11/29/2016
DA 15-0316
Case Number: DA 15-0316
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 307
IN THE MATTER OF:
C.V.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Dawson, Cause No. DI 15-02
Honorable Richard A. Simonton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Brian Bulger, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Oliva Norlin-Rieger, Dawson County Attorney, Glendive, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 28, 2016
Decided: November 29, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 C.V. appeals from a May 8, 2015 Order of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Dawson County, granting the State’s petition for involuntary commitment.
¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:
Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in finding there was sufficient
evidence to commit C.V. to the Montana State Hospital.
Issue Two: Whether C.V.’s right to remain silent was violated.
Issue Three: Whether C.V.’s right to due process was violated.
¶3 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 29, 2015, the Dawson County Attorney petitioned the District Court for
the involuntary commitment of C.V., alleging that as the result of a mental disorder, she
was unable to provide for her own basic needs of safety, there was an imminent threat of
injury to herself or others, and her recent acts or omissions would, if untreated,
predictably result in deterioration of her mental condition to the point at which she would
become a danger to herself or others or would be unable to provide for her own basic
need of safety. The petition included mental health professional Albinus Heidt’s report
detailing his diagnosis of C.V. with a delusional disorder, and his conversations with two
complaining witnesses, Tara Oakland and Kristin Thompson, regarding their interactions
with C.V.
¶5 Mr. Heidt met with C.V. at the Glendive Medical Center to conduct a mental
health evaluation, in which C.V. chose not to participate. In rambling speech and
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tangential responses to Mr. Heidt’s questions, C.V. denied any serious mental illness, and
communicated that she believed an acquaintance, Cy Wyse, was cheating her out of
money and the Oakland family was blacklisting her from employment. C.V. was unable
or unwilling to tell Mr. Heidt where she lived. When Mr. Heidt asked C.V. whether she
was employed, she replied that this information “was either secret or confidential and she
could not divulge that” to him. Mr. Heidt received information about C.V. from
Oakland, Thompson, Wyse, Katie Mills of the Dawson County Sheriff’s Office, and Dr.
Joe Leal, C.V.’s treating physician. Because C.V. refused to participate in the mental
health evaluation, Mr. Heidt relied heavily on information from these other sources—
which included interviews with complaining witnesses and documents filed with
Sheriff’s Office by the complaining witnesses and C.V., herself—to reach his diagnosis
that C.V. suffers from a delusional disorder.
¶6 The District Court found the petition established probable cause that C.V. suffers
from a mental disorder that requires her commitment. Between April 30 and May 8,
2015, an initial hearing, an adjudicatory hearing, and a dispositional hearing were held.
¶7 At the initial hearing on April 30, 2015, C.V. argued the State did not have
probable cause to file the commitment petition, and the District Court proceeded with the
hearing to establish probable cause at which Mr. Heidt, Thompson, and Oakland testified.
¶8 Mr. Heidt testified as an expert witness and mental health professional regarding
his diagnosis of C.V.’s delusional disorder, and that her own safety and the safety of
others were at risk because of her delusional disorder. Mr. Heidt stated that C.V. does
not recognize that she has a delusional disorder, and explained that a person with a
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delusional disorder distorts reality. When asked how a person with a delusional disorder
is affected, Mr. Heidt testified: “What happens is that the individual ends up—in this
case ends up saying and doing things which has [sic] been escalating other people in the
community to become scared for their own safety and the safety of their children.” The
District Court scheduled the commitment hearing for May 4, 2015, and appointed Cindy
Heidt as the professional person ordered to conduct a mental health evaluation and
submit a written report. The District Court appointed Linda O’Connor as C.V.’s
Appointed Friend.
¶9 At the initial hearing, Thompson, the office manager for Oaks Disposal Trucking,
testified that C.V. has repeatedly called Oaks Disposal Trucking regarding employment
despite being told there were no openings. Thompson stated C.V. would berate and
harass her and other employees during phone calls and messages to the point Thompson
considered quitting her job. During one voice message, C.V. stated she knew
Thompson’s home address, which caused Thompson concern for her family’s safety.
Thompson stated she was seeking an order of protection against C.V., and although she
had never seen C.V. in person before the hearing on April 30, 2015, their interactions
over the phone caused Thompson to change her behavior when out in the community.
¶10 Oakland, the owner of several businesses in the community including Oaks
Disposal Trucking, also testified at the initial hearing. Oakland stated C.V. frequently
called seeking employment or trying to contact Wyse, who does not work for any of
Oakland’s businesses, and that C.V.’s calls always reverted to complaining about a car
and asserting that Wyse owed her money. When C.V. called demanding a job application
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for driving trucks, Oakland informed C.V. that Oakland does not own or work for the
trucking business and instructed her to not call back. Oakland testified C.V. called up to
five times a day every couple of months since July 2013, and the intensity of the calls
increased over the last two months. C.V. also called Oakland’s father-in-law’s insurance
company and Oakland’s accountant. C.V. demanded a W-2 form from Oakland’s
accountant even though C.V. was never employed by Oakland’s businesses. Oakland
testified C.V. filed three complaints with federal agencies regarding employment with
Oakland’s businesses, and made false allegations to those federal agencies and local law
enforcement. Oakland stated that the phone calls and complaints caused her to alter her
activities because she was concerned C.V.’s behavior was escalating.
¶11 Finding unrebutted testimony that C.V. suffers from a delusional disorder, the
District Court found C.V. posed an imminent threat of injury to herself and others,
noting: “[W]hile she may not be a direct risk to others or herself, the danger in part is the
response of the people that she’s stalking and harassing and how they’re going to react to
protect themselves.”
¶12 On May 4, 2015, Ms. Heidt filed her report with the District Court, and at the May
4, 2015 adjudicatory hearing, Ms. Heidt testified to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that C.V. suffers from a delusional disorder mixed type with grandiose and
persecutory features. Ms. Heidt explained the delusional disorder is a thought disorder
and available treatment includes antipsychotic medications, teaching reality thinking and
cognitive types of therapy. Ms. Heidt testified there was an imminent threat of injury to
C.V. as a result of her delusional disorder because:
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Some of the things that she’s been doing is going to people’s places and she
has gone to Mr. Wyse’s home on several occasions at night and sometimes
when he has been sleeping. And that could be a danger either to him or to
herself because sometimes people, if they don’t know and there is a
prowler, sometimes they protect themselves. And that would be a
significant concern.
Based on her observations of C.V. and C.V.’s refusal of treatment at the Glendive
Medical Center, which lacks a psychiatric ward, Ms. Heidt stated C.V. required treatment
at the Montana State Hospital due to the escalation of C.V.’s behavior and the risk she
posed to herself and others.
¶13 Also on May 4, 2015, O’Connor filed her report with the District Court. C.V.
refused to speak with O’Connor, and referred O’Connor to her attorney. O’Connor’s
report had to rely on documents provided by the County Attorney detailing C.V.’s
activities and behavior. At the adjudicatory hearing, O’Connor recommended C.V. be
committed for treatment.
¶14 At the May 8, 2015 dispositional hearing, the State called Ms. Heidt to testify
regarding her recommendations, and C.V. called one lay witness, Charles Nemec, to
testify regarding his interactions with C.V. Ms. Heidt recommended C.V. be placed at
the Montana State Hospital for treatment. Nemec testified that he previously evicted
C.V. from an apartment for having an unauthorized dog, and found C.V.’s apartment to
be well kept and her demeanor under the circumstances very pleasant. Following the
dispositional hearing, the District Court issued its written findings of facts, conclusions of
law, and order of commitment (Order). The District Court found C.V. suffers from a
delusional disorder and that there was an imminent threat of injury to herself or others
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from C.V.’s acts or omissions. The District Court committed C.V. to the Montana State
Hospital for a period not to exceed ninety days as the least restrictive placement because
no alternative treatment exists within the community.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶15 We review a district court’s civil commitment order to determine whether the
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. In the
Matter of S.L., 2014 MT 317, ¶ 20, 377 Mont. 223, 339 P.3d 73. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the district court
misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made after reviewing the entire record. S.L., ¶ 20. We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party when determining
whether substantial credible evidence supports the district court's findings. In the Matter
of the Mental Health of A.S.B., 2008 MT 82, ¶ 17, 342 Mont. 169, 180 P.3d 625 (citation
omitted). Due process claims arising from an involuntary civil commitment are subject
to plenary review. In the Matter of M.K.S., 2015 MT 146, ¶ 10, 379 Mont. 293, 350 P.3d
27.
DISCUSSION
¶16 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in finding there was sufficient
evidence to commit C.V. to the Montana State Hospital.
¶17 C.V. argues the District Court erred in concluding that the State met its burden to
commit her to the Montana State Hospital because the mental health professionals’
reports relied on sources that contained hearsay and the complaining witnesses did not
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sufficiently substantiate that C.V. posed an imminent threat of harm to herself or others.
See § 53-21-126, MCA; see also In the Matter of the Mental Health of T.J.D., 2002 MT
24, 308 Mont. 222, 41 P.3d 323; In the Matter of the Mental Health of D.L.T., 2003 MT
46, 314 Mont. 297, 67 P.3d 189, overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Costco
Wholesale, 2007 MT 43, ¶ 16, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.3d 727. C.V. contends that because
neither Thompson nor Oakland testified that C.V. made an articulated or specific threat
during her phone calls and they saw C.V. in person for the first time during the April 30,
2015 initial hearing, their testimony failed to meet the statutory standard of showing an
imminent threat to self or others. C.V. also contends the mental health professionals
relied on hearsay information regarding C.V.’s interactions with Wyse to form the bases
of their opinions, and without that inadmissible hearsay, their opinions were not sufficient
to show C.V. posed an imminent threat of harm to herself or others. See D.L.T.,
¶¶ 16-17; T.J.D., ¶ 14.
¶18 The State argues C.V. failed to raise any timely objections, including hearsay
objections, to the mental health professionals’ delusional disorder diagnosis during the
District Court proceedings, and therefore waived appellate review of the hearsay claims.
See In the Matter of K.M.G., 2010 MT 81, ¶ 36, 356 Mont. 91, 229 P.3d 1227. The State
also argues any alleged inadmissible hearsay that Ms. Heidt relied on to diagnose C.V.
and formulate her opinion was harmless error, because Ms. Heidt relied on other
evidence that was not hearsay, including witness testimony and admissions filed by C.V.
with the clerk of court. See M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); A.S.B., ¶ 36.
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¶19 In involuntary commitment cases, the district court must find the respondent
suffers from a mental disorder to a reasonable medical certainty, and then determine
whether the respondent requires commitment. Section 53-21-126, MCA. To determine
whether the respondent requires commitment, the court considers criteria listed in
§ 53-21-126(1), MCA. Satisfaction of any of the criteria justifies commitment. Section
53-21-127(7), MCA. The State relied on the two following criteria in this case:
(c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of
injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or
omissions; and
(d) whether the respondent’s mental disorder, as demonstrated by the
respondent’s recent acts or omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result
in deterioration of the respondent’s mental condition to the point at which
the respondent will become a danger to self or to others or will be unable to
provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter,
health, or safety. Predictability may be established by the respondent’s
relevant medical history.
Section 53-21-126(1)(c)-(d), MCA.
¶20 The standard of proof in a hearing on an involuntary commitment petition is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to any physical facts or evidence and clear and
convincing evidence as to all other matters. Section 53-21-126(2), MCA; A.S.B., ¶ 23.
“Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to others must be proved by overt acts
or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be material and relevant as to the
respondent’s present condition.” Section 53-21-126(2), MCA; A.S.B., ¶ 23.
¶21 Pursuant to § 53-21-126(2) and (4), MCA, the State is obligated to introduce
evidence of the Respondent’s recent overt acts or omissions separate from the
professional person’s testimony. D.L.T., ¶¶ 16-17. “The written report of the
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professional person indicating the diagnosis ‘may be attached to the petition, but any
matter otherwise inadmissible, such as hearsay matter, is not admissible merely because it
is contained in the report.’” T.J.D., ¶ 14 (quoting § 53-21-126(3), MCA). In T.J.D., we
held the district court erroneously relied on inadmissible hearsay statements contained in
the professional person’s report, and reversed T.J.D.’s commitment because the report’s
hearsay information was the only evidence of an imminent threat of injury in the record.
T.J.D., ¶¶ 16-18. Similarly, in D.L.T., we held that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting hearsay testimony through the professional person, who was the only
witness at the hearing, and solely relying on that inadmissible hearsay testimony as
sufficient evidence to support D.L.T.’s involuntary commitment. D.L.T., ¶¶ 10, 18.
¶22 Unlike in T.J.D. and D.L.T., where the State presented evidence about the
respondent’s acts through the professional person’s testimony alone, in this case, the
State presented additional evidence of C.V.’s overt acts through witness testimony that
showed C.V. posed an imminent threat of injury to herself or others and, if left untreated,
her mental health would deteriorate. Moreover, Ms. Heidt relied on admissions made by
C.V. in filings with the Dawson County clerk of court. M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (providing
a statement offered against a party that is the party’s own statement is not hearsay). Two
witnesses testified C.V.’s harassing phone calls and stalking behavior were escalating,
and Ms. Heidt opined these were threats that showed C.V. posed an imminent threat of
harm to herself or others and that, if left untreated, C.V.’s condition would deteriorate.
Section 53-21-126(1)(c)-(d), MCA. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
State as the prevailing party, we conclude the State met its burden of establishing that
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C.V. posed an imminent threat of harm to herself or others and that, if left untreated, her
condition would continue to deteriorate. The District Court’s finding that there was an
imminent threat of injury to C.V is supported by substantial credible evidence, and is not
clearly erroneous.
¶23 Issue Two: Whether C.V.’s right to remain silent was violated.
¶24 C.V. argues both the mental health professionals’ reports and the District Court’s
findings relied in part on C.V.’s exercise of her right to remain silent and refusal of a
mental health evaluation to determine whether C.V. suffers from a delusional disorder.
The State argues C.V. never objected to the reports or the delusional disorder diagnosis
during the District Court proceedings. The State also argues C.V. failed to adhere to
M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g), which requires an Appellant’s argument “contain the contentions
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statues, and pages of the record relied on.” State v.
Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, ¶ 12, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74 (holding it is not the Court’s
obligation to conduct legal research or develop legal analysis that might support a party’s
position). We agree.
¶25 C.V. never raised objections to the mental health professionals’ diagnoses. We
generally will not review a claim to which a party has failed to object or otherwise
properly preserve for appeal in the district court. K.M.G., ¶ 36. We will not reverse a
district court that was not given an opportunity to correct the alleged error. Siebken v.
Voderberg, 2015 MT 296, ¶ 19, 381 Mont. 256, 359 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted). C.V.
also fails to support her argument that the District Court violated her right to remain
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silent with any legal authority or legal analysis. Therefore, we hold C.V. waived
appellate review of this issue by failing to object during the District Court proceedings.
¶26 Issue Three: Whether C.V.’s right to due process was violated.
¶27 The District Court stated in its Conclusions of Law VII: “Should the Respondent
not comply with discharge recommendations from the Montana State Hospital, Warm
Springs, the Respondent be immediately taken back to the Montana State Hospital,
Warms Springs, Montana to continue treatment.”
¶28 C.V. argues the District Court’s Order gave Montana State Hospital officials the
discretion to return C.V. to the hospital for further treatment after discharge if hospital
staff determine at any time she does not follow the discharge recommendations in
violation of § 53-21-128, MCA, which regulates the extension of the initial three-month
commitment period. C.V. asserts that the Order violates due process because it makes no
provision for any further hearings or determinations by the District Court as to an alleged
violation of the discharge recommendations and leaves commitment to the sole discretion
of hospital staff.
¶29 “[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-respondent, but also courts, that are
charged with the duty of safeguarding the due process rights of individuals involved at
every stage of the proceedings, and must therefore rigorously adhere to the standards . . .
mandated under Title 53, Chapter 21.” In the Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.F.,
2001 MT 140, ¶ 92, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485. As we have long held, these statutes must
be strictly followed. T.J.D., ¶ 20; D.L.T., ¶ 8.
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¶30 Section 53-21-128, MCA, provides extensive due process safeguards for the
extension of the initial three-month commitment period: (1) the professional person in
charge of the respondent at the hospital must petition the district court for an extension
not less than two weeks prior to the end of the three-month commitment; (2) a written
report about the respondent’s mental and physical condition must accompany the
petition; and (3) the report must include descriptions of the tests, evaluations, and past
and future courses of treatment. Once the petition to extend the commitment is filed with
the district court: (1) notice must be given to the respondent, next of kin, counsel, and
appointed Friend of the respondent; (2) a hearing must be held if requested, which shall
follow the same procedure as an original hearing under § 53-21-126, MCA, with the
exception of the right to a jury trial; and (3) if no hearing is requested, the district court
shall enter an order of commitment not to exceed six months. Section 53-21-128(1),
MCA.
¶31 The District Court’s Order provided for no safeguards or due process before
allowing for C.V.’s recommitment if it is alleged that she has failed to comply with
discharge recommendations. Section 53-21-127(4), MCA, provides: “[e]xcept as
provided in [§ 53-21-127(3)(b)(ii), MCA, regarding commitments within the
community], a treatment ordered pursuant to this section may not affect the respondent’s
custody or course of treatment for a period of more than 3 months.” Once a respondent is
discharged after a ninety-day commitment, the State must initiate new proceedings to
commit the respondent for treatment again. The District Court erred by allowing for C.V.
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to be immediately taken back to the Montana State Hospital to continue treatment if she
did not comply with discharge recommendations after the ninety-day commitment.
CONCLUSION
¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision that there was
sufficient evidence to commit C.V. to the Montana State Hospital. We reverse and
remand to the District Court to strike the condition that C.V. shall be immediately taken
back to the Montana State Hospital to continue treatment if she does not comply with
discharge recommendations to comply with Title 53, chapter 21, MCA.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
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Matter of C.V.
Combined Opinion