguments, and
provided a well-reasoned explanation for the sentence it
imposed, grounded in various § 3553(a) factors. Further, Carr
has not met his burden to rebut the presumption of substantive
reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Carr’s criminal judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Carr, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Carr requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Carr.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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