FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ABUBAKAR HUSSEIN AHMED, No. 15-15963
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01626-MHB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
through its Campus Police Department; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michelle H. Burns, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted November 16, 2016***
Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Abubakar Hussein Ahmed appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
Ahmed consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of
discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir.
1981). We vacate and remand.
The district court properly found that Ahmed’s First Amended Complaint
violated Rule 8(a)’s requirement that a pleading shall contain “a short and plain
statement” of the case. However, the district court did not consider less drastic
alternatives before dismissing Ahmed’s action. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
1172, 1175, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (while a complaint which fails to comply with
Rule 8 may be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b), a district court
should first consider less drastic alternatives); Nevijel, 651 F.2d at 674 (less drastic
alternatives include “further amended complaints, allowing additional time, or
insisting that appellant associate experienced counsel”). Further, the district court
did not include any discussion of the facts alleged in Ahmed’s complaints, and it is
unclear whether it “consider[ed] the strength” of Ahmed’s case before dismissing
it. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179 (noting that district court considered the strength of
plaintiff’s case, but acknowledging that “thorough analysis” was not a prerequisite
for dismissal).
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Moreover, while the district court had previously given Ahmed an
opportunity to amend his complaint, the district court’s initial screening order
failed to give Ahmed notice of any deficiencies in his original complaint. See
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (the
court “must do more than simply advise the pro se plaintiff that his complaint
needs to be shorter and more concise”; the district court is “required to draft a few
sentences explaining the deficiencies”). Because we conclude that it is not clear
that Ahmed’s claims cannot be cured by amendment, see id., we vacate the
judgment, and remand to the district court to give Ahmed notice of the deficiencies
in his claims and an opportunity to file an amended complaint.
On further inquiry, we conclude that the appeal is not frivolous, grant in
forma pauperis status, and instruct the district court to return the filing fee to
Ahmed.
VACATED and REMANDED.
3 15-15963