Com. v. Jean, J.

J-A21014-16 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : JOSHUA JEAN, : : Appellant : No. 2959 EDA 2015 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0013192-2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ. CONCURRING STATEMENT BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016 I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that, where the prosecutor had elicited testimony regarding Appellant’s prior arrest (or incarceration), defense counsel’s decision to forego a curative instruction waived Appellant’s ability to plead prejudice on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Norman, 549 A.2d 981, 986 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 481 A.2d 1221 (Pa. Super. 1221 (Pa. Super. 1984), and concluding that, “[w]hen counsel chooses to refuse appropriate curative instructions for [a] legitimate tactical reason, the defense may not plead prejudice on appeal.”). I write separately to express my disagreement with the conclusions reached by this Court in Norman and Miller. A trial court may grant a mistrial “only where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing J-A21014-16 and rendering a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1273 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). However, our Supreme Court has concluded that “‘[a] mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011)). Absent a defendant’s confession, nothing can be more damaging and prejudicial to a defendant than testimony regarding a defendant’s prior arrest or conviction. In my 35 years of judicial experience, once a jury learns of a defendant’s prior conviction, the presumption of innocence, in reality, disappears. The impact of such testimony is immediate, and prevents the jury “from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” See Cash, 137 A.3d at 1273. The remedy of a “curative” instruction is illusory, as it cannot overcome the impact of such testimony on a jury. Judge Dubow joins this concurring statement. -2-