MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 29 2016, 10:25 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Andrew J. Sickmann
Boston Bever Klinge Cross & Chidester
Richmond, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffery Allen Bell, November 29, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
89A01-1607-DR-1594
v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior
Court
Leslie Ann Bell, The Honorable David A. Kolger,
Appellee-Petitioner. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D02-1211-DR-424
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Jeffery Bell (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his Indiana Trial
Rule 60(B) petition to set aside a provision of the Dissolution of Marriage
Decree concerning Husband and Leslie Bell (“Wife”). Husband contends that
the trial court erred in failing to terminate his spousal-maintenance obligation
because Husband’s agreement to pay was unconscionable and the product of
duress, undue influence, and fraudulent inducement. Concluding sua sponte
that Husband did not timely seek relief from the maintenance obligation
incorporated into the Dissolution of Marriage Decree, we affirm on other
grounds.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] When Husband and Wife divorced in 2006, they entered into a settlement
agreement, which the trial court incorporated and merged into its Dissolution
of Marriage Decree. The agreement—which itself allowed modification only
by written agreement—provided, inter alia, that Husband would pay Wife
spousal maintenance. In 2007, Husband and Wife modified their agreement,
with one modification reducing Husband’s maintenance obligation. The trial
court, in turn, incorporated the modification into its decree. In 2008, other
aspects of the agreement underwent changes, but the trial court’s modified
maintenance order remained in effect.
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[3] On September 30, 2013, and then as amended on March 31, 2015, Husband
petitioned to modify the trial court’s decree. In part, Husband sought to have
his maintenance obligation terminated, alleging that the underlying agreement
to pay maintenance was unconscionable and fraught with issues of fraudulent
inducement, duress, and undue influence. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied Husband’s petition.
[4] Husband now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] “To promote the amicable settlements of disputes,” parties to a dissolution of
marriage proceeding may agree, in writing, to the maintenance of either party.
Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17(a). Where they have done so, “the terms of the
agreement, if approved by the court, shall be incorporated and merged into the
decree and the parties shall be ordered to perform the terms.” I.C. § 31-15-2-
17(b)(1). In general, “we will presume the parties intended their agreement to
be final and non-modifiable unless they specifically provided otherwise.” Pohl
v. Pohl, 15 N.E.3d 1006 (Ind. 2014). When a trial court reviews a proposed
agreement or modification, the court “should concern itself only with fraud,
duress, and other imperfections of consent . . . or with manifest inequities,
particularly those deriving from great disparities in bargaining power.” Voigt v.
Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1278-80 (Ind. 1996) (citation omitted).
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[6] Husband independently sought modification of his spousal-maintenance
obligation arising from his original and modified agreement with Wife, which
the trial court had approved and merged into its decree. At the hearing on
Husband’s petition, Husband alleged that Wife made threats that vitiated his
consent to the underlying agreement. Although neither Husband’s petition nor
the trial court’s order denying the petition refers to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B),
Husband now characterizes his petition as a Trial Rule 60(B) motion and we
agree with this characterization. Trial Rule 60(B) provides certain grounds for
relief from an order. Among them, Trial Rule 60(B)(3) provides that the trial
court may relieve a party from an order due to fraud, misrepresentation, “or
other misconduct of an adverse party.” However, where a party seeks relief
under Trial Rule 60(B)(3), the party must do so within one year of the order’s
entry. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B); Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ind. 2002).
[7] All of Husband’s arguments for Trial Rule 60(B) relief stemmed from Wife’s
purported misconduct. Therefore, Husband sought relief under Trial Rule
60(B)(3) and was subject to the one-year deadline. The trial court ordered
Husband to comply with the original maintenance terms in its 2006 decree and
the modified terms in its 2007 decree. However, Husband did not seek relief
from any order until 2013. Husband’s petition was untimely.
[8] We will reverse the denial of a Trial Rule 60(B) motion only where the trial
court abuses its discretion, Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 358, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s untimely request for relief.
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Conclusion
[9] The trial court did not err in denying Husband’s untimely Trial Rule 60(B)
request to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation.
[10] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
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Jeffery Allen Bell v. Leslie Ann Bell (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion