CLD-040 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-2367
___________
LA-QUN RASHEED WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
LOUIS FOLINO; TRACY SHAWLEY; PAUL PALYA; LT. WILLIAM SHRADER;
D.S.F.M. GILLMORE; C/O SUMEY; C/O BLANCHERD; C/O SMITH; All sued in
their individual capacities; RN NEDRO GREGO; IRMA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-00770)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 10, 2016
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 17, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
La-Qun Rasheed Williams appeals the Magistrate Judge’s final order granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on his two federal claims, and remanding the
remaining negligence claim to Pennsylvania state court. Williams is a prisoner
incarcerated at SCI Greene, and is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Because no
substantial question is presented, we will summarily affirm the judgment.
Williams initially brought suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court against
various officials, coordinators, and officers at SCI Greene. Williams alleged claims
under the First Amendment for retaliation; the Eighth Amendment for excessive force,
inhumane conditions of confinement, and denial of medical care; the Fourteenth
Amendment for due process violations; and Pennsylvania state law for negligence. The
Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, and the parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate
Judge.
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Magistrate Judge
granted the motion in part, dismissing Williams’ excessive force, unconstitutional
confinement, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and denied it in part, allowing
Williams’ retaliation, unconstitutional delay or denial of medical care, and negligence
claims to continue. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
The Magistrate Judge granted the motion as to the federal claims and remanded the
constitute binding precedent.
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remaining negligence claim to Pennsylvania state court. Williams filed a timely notice of
appeal followed by a motion for reconsideration, which the Magistrate Judge denied. In
his notice of appeal, Williams referenced only the Magistrate Judge’s second order,
granting summary judgment and remanding to state court.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Review of the Magistrate
Judge’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014), and we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record.
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Summary judgment is
proper if the non-moving party fails to sufficiently establish an essential element of the
case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480
F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007). Mere allegations are insufficient to convince a reasonable
factfinder to find all of the elements of the prima facie case. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265.
A. Deliberate Indifference or Denial of a Serious Medical Condition
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Although Williams does not address it in his notice of appeal, we have reviewed and
agree with the Magistrate Judge’s first order dismissing Williams’ excessive force,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and due process claims. See Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating dismissal for failure to state
a claim is reviewed de novo). Williams merely complained of being pushed or shoved
without a resulting injury, which “almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force
claim.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010). Williams’ due process claim relates
to rejection of a grievance; allegations of improprieties in handling a prisoner’s grievance
do not state a cognizable § 1983 claim. See Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th
Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Williams’ unconstitutional confinement claim was based
on exposure to swinging cabinet doors with protruding metal, which simply does not state
a claim for the deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”
sufficient to support the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Tillman v.
3
Williams alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his recurring
seizures when they refused to treat him and denied the sick call slips, request slips, and
grievances he submitted during November and December 2014, in compliance with
prison procedure. It is undisputed that Williams’ history of seizures, which began in
1997, was noted in his transfer forms to SCI Greene in November 2013, and that on
January 27 and 28, 2014, he experienced a seizure, filed a sick call slip, and was attended
to by medical personnel.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Prison authorities are liable where they “deny
reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . and such denial exposes the inmate to
undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,” or if they intentionally refuse to
provide for a known need for medical care. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.
2004). “Deliberate indifference is also evident where prison officials erect arbitrary and
burdensome procedures that result in interminable delays and outright denials of medical
care to suffering inmates.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a
prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth
Lebanon Cty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000).
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Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see
also Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that non-physician
defendants were not deliberately indifferent for failing to respond directly to the medical
complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor).
In support of his claim, Williams first alleges that he submitted sick call slips on
three occasions – December 4, December 12, and December 19, 2013 – stating he
experienced seizures and that he did not receive medical treatment. See R. Doc. 30,
Exhibit 16. Defendants submit sick call logs from the days following Williams’ alleged
submissions; Williams’ name does not appear on the sick call logs, meaning he either
refused to be seen by medical staff or fabricated the submissions after the fact.
Furthermore, Defendants include other submissions from Williams from around the same
time, along with sick call logs which show his name and indicate he actually submitted
other sick call requests, signed in, and was seen by medical staff. Williams did not
mentions seizures at these appointments. Williams’ “mere allegations” that he actually
submitted these sick call slips and was denied attention are insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on this ground. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265.
Williams also submitted three request slips that detail seizures in support of his
deliberate indifference claim. See R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 27. The first request merely states
he is an epileptic who experiences seizures, and requests the metal cabinets in his cell be
removed because they are health hazards. The latter two requests describe a seizure on
December 4, 2013, and request medication and that the cabinet be removed or replaced.
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However, removing a cabinet is not “medical treatment” that would subject an inmate to
undue suffering or tangible injury. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. Furthermore, these
requests were submitted to prison administrators, not medical personnel, and the denials
show that Defendants checked the sick call log before denying Williams’ request to
verify that he was not seen by medical staff. Therefore, Defendants – all non-medical
personnel – should not be charged with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of
deliberate indifference because Williams has not shown that Defendants had “a reason to
believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not
treating) a prisoner.” See id. at 236. Accordingly, Williams’ request slips are also
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on this ground. See Blunt, 767 F.3d
at 265.
Finally, to support his claim of deliberate indifference, Williams submitted a
grievance he filed on December 24, 2013, alleging he suffered a seizure, his sick call slip
went unanswered, and he needed to resume taking medication. R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 20.
Defendants submit sick call logs which reveal Williams was seen by medical personnel
during the time that forms the basis of the complaint, and made no mention of seizures.
Where Williams was receiving treatment for other issues, non-medical prison staff should
not be considered deliberately indifferent for failing to respond directly to the medical
complaints of a prisoner. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. Furthermore, the outcome of
Williams’ grievance is not determinative of the underlying issue of whether prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to his alleged serious medical needs. Therefore, no
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genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendants’ deliberate indifference to
Williams’ serious medical needs, and summary judgment on this issue was proper.
B. Retaliation
Williams asserts three instances of retaliation: (1) excessive force was applied
against him in retaliation for filing previous grievances; (2) after filing a grievance
concerning the alleged excessive force, he was given a misconduct because prison staff
said he lied about the basis of the grievance – which he alleges was a false and merely
retaliatory determination; and (3) he was denied adequate access to the law library in
retaliation for filing the grievance. In order to prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff
must show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, prison officials took an
adverse action against him, and there is a causal connection between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.
2001).
Williams first alleges that Officer Sumey used excessive force when escorting him
out of his cell and to the shower in retaliation for filing grievances. Viewing the video
evidence submitted in support of summary judgment in the light most favorable to
Williams, it is apparent that Officer Sumey merely escorted Williams to and from the
shower; the video is devoid of any evidence of excessive force. Therefore, Williams has
not presented “evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the
elements of [the] prima facie case.” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265. Accordingly, no genuine
factual issue exists and summary judgment was properly granted as to this claim.
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Next, prison staff issued Williams a misconduct for lying to an employee based
upon the false claim of abuse against Officer Sumey. Williams alleges both that this was
merely as retaliation for filing the grievance, and that the misconduct was false because
the abuse claim was legitimate. As discussed above, the video shows no evidence of
excessive force. Therefore, Williams’ contention that the misconduct was false is a mere
allegation without any support and creates no genuine issue of material fact.
In addition, a legitimate misconduct for lying to prison staff is not retaliatory, and
a misconduct report is legitimate so long as it is issued for “reasons reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. In evaluating the legitimacy
of a misconduct report, this Court considers “the quantum of evidence of the misconduct
to determine whether the prison officials’ decision to discipline an inmate for his
violations of prison policy was within the broad discretion we must afford them.”
Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2016). A finding of misconduct must
include “a meaningful written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
action taken.” Dyson v. Kocik, 689 F.2d 466, 467 (3d Cir. 1982).
Here, the misconduct conviction is supported by a written statement of the
evidence relied on in concluding that Williams lied in submitting the grievance.
Furthermore, issuing a misconduct report based upon filing a false grievance is
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of discouraging the filing of false
or facetious grievances. Therefore, Defendants have satisfied their burden of presenting a
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“quantum of evidence” of misconduct.2 See Watson, 834 F.3d at 426. Accordingly, the
misconduct was legitimate and not retaliatory, and summary judgment was properly
granted as to this claim.
Finally, Williams asserts that he was denied adequate use of the law library in
retaliation for filing the grievance against Officer Sumey, and that he is unable to bring
the materials he requires with him to the library, since he cannot carry them while his
hands are restrained during transport. Defendants assert Williams did not suffer the
adverse action of denial of the law library, and submit a record of Williams’ library use to
support their claim that he received all the library time he was entitled to – two hours per
week – during the time period at issue. R. Doc. 30, Exhibit 9. Williams provides nothing
to support his claim that he is entitled to additional library time, and appears confused as
to the appropriate amount of library time he is entitled to. Defendants provide affidavits
stating prison procedure allows for at least two hours of library time per week, and up to
six, conditions permitting. Williams has not come forward with “evidence sufficient to
convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case”;
rather, he relies on mere allegations, which is insufficient. See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, because Williams cannot establish the
2
We recently clarified that this Circuit follows the “quantum of evidence” standard, as
opposed to the “some evidence” standard used by the Eighth Circuit. See Watson, 834
F.3d at 426-30 (Ambro, J., concurring) (discussing Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469
(8th Cir. 1994) and other cases). Under this standard, our conclusion is supported by the
record. See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 186.
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existence of an essential element of its case on which it will he bear the burden of proof
at trial, no genuine factual issue exists and summary judgment is proper. See Lauren W.,
480 F.3d at 266.
C. Negligence Claims under Pennsylvania State Law
In light of the above, the remaining negligence claims under Pennsylvania state
law were properly remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie–
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) (“a district court has discretion to
remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper
determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate”); Shaffer
v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable”)
(citations omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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