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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-12006
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cr-00008-LGW-RSB-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER DASHAUN YOUNG,
a.k.a. Gooch,
a.k.a. Lil Bub,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(December 6, 2016)
Before WILSON, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Christopher Young appeals his 288-month sentence after pleading guilty to
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C § 846, and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). On
appeal, Young argues (1) that the government breached his plea agreement by not
recommending a sentence within the guideline range, and (2) that the government
did not meet its burden to prove that he breached the plea agreement by obstructing
justice when he tampered with witnesses. After review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm.
“Whether the government has breached a plea agreement is a question of
law that [we] review[] de novo.” United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1281
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we
review the district court’s determinations regarding the defendant’s conduct,
namely the alleged obstruction of justice, for clear error. See United States v.
Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir. 2004). Also, “we must give due regard to
the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we
will not overturn the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous.” United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1083 (11th Cir. 1990).
“The government is bound by any material promises it makes to a defendant
as part of a plea agreement that induces the defendant to plead guilty.” Horsfall,
552 F.3d at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the government is freed
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from its obligations under the plea agreement when the defendant substantially
breaches it. United States v. Salmona, 810 F.3d 806, 811 (11th Cir. 2016).
Although the plea agreement between Young and the government includes a
commitment by the government to recommend a sentence within the guidelines
range, it could be voided if Young obstructs justice or otherwise fails to comply
with its terms.
Regardless of whether the government failed to meet its obligations under
the plea agreement, which is not clear, the government was released from any
obligations under it because Young breached the plea agreement. 1 The district
court found that the government proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Young obstructed justice when he threatened codefendants to remain silent and
refrain from cooperating with authorities. See Salmona, 810 F.3d at 811. The
government presented recordings of phone calls, along with testimony from an FBI
agent and a co-defendant who was the target of some threats. The district court did
not clearly err when it found this testimony to be credible and determined that
Young obstructed justice by tampering with witnesses. See Amedeo, 370 F.3d at
1318. Consequently, the government was freed from its obligations under the plea
agreement after Young’s breach.
1
The government’s request for a “substantial period of incarceration” is not clearly inconsistent
with its obligation to recommend a sentence within the guideline range, which was 210–240
months (plus a mandatory consecutive 60 month term). Further, the district court explicitly
stated that it did not construe the government’s request as one for an above-the-guideline-range
sentence.
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AFFIRMED.
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