11/22/2016
DA 15-0534
Case Number: DA 15-0534
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 300
CITY OF BOZEMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JAMES KING,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC 15-52B
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James King (Self-Represented), Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Madison L. Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Greg Sullivan, Bozeman City Attorney, Ed Hirsch, Prosecutor,
Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 2016
Decided: November 22, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 James King was convicted of disorderly conduct on September 12, 2014, in the
Bozeman Municipal Court. Acting pro se, he appealed the verdict to the Eighteenth
Judicial District Court, Gallatin County. The District Court, in a comprehensive opinion
and order, declined appellate jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the Municipal Court
for enforcement of King’s sentence. King appeals. We affirm.
ISSUE
¶2 A restatement of the issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it
declined to exercise jurisdiction over King’s appeal from the Municipal Court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On November 23, 2013, King was involved in a physical altercation with John
Cernick in Bozeman, Montana. The responding officers cited both King and Cernick for
disorderly conduct. Cernick subsequently entered a guilty plea while King pled not
guilty.
¶4 King’s trial was initially set for April 2014 but was reset to May 16, 2014, to
accommodate the court’s schedule. The May 16 trial was vacated to allow King to file a
motion to dismiss which, following a hearing, the court denied. At calendar call on July
2, trial was confirmed for July 8, 2014. Both King and the State agreed to that date.
Later that day, King reappeared at the close of calendar call and informed the court that
his out-of-state eyewitness could not be present on July 8 but could be present on July 22.
King indicated that he had arranged to switch trial dates with another defendant so that
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King’s trial could take place on July 22, 2014. The audio recording of the 1.5 minute
conversation does not indicate that State’s counsel was present, nor did King represent
that the State agreed or objected to the change in trial date. The court rescheduled the trial
for July 22, 2014. Subsequently, the State moved to continue the trial on the grounds
that the arresting officer could not be present on that date. Over King’s objection, the
court granted the State’s motion and King moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The
court instructed King to file a written motion on the matter, which he did in August 2014.
The Municipal Court subsequently denied King’s motion without a written order, and
conducted the trial on September 12, 2014. Following a guilty verdict, King was
sentenced to pay a $100 fine and $135 in surcharges and fees. No jail time was ordered.
King appealed his sentence to the District Court, asserting eight grounds for appeal. The
District Court obtained the Municipal Court record, reviewed it, and on July 1, 2015,
issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order (Order).
¶5 The District Court initially noted that § 46-17-404(2), MCA, provides that a party
may appeal to the district court from a judgment of municipal court when the amount in
controversy exceeds $200. The court further observed that Rule 1(b)(2) of the Uniform
Municipal Court Rules of Appeal to District Court, Title 25, Chapter 30, MCA
(U.M.C.R. App.), limits a district court’s appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases to
cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $300. The court recognized, however,
that Rule 3, U.M.C.R. App., and § 46-17-404(2)(b), MCA, grant the district court
discretion to exercise appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding the amount in controversy in
the “interests of justice.” Excluding the surcharge and fees imposed in King’s sentence,
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as required by City of Kalispell v. Koestner, 2001 MT 53, ¶ 12, 304 Mont. 315, 21 P.3d
622, the court determined that King’s $100 fine did not satisfy the threshold amounts set
forth in the applicable rules or statutes. While the District Court acknowledged that
neither the rules nor the statutes defined “interests of justice,” it concluded that it would
accept appellate jurisdiction if King’s issues were meritorious. Consequently, the District
Court addressed each of King’s issues and determined that it would not exercise appellate
jurisdiction on “interests of justice” grounds as it was unlikely that King would prevail on
any of the issues raised.
¶6 King filed a timely appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 The district court’s determination of whether it has the power to review a
municipal court’s decision is a question of law which we review to determine whether its
interpretation is correct. Koestner, ¶ 8 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Did the District Court err when it declined to exercise jurisdiction over King’s
appeal from the municipal court?
¶9 Continuing to act pro se, King generally argues that the District Court’s denial of
his motion to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion and error. He challenges the
court’s determinations that his issues lacked merit and that he was not likely to prevail on
appeal.
¶10 King presents numerous specific arguments on appeal alleging District Court,
Municipal Court, and State error, abuse of discretion, misconduct, and bias. He first
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asserts that the District Court intentionally misinterpreted one of his issues presented on
appeal and consequently failed to address “the most important basis of the appeal,” i.e.,
whether, over King’s objection, the Municipal Court erred when it granted the State’s
motion to continue the July 22, 2014 trial. King claims that the District Court purposely
misconstrued his argument as an appeal of the Municipal Court’s May 2014 ruling
pertaining to video teleconferencing of an out-of-state witness. He argues that the
District Court’s failure to address the true issue in its Order was a violation of multiple
rules of judicial conduct. King’s claim is unsupported by the record and consists solely
of accusations and allegations without legal argument or analysis. The record indicates
that the District Court gave generous consideration to King and his appeal and granted
him leniency as a self-represented litigant. The court entered a 32-page opinion and
order, offering detailed analysis and conclusions. We reject King’s unsubstantiated
argument of judicial misconduct and bias.
¶11 We next address King’s claim that the Municipal Court abused its discretion by
granting the State’s request for a continuance to the July 22 trial. The record reflects that
the State argued that King failed to consult the State prior to obtaining the court’s
permission to reschedule the trial from July 8 to July 22. As noted above, the audio
recording between King and the court does not indicate that State’s counsel was present.
The State maintains that upon learning that the court had moved the trial date to July 22,
it immediately moved to reschedule on the grounds that its witness could not be present
on that date. The court initially denied the State’s motion but after conducting a hearing
on the motion, it granted it over King’s objection. While King challenges this decision, it
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was nonetheless within the Municipal Court’s discretion. State v. Gleed, 2014 MT 151,
¶ 10, 375 Mont. 286, 326 P.3d 1095. The court heard the arguments presented by the
parties and the rationale for a continuance. Consequently, the Municipal Court was in a
better position than this Court to render this decision based upon the circumstances of this
case. We will not disturb a discretionary ruling absent a finding that the court acted
“arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceed[ed] the bounds of
reason resulting in substantial injustice.” In re T.N.-S., 2015 MT 117, ¶ 16, 379 Mont.
60, 347 P.3d 1263 (internal citations omitted). We conclude the court’s decision did not
constitute an abuse of its discretion.
¶12 King’s remaining issues and his claims that these issues have merit, include: (1)
the State violated the discovery process; (2) the Municipal Court and the State
“suppressed evidence” that would have benefitted King; (3) the Municipal Court chose
the State’s non-critical witness over his critical witness in violation of his Montana and
United States constitutional rights; (4) the State was judicially estopped from moving for
a continuance from the July 22 trial date based upon its acknowledgement that such
continuance would violate King’s right to a speedy trial; (5) the Municipal Court
“ignored” his August 2014 motion to dismiss after the court ordered that he file it; and (6)
the evidence presented in this case was insufficient to convict him.
¶13 We conclude the District Court neither erred nor abused its discretion in its
considered and detailed Order addressing the merits of each of these issues. As it was
unlikely that King would have prevailed on these claims had the District Court exercised
appellate jurisdiction, the interests of justice did not demand that it do so. Whether the
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“interests of justice” would be served by accepting appellate jurisdiction is soundly
within the District Court’s broad discretion. Section 46-17-404(2)(b), MCA.
¶14 As the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the interests of
justice would not be furthered by allowing King’s appeal, we affirm.
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
We Concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice James Jeremiah Shea, specially concurring.
¶15 In his opening brief to this Court, King states that his argument on appeal to the
District Court “strictly revolved around the Municipal Court’s decision to [o]verrule the
defense’s objection to [the] State’s continuance of the July 22, 2014 trial date.” On that
point, I agree that the Municipal Court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the July
22 trial date, and I would affirm on that basis. I write separately because the Court
incorrectly perpetuates a misinterpretation of the statute and rule regarding the threshold
amount in controversy necessary to appeal a municipal court decision to district court.
¶16 As the Court correctly notes, both § 46-17-404(2), MCA, and Rule 1(b)(2),
U.M.C.R. App., determine the jurisdictional threshold for appealing a municipal court
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judgment to district court by the “amount in controversy.”1 Opinion, ¶ 5. Upon his
conviction in Municipal Court, “King was sentenced to pay a $100 fine and $135 in
surcharges and fees.” Opinion, ¶ 4. In appealing his case to the District Court, King did
not just challenge the $100 fine; he sought reversal of his conviction and dismissal of his
entire case on multiple grounds. If his appeal was successful, King would have
eliminated the fine, surcharges, and fees, totaling $235. Thus, the “amount in
controversy” that was the subject of King’s appeal was $235.
¶17 The Court, however, ignores the fact that King was contesting all of the monetary
obligations imposed upon him, and erroneously concludes that the “amount in
controversy” was merely the fine. The Court arrives at this erroneous conclusion by
citing Koestner for the proposition that it requires “[e]xcluding the surcharge and fees
imposed in King’s sentence.” Opinion, ¶ 5 (citing Koestner, ¶ 12). However, in
Koestner, the interpretation of what constitutes the “amount in controversy” for
determining district court jurisdiction of a municipal court appeal was not the issue. That
being noted, we did limit our consideration of the jurisdictional threshold to only the fine
imposed; thus, I agree that this is a fair reading of Koestner. To the extent that Koestner
could be read as such, it is incorrect and I would overrule it.
¶18 In Voerding v. State, 2006 MT 125, ¶ 16, 332 Mont. 262, 136 P.3d 502, we
concluded that “the plain meaning of the word ‘fine’ . . . does not encompass fees, costs,
1
I note that there is a discrepancy between the threshold amount in controversy set by
§ 46-17-404(2), MCA ($200), and Rule 1(b)(2), U.M.C.R. App. ($300). However, resolution of
this discrepancy is mooted by the Court’s incorrect interpretation of the “amount in controversy”
as being limited to the fine imposed.
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charges, or any other court-imposed financial obligations.” We also concluded that there
is a “clear statutory distinction between fines and other court-imposed financial
obligations.” Voerding, ¶ 19. When it drafted § 46-17-404(2), MCA, the Legislature
could have used the term “fine” in setting the threshold for district court jurisdiction of a
municipal court appeal. It did not. It chose instead to use the term “amount in
controversy.” In construing a statute, our duty “is simply to ascertain and declare what is
in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit
what has been inserted.” Section 1-2-101, MCA. Moreover, “statutory language must be
construed according to its plain meaning . . . .” Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 2000 MT
287, ¶ 46, 302 Mont. 209, 14 P.3d 487 (citation omitted). Neither § 46-17-404(2), MCA,
nor Rule 1(b)(2), U.M.C.R. App., limits the district court’s appellate jurisdiction based on
the amount of the fine. Rather, the jurisdictional limit is expressly based on the “amount
in controversy.” By interpreting the term “amount in controversy” as applying only to
King’s $100 fine, the Court not only fails to construe the statute according to its plain
meaning, it both omits the term “amount in controversy” and inserts the term “fine,” thus
managing to violate just about every rule of statutory construction in the interpretation of
a single statute.
¶19 For the foregoing reasons, although I concur in the result the Court reaches, I
disagree with its conclusion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal from the Municipal Court.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
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