UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4225
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAMAR DAVELL PETTY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00167-CCE-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2016 Decided: November 9, 2016
Before MOTZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Tiffany T. Jefferson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, JoAnna G.
McFadden, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shamar Davell Petty pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2012). On remand for resentencing, the district court imposed
an above-Sentencing Guidelines sentence of 92 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Petty contends that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
Because Petty does not assert any procedural sentencing
error, we review only the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, considering “the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)].” United States v. Gomez-
Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard
applies to any sentence, whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range.” United States v.
Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100–01 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a sentence that falls
outside the applicable Guidelines range, “we consider whether
the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 529 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Petty argues that his sentence is greater than necessary to
achieve the purposes of sentencing and that the district court
failed to give sufficient reasons for the extent of the
variance. After reviewing the district court’s thorough
explanation of Petty’s sentence, we conclude that it did not
abuse its discretion. The district court noted that Petty had a
long criminal history, including several convictions involving
firearms, and that he had received relatively lenient sentences
in the past that had not deterred him from engaging in new
criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B). The
district court also considered the dangerousness of the conduct
underlying the offense of conviction — specifically, that Petty
carried and discarded a firearm in a residential neighborhood.
See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court considered the
Guidelines range and determined that a sentence significantly
higher than that range was necessary to protect the public and
to demonstrate to Petty that his conduct could not continue.
See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4)(A).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s amended
criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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