United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2526
SAI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; US DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; UNITED STATES; MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE, Troop F /
MAssport (MPD); MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY; CITY OF BOSTON, in
both official and individual capacities; TRICIA TONGE-RILEY, TSA
STSO; SHANNA KUKLA, TSA STSO; PAUL COLEMAN, MPD Officer; JOHN
FERRAGAMO, TSA security manager; ALEX RANSOM, TSA Office of
Intelligence (TSA-OI); WILLIAM EVANS, TSA incident monitor; JEH
CHARLES JOHNSON, DHS Secretary; JOHN S. PISTOLE; FRANCINE
KERNER; MEGAN H. MACK; TAMARA KESSLER; KIMBERLY WALTON; WILLIAM
MCKENNEY; SEENA FOSTER; ZACHARY BROMER; JEREMY BUZZELL; ERIKA
LUCAS; UNKNOWN TSA COUNSEL,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Patricia E. Roberts, Tillman J. Breckenridge and Bailey &
Glasser LLP, on brief for appellant.
December 7, 2016
Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Sai (identified by an
adopted mononym) seeks interlocutory review of a district court
decision denying him appointed counsel as a collateral order.
Sai's allegations against the Transportation Security
Administration and other defendants include violation of federal
statutes prohibiting discriminatory treatment of disabled persons.
The statutory scheme specifically authorizes court appointment of
counsel. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 12188(a)(1). However, the
mechanism is not funded, and it is subject to the district court's
broad discretion. The difficulties in rationing the precious
resource of volunteer lawyer services have been long acknowledged.
See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2nd Cir.
1989)(addressing situation in which "volunteer lawyer panels of
the district courts are drowning in requests").
We are aware of the circuit split on interlocutory review of
denials of appointed counsel as collateral orders. See Ficken v.
Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(collecting cases).
We are also aware that some courts have distinguished refusals to
"request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) from refusals to "appoint an
attorney" for claimants under federal anti-discrimination statutes
"in such circumstances as the court may deem just." Id. In our
estimate, this distinction is prudent, and we do not begin with an
automatic assumption that appointment decisions under § 1915(e)
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and under federal anti-discrimination statutes belong in a single
category. Nonetheless, after giving the matter separate
consideration, we are persuaded that the factors we identified in
Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145 (1983)(per curiam), for not
categorizing the denial of appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) as a collateral order logically also apply to denial of
appointed-counsel requests under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a) and
12188(a)(1).
As a legal matter, an order denying appointment is inherently
non-final because it is subject to revision as the case develops,
however convinced or emphatic an individual judge appears to be at
a given time. See Appleby, 696 F.2d at 147. The federal courts
have identified several considerations (not constituting an
exhaustive list) relevant to decisions on appointment of counsel
for anti-discrimination claimants, including "the merits of
plaintiff's case, the plaintiff's ability to pay for private
counsel, his efforts to obtain a lawyer, the availability of
counsel, and the plaintiff's ability to gather the facts and deal
with the issues if unassisted by counsel." Cooper, 877 F.2d at
172-74; see also Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d
1417, 1420-21 (10th Cir. 1992) (identifying four factors most
relevant for purposes of deciding whether to appoint counsel in a
Title VII case: "(1) plaintiff's ability to afford counsel; (2)
plaintiff's diligence in searching for counsel; [] (3) the merits
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of plaintiff's case . . . [and (4)] the plaintiff's capacity to
prepare and present the case without the aid of counsel"). These
considerations are not static, and would be subject to reevaluation
as a case proceeds after an initial denial of appointed counsel.
In the course of proceedings, the merits might well become clearer.
What a district court deems to be insufficient diligence might be
supplemented by a litigant's additional efforts to obtain counsel,
which could cast more light on the availability of counsel. The
litigant's pro se capabilities might also become clearer as a case
advances. We note that, in a disability-discrimination matter,
it can be especially important to evaluate and monitor with care
the effect a disability is having on the claimant's chances to
seek out and obtain representation, and to conduct litigation on
a pro se basis. Reevaluation of one or more of the above-
summarized considerations in view of later developments could
alter a district court's treatment of an appointment request. We
note that omitting the words "without prejudice" from an initial
denial would not prevent reassessment at a later date. See
Appleby, 696 F.2d at 147.
In addition to the possibility of reassessment, as a practical
matter, a wrongful denial of a request for appointed counsel should
not easily escape review after entry of final judgment. "[I]f the
district court erred at the outset in denying appointed counsel,
its error would be presumptively prejudicial." Id. "[M]oreover,
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. . . where appointive counsel is erroneously denied, a reviewing
court may relieve plaintiff of any untoward consequences of his
lack of counsel." Id. at n.3. Thus, while we decline at this
time to join those circuits treating a denial of appointed counsel
to an anti-discrimination claimant as an immediately reviewable
collateral order, we intimate no doubts about the reviewability of
such a denial in an appeal from a final judgment. Further, we
emphasize that the presence in the record of a clear statement of
reasons bearing on the district court's exercise of its discretion
in matters of appointment, including discussion of any pertinent
factors from the non-exhaustive list set out above, may prove
crucial to this court's eventual review. See Castner, 979 F.2d
at 1422-23 (remanding because record provided "no indication what
considerations underlie[d] th[e] decision [to deny appointment],
and the record d[id] not contain sufficient evidence from which
[the court of appeals] c[ould] make an independent determination
whether it was an abuse of discretion not to appoint counsel").
For the reasons explained above, this interlocutory appeal is
dismissed.
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