NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 8 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETRA CARRILLO; IVAN CARRILLO; No. 14-15491
ARLEEN CARRILLO; AYLEEN
CARRILLO; JAYLEEN CARRILLO; D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02122-JAD-
BRIANNA LATISHA CARRILLO, GWF
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT; A. CARPENTER,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 15, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Petra Carrillo, acting individually, on behalf of her minor children, and as
special administratrix of the estate of her husband, Ivan Carrillo, appeals the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Department (“LVMPD”) and former LVMPD Officer Aron Carpenter in this case
stemming from Ivan’s death during a car chase. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Carrillo, we agree with
the district court that Carpenter did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
intentionally colliding with Ivan Carrillo’s vehicle. “A police officer’s attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386
(2007); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2014). Ivan Carrillo
plainly posed a danger to others when fleeing the police by crossing into oncoming
traffic, purposely avoiding a spike strip designed to halt his flight, and driving near
innocent bystanders (and, in fact, getting into a crash that sent one such bystander to
the hospital).
2. The district court also properly entered judgment for the LVMPD on
Carrillo’s claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Monell liability is unavailable “[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional
injury at the hands of the individual police officer.” City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).
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3. Given our conclusions above, we need not address Carrillo’s arguments
about the district court’s decisions to exclude the LVMPD Accident Investigation
Supplement and Luis Maldonado’s deposition testimony (and, by extension, the
LVMPD Safe Driving Policy) as unauthenticated. But we express concern over the
highly technical nature of those decisions. The authenticity of the excluded
evidence was not in dispute, and any possible foundational error should have been
easily corrected. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (“[The Rules] should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”); Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (“It is . . . entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities.”).
AFFIRMED.
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