United States v. Tyrone Williams

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4121

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TYRONE MAURICE WILLIAMS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (4:14-cr-00043-BO-1)

Argued: September 20, 2016 Decided: November 18, 2016

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded with instructions
by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Stephen Clayton Gordon, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Barbara
Dickerson Kocher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara,
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V.
Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
PER CURIAM:

Tyrone Maurice Williams was indicted and pled guilty to

Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (“Count 1”);

using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to and

possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (“Count 2”); possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

922(g)(1) (“Count 3”); and robbery of a credit union, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (“Count 4”). We affirm

Williams’ convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for

resentencing before a different district judge.

I.

Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment in this case arose out of

Williams’ robbery of a Dollar General store in New Bern, North

Carolina, on July 24, 2012. During the robbery, Williams shot

the store cashier and store manager, inflicting serious physical

injuries upon both men. Williams then forced the injured

cashier to open the safe. He fled with $600 in currency. Count

3 involved an incident occurring in Winterville, North Carolina,

in August 2012. Police officers responding to a noise complaint

found Williams and others loitering around a vehicle. When the

officers approached the group, Williams pulled a handgun from

his waistband and fled on foot. Williams was apprehended and

the gun was recovered. Count 4 arose out of Williams’ armed

3
robbery of the First Flight Federal Credit Union in New Bern,

North Carolina, in February 2014. Williams passed a threatening

note demanding money to a teller. The teller put $4,373 in

currency into an envelope and gave it to Williams. Subsequent

to his arrest, Williams confessed to robbing the credit union,

robbing the Dollar General store, and shooting the Dollar

General employees.

Williams pled guilty as charged to all counts without a

plea agreement. Counts 1 and 4 each carried a maximum statutory

term of imprisonment of 20 years, and Count 3 carried a maximum

statutory term of imprisonment of 10 years. The statutory range

for Count 2 was 10 years to life imprisonment.

The presentence report grouped Counts 1, 3 and 4.

Williams’ adjusted offense level for Count 1 was 30, which

included a 10-level increase for infliction of permanent or

life-threatening bodily injury and abduction of a person to

facilitate the commission of an offense. The adjusted offense

levels for Counts 3 and 4, respectively, were 14 and 24. Under

the grouping rules, the highest offense level of 30 was

increased by 1, resulting in a combined adjusted offense level

of 31. A 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility

reduced the total offense level to 28. With a criminal history

category of IV, Williams’ advisory Guidelines sentencing range

was 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment. Count 2 required

4
imposition of a consecutive sentence and was excluded from the

grouping rules. The advisory Guidelines sentence for Count 2

was the statutory minimum 10-year term of imprisonment. Neither

Williams nor the government objected to the presentence report.

The district court held a sentencing hearing on January 21,

2015. The district court began the hearing by asking Williams

if he “want[ed] to say anything about the punishment [he would]

receive,” to which Williams simply responded, “No, Sir.” J.A.

24. What followed can only be described (at best) as a testy

exchange between the district court and Williams about Williams’

crimes and the district court’s view that Williams was not

remorseful. The district court began by demanding to know why

Williams “tr[ied] to murder” the Dollar General employees. J.A.

24. When Williams stated that he “didn’t try to murder them”

and that “it wo[uld]n’t happen” again, the district court

informed Williams that “[i]t won’t happen because I’m going to

put you in jail forever.” J.A. 25. When Williams acknowledged

that he could not “change what happened,” but did “have the

opportunity to apologize” and “grow from it and become . . . a

better person,” the district court told Williams that there were

“some things you can’t apologize for” and that “[i]n some

societies they would just eliminate you. . . . You won’t have

to worry about getting better, you would be gone.” J.A. 27.

5
 The district court then heard from the Dollar General

victims about the effect the incident had upon their lives and

the lives of their families. The district court stated that in

more than three decades it had “never heard an allocution as

powerful” as those offered by the victims and that, in contrast,

Williams had been “brazen enough to look at these people whose

lives he has crushed and driven into the ground with virtually

no remorse.” J.A. 41. The district court further stated that

it could not “see any justification for a sentence below the

maximum that the statute and law would permit,” and suggested

that the “appellate courts c[ould] listen to and read the

testimony of the witnesses and the lack of contrition on the

part of the defendant.” J.A. 42.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court

imposed a total term of imprisonment of 480 months. On Counts 1

and 4 (the two robbery charges), the district court imposed

concurrent statutory maximum sentences of 240 months. The

district court also imposed the statutory maximum sentence of

120 months for Count 3 (the felon-in-possession charge), but

ordered that it run consecutively to the other counts in the

group. This resulted in a sentence of 360 months on the three

grouped counts. The district court then added the mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months on Count 2, raising the total

term of imprisonment to 480 months.

6
 The next day, however, the district court sua sponte gave

notice to the parties of its intent to reopen the sentencing

proceeding, and the court scheduled a hearing for January 27.

At the inception of the hearing, the district court sought

agreement from the government and Williams’ counsel that it had

the power to reopen the sentencing proceeding and change

Williams’ sentence. Both agreed that it did.

After “incorporat[ing] by reference everything that was

said including the allocution participation at the last

hearing,” the district court stated that, “after thinking about

how [it] imposed [the 480-month] sentence[,] [it] want[ed] to go

back and remove that and consider a different approach to it.”

J.A. 51. The district court, upon “reflection,” then imposed a

total prison term of 360 months. J.A. 52. For grouped Counts

1, 3, and 4, the district court imposed a within-guidelines

sentence of 120 months. For Count 2, the district court varied

upward and imposed a consecutive sentence of 240 months (double

the mandatory minimum and well below the statutory maximum of

life imprisonment).

The district court explained its reconsideration of the

480-month sentence. First, the district court judge advised

that he had been under the mistaken impression at the initial

sentencing hearing that the maximum sentence that he could

impose for Count 2 was 10 years’ imprisonment. Second, the

7
district court judge observed that “under the guidelines and

under sentencing law and taking 3553(a) into account,” Count 2

was “the place where I should [have] upwardly depart[ed],” J.A.

52, because “the use of the firearm [was] the salient object in

this case that caused all the damage,” J.A. 54. Finally, the

district court explained that “[i]n the fast moving way in which

the hearing went dominated by the allocution there wasn’t enough

time to think about what an appropriate upward departure would

be. And I believe after reflection this is what I should do.”

J.A. 53.

On appeal, Williams challenged his convictions on Counts 1

and 2, and his 360-month sentence as substantively unreasonable.

The government did not appeal. We directed the parties to file

supplemental briefs addressing the question of whether the

district court had jurisdiction to reopen the sentencing

proceeding and reduce Williams’ sentence to 360 months. We also

requested the parties to supplement their briefs to address the

question of whether the 480-month sentence imposed by the

district court was substantively reasonable.

II.

Williams challenges his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 on

the basis that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional under the

Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. As Williams

acknowledges, this argument is foreclosed by precedent. See

8
United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.

III.

With regard to Williams’ sentence, we conclude that the

district court lacked jurisdiction to modify Williams’ sentence

from 480 months to 360 months, and thus it is the 480-month

sentence that we review. Because we hold that the 480-month

sentence was unreasonable, we vacate that sentence and remand

for resentencing.

A.

Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure–the

provision upon which Williams relies to support the district

court’s jurisdiction-provides that “[w]ithin 14 days after

sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from

arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Fed. R. Crim.

P. 35(a). “‘[S]entencing’ means the oral announcement of the

sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c); United States v. Layman, 116

F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court’s authority

to modify a sentence under Rule 35(a) is “severely limited.”

Id. “The rule ‘is not intended to afford the opportunity to

reconsider the application or interpretation of the sentencing

guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind about the

appropriateness of the sentence.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim.

P. 35, Advisory Committee Notes on 1991 Amendments); see also

9
United States v. Fields, 552 F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2009)

(“Congress limited the reach of Rule 35(a) because it wanted to

promote openness and finality in sentencing.”).

Here, the district court orally announced Williams’ prison

sentence on January 21, 2015, and resentenced Williams six days

later because the court, “upon reflection,” changed its mind

about the ground for the upward departure and the appropriate

extent of the departure. J.A. 52. The district court lacked

the power to do so. See Fields, 552 F.3d at 404-05; Layman, 116

F.3d at 108. Because the 360-month sentence was issued without

jurisdiction, we therefore deem it to be of no effect and not

subject to appellate review. The operative sentence for our

review is the 480-month sentence imposed on January 21, 2015.

B.

Williams contends that the district court abused its

discretion in imposing the 480-month sentence. We agree.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), district courts must consider

“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” and “impose a sentence

sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the

statutory purposes of sentencing. Those purposes include “the

need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford

10
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide

the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).

Generally speaking, the district court must begin the

sentencing process with a correct calculation of the applicable

Guidelines range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49

(2007). “[T]he district court should then consider all of the §

3553(a) factors to determine whether they support [a particular]

sentence.” Id. at 49-50. “After settling on the appropriate

sentence, [the district court] must adequately explain the

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to

promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Id. at 50. “The

farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline range,

the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.”

United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence, we “examine the totality of the circumstances to see

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding

that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Gomez–Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration

11
omitted). And where, as here, the sentencing court has imposed

a sentence that varies upward from the advisory Guidelines

sentence, we must determine “whether the sentencing court acted

reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a

sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from

the sentencing range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d

938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted);

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We “must give due deference to the

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a

whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States v.

Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “This deference is due in part because the

sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and

judge their import and the judge sees and hears the evidence,

makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the

facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” United

States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

No one can doubt the breadth and severity of Williams’

crimes. And we cannot say at this juncture that a district

court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines sentence

in some way and in some measure could not be justified by the §

3553(a) factors. However, it is our duty to consider the

totality of the circumstances that led to the district court’s

12
decision to impose a specific variant sentence, along with the

reasoned basis articulated by the district court for its

decision. Having taken these things into consideration, we must

conclude that the district court abused its discretion.

First, the extent of the variance was significant. The

Guidelines sentencing range for grouped Counts 1, 3, and 4 was

110-137 months’ imprisonment. Although it would not alone

render the sentence unreasonable, we note that the adjusted

offense level for Count 1, which carried the highest adjusted

offense level for the group, had already taken into account the

fact that Williams inflicted serious bodily injury upon the

Dollar General victims. By imposing the statutory maximum

sentences on Counts 1 and 4, removing Count 3 from the group,

and imposing a consecutive instead of concurrent statutory

maximum sentence on Count 3, the district court imposed a total

sentence (360 months) for the grouped counts that was more than

2 1/2 times the top of the advisory range, before adding the

mandatory minimum 10-year term on Count 2. The end result was a

40-year sentence that was more than 18 1/2 years above the

maximum advisory Guidelines sentence for all offenses.

Second, while we would normally be required to give due

deference to a district court’s application of the § 3553(a)

factors and its concomitant determination that the variant

sentence imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary,

13
to comply with the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), such

deference is largely unwarranted under the unusual circumstances

of this case. Here, the district court’s determination, while

ostensibly grounded in the § 3553(a) factors, was clearly

affected by other matters. The record of the sentencing

proceeding clearly conveys an unusually high degree of emotion,

no doubt ignited by the district court’s displeasure with

Williams’ decision not to allocute, and then fueled by the

allocutions that were offered by the Dollar General victims.

And contrary to the district court’s belief at the time, our

reading of the record does not automatically cause us to reject

Williams’ professed remorse for his actions. As the district

court would later admit, the sentencing hearing was at least in

some measure tainted by “the fast moving way in which the

hearing went[,] dominated by the allocution,” so as not to allow

“enough time to think about what an appropriate upward departure

would be,” J.A. 53, and by its misinterpretation of the

presentence report and failure to understand that it could have

varied on the count that most troubled the court – Williams’ use

of the firearm to shoot the victims. Although the district

court’s change of heart alone does not suffice to establish the

unreasonableness of the sentence, the events that occurred

during the “resentencing” hearing do confirm our concerns about

the sentence that was imposed at the first sentencing hearing.

14
 To conclude, we are unable to say on the existing record

that the district court “acted reasonably both with respect to

its decision to impose [the variant] sentence and with respect

to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”

Washington, 743 F.3d at 944 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nor would our doing so in these circumstances “promote the

perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

“Inherent in the concept of reasonableness is the notion that

the rare sentence may be unreasonable, and inherent in the idea

of discretion is the notion that it may, on infrequent occasion,

be abused.” United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 536 (4th

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This case

presents an example of that rare sentence presented to us on

those infrequent occasions.” Id. Accordingly, we vacate the

480-month sentence imposed by the district court as

substantively unreasonable. In light of the circumstances, we

also think a fresh start is in order. Accordingly, we will

remand the case to a different district judge for resentencing.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’ convictions,

vacate his sentence as unreasonable, and remand for resentencing

before a different district judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

15