In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐1232
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JAMIE GOLDEN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 06 CR 30050 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 16, 2016
____________________
Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Shortly after Jamie Golden1 was
released from prison, the government petitioned for revoca‐
1 Although the Defendant’s legal name is Jamie Golson, the district
court proceedings and the appeal were both captioned under the name
2 No. 16‐1232
tion of his supervised release. While in jail pending the con‐
clusion of revocation proceedings, Golden was involved in a
prison fight in which he repeatedly battered a fellow inmate.
As a result, the district judge found that he had committed an
aggravated battery—a Grade A violation of his supervised re‐
lease—and revoked his release.
On appeal, Golden claims that the district judge errone‐
ously concluded that an aggravated battery had occurred,
and that even if it had, it did not constitute a Grade A viola‐
tion. We disagree. Golden unquestionably battered the other
inmate, and because it occurred on public property (a county
jail), the battery was aggravated. And the Grade A label was
appropriate, since Golden’s conduct qualifies as a “crime of
violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Golden also claims that the district judge failed to make
the requisite factual findings that supported the duration and
conditions of his newly imposed supervised release. But
Golden waived this argument by asking for the duration he
ultimately received and by affirmatively withdrawing his ob‐
jections to the conditions he now challenges. So we affirm the
district judge’s revocation of Golden’s initial supervised re‐
lease and her imposition of new supervised‐release condi‐
tions.
I. BACKGROUND
Jamie Golden was convicted of conspiring to distribute co‐
caine in violation of federal law and served approximately
eight years in prison. In the weeks following his release from
“Jamie Golden.” We will refer to him by the latter name to minimize any
confusion.
No. 16‐1232 3
prison, Golden allegedly stole $1500 from the gas station
where he was working, repeatedly failed to report to the fed‐
eral probation office, and failed to submit to two drug tests.
This prompted the office to petition the district judge to re‐
voke his supervised release. The judge issued an arrest war‐
rant, and Golden was arrested.
While detained at the Sangamon County Jail pending a
revocation hearing, Golden and several other inmates at‐
tacked a fellow inmate named Louis Brown, who was alleg‐
edly bullying others. In a videotaped recording of the attack,
Golden can be seen throwing Brown to the ground twice and
repeatedly punching and kicking Brown in or near his head.
In the wake of this incident, the State of Illinois charged
Golden with aggravated battery and mob action, which the
probation office incorporated into a supplemental revocation
petition. After holding a revocation hearing, the district judge
found that Golden had committed both aggravated battery
and mob action, concluded that both offenses were Grade A
violations of his supervised release, and sentenced Golden to
42 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised re‐
lease with various conditions. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. No Abuse of Discretion in Revoking Golden’s Super‐
vised Release
On appeal, Golden maintains that the district judge erro‐
neously concluded that he committed aggravated battery and
mob action, and that even if he did, neither violation consti‐
tutes a Grade A violation of his supervised release. We review
the district judge’s revocation for abuse of discretion and any
related factual findings for clear error, United States v. Preacely,
4 No. 16‐1232
702 F.3d 373, 375 (7th Cir. 2012), and the district judge’s inter‐
pretation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo, United
States v. McClanahan, 136 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 2011).
1. Golden Committed Aggravated Battery
As a condition of his release from prison, Golden was
barred from “commit[ting] another federal, state or local
crime.” The government bore the burden of establishing that
Golden violated the terms of his supervised release by com‐
mitting such an offense, and a preponderance of the evidence
was necessary for the district judge to agree. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3); see also, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 759 F.3d 664,
669 (7th Cir. 2014). According to the government, Golden
committed two state law crimes: aggravated battery and mob
action. In Illinois, a battery occurs if an individual unjustifi‐
ably “causes bodily harm to an individual” or “makes physi‐
cal contact of an insulting or provoking nature” with another.
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐3. A battery can be aggravated if,
among other things, it causes “great bodily harm” or is com‐
mitted on “public property.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐
3.05(a)(1), (c).
The district judge did not abuse her discretion in conclud‐
ing that Golden committed an aggravated battery by batter‐
ing Brown on public property. Golden concedes that he com‐
mitted a battery, and that he did so on public property—a
county jail. Nevertheless, he claims that the public‐property
path to aggravated battery is unavailable because the govern‐
ment somehow failed to prove that the Sangamon County Jail
is public property.
This argument has no merit. The proposition is so obvious
that a detailed discussion of it by the parties would have been
No. 16‐1232 5
a waste of time. Cf. People v. Messenger, 40 N.E.3d 410, 423 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (“This court has found no decision that charac‐
terizes a county jail as anything other than public property.
We see no reason to rule that a county jail is not public prop‐
erty under the aggravated battery statute or that it is, per se,
an issue subject to reasonable dispute.”); People v. Hill, 949
N.E.2d 1180, 1183–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he [county] jail
was property owned by the government and thereby consti‐
tuted public property.”); People v. Childs, 711 N.E.2d 1151,
1159–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“Because this conduct occurred
on public property, [a county jail,] it constitutes aggravated
battery.”).
In defense of his position, Golden asserts that private com‐
panies such as Corrections Corporation of America operate
certain detention centers in the United States. However, he
has not suggested that any such company operates any
county jail in Illinois, nor has he attempted to explain under
what circumstances such an operation can convert carceral
property from “public” to “private.” Golden also claims, in‐
correctly, that the district judge failed to find that the Sanga‐
mon County Jail was a public property—she did, albeit im‐
plicitly—and even if the judge had failed to do so, that would
not preclude us from reaching the same conclusion on appeal.
See United States v. Thomas, 934 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“Under longstanding doctrine, an appellate court may affirm
on any ground that finds support in the record.”); cf. Messen‐
ger, 40 N.E.3d at 423 (“The Illinois courts … have regularly
sanctioned the use of judicial notice to establish an element of
the offense.”).
Because the district judge did not err in concluding that
Golden committed aggravated battery by battering Brown on
6 No. 16‐1232
public property, we need not consider the government’s al‐
ternative claim that Golden committed aggravated battery by
causing Brown “great bodily harm.” Nor must we determine
whether the district judge abused her discretion in finding
that Golden committed mob action, since, as explained below,
the aggravated battery finding alone was sufficient to revoke
Golden’s supervised release.
2. Aggravated Battery Is Grade A Violation
Golden argues that assuming he committed aggravated
battery, this offense did not constitute a Grade A violation of
his supervised release so a revocation of his supervised re‐
lease was not required. A Grade A violation has occurred
when an individual has committed “conduct constituting (A)
a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of im‐
prisonment exceeding one year that … is a crime of violence.”
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1). The occurrence of a Grade A violation
mandates revocation and typically results in a longer term of
imprisonment than a Grade B or C violation. Id. §§ 7B1.3(a)(1),
7B1.4(a).
On appeal, Golden apparently concedes, correctly, that
aggravated battery is punishable by at least one year in
prison. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12‐3.05(h); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/5‐4.5‐40(a). Instead, Golden maintains that aggravated bat‐
tery is not a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines. In doing so, Golden rightly focuses on the ele‐
ments clause. Aggravated battery is not an enumerated of‐
fense under the Guidelines, and the Guidelines’ residual
clause is off limits. See United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715,
725 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Golden claims that the elements
clause, too, is not relevant because aggravated battery under
No. 16‐1232 7
Illinois law encompasses conduct that is both violent and non‐
violent. See United States v. Evans, 576 F.3d 766, 767 (7th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
Critically, Golden’s argument assumes that the categorical
approach applies—i.e., that we must examine the elements of
the generic aggravated‐battery offense without regard to
Golden’s actual conduct. But that approach is squarely fore‐
closed both by the Guidelines themselves and by our case law.
See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 App. Note 1 (“The grade of violation does
not depend upon the conduct that is the subject of the crimi‐
nal charges … of which the defendant is convicted in a crimi‐
nal proceeding. Rather, the grade of the violation is to be
based on the defendant’s actual conduct.”); United States v.
Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1155 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Application Note
1 tells the district judge to consider what the person on super‐
vised release did, rather than what crimes he has been charged
with.”).
Golden notes in response that the Ninth Circuit has de‐
clared that the categorical approach should apply. See United
States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2015). However, that
opinion is not controlling and conflicts with at least two of our
sister circuits. See id. at 993 n.5 (citing United States v. Carter,
730 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Cawley, 48 F.3d
90, 93 (2d Cir. 1995)). Perhaps more importantly, Golden
makes no attempt to explain why we should jettison Trotter in
favor of Willis, and we decline to invent a reason for him. See
Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2013) (ob‐
serving the well‐recognized principle that underdeveloped
arguments are waived on appeal).
8 No. 16‐1232
Turning to Golden’s actual conduct, the videotape of the
incident and witness testimony establish that Golden repeat‐
edly punched, kicked, and body slammed Brown. So Golden
clearly “use[d] … physical force against the person of an‐
other,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), and, in doing so, committed a
Grade A violation of his supervised release.
B. Golden Waived Any Objections to Duration and
Conditions of Supervised Release
Golden also argues that the district judge erred in impos‐
ing a three‐year duration of supervised release and four of the
various conditions. We review a sentence “imposed following
revocation of a defendant’s supervised release to ascertain
whether it was plainly unreasonable,” based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583, which largely incorporates the factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 949 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, we need not reach the merits of Golden’s claim.
Golden specifically requested the three‐year duration of su‐
pervised release he received. That constitutes waiver. See
United States v. Cary, 775 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2015) (“By ask‐
ing for the very condition the court subsequently imposed,
[the defendant] waived any argument against it.”). So, too,
with regard to the conditions themselves, since Golden in‐
formed the judge that if she imposed the conditions that were
circulated to the parties prior to the revocation hearing—
which included the same four conditions that he challenges
on appeal—Golden would withdraw his prior objections. See
United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (af‐
firmative withdrawal of an objection to conditions of super‐
vised release constitutes waiver).
No. 16‐1232 9
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
United States v. Jamie Golden
Combined Opinion