Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
December 22, 2016 Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice
150298 Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
________________________________________ Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
In re Contempt of KELLY MICHELLE DORSEY. Richard H. Bernstein
_________________________________________ Joan L. Larsen,
Justices
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v SC: 150298
COA: 309269
Livingston CC Family Division:
08-012596-DL
TYLER MICHAEL DORSEY,
Respondent,
and
KELLY MICHELLE DORSEY,
Appellant.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 9, 2014
judgment of the Court of Appeals is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1),
in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we AFFIRM the result reached by the Court of
Appeals. We agree that MCL 712A.2 gave the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division
(“family court”) subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile proceeding in which it
entered the drug test order underlying the contempt orders. The appellant has mounted a
collateral attack on that order, asserting that the family court lost subject matter
jurisdiction because it violated MCL 712A.6. That argument amounts only to a claim
that the court improperly exercised its subject matter jurisdiction to hear the juvenile
delinquency case. The appellant’s collateral attack is accordingly barred. See Jackson
City Bank & Trust Co v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544-545 (1935). We decline to address
whether this Court should adopt any other exceptions to the general rule barring such
collateral attacks because, under the circumstances presented in this case, the appellant
had a meaningful opportunity to appeal the drug test order, and there is no indication that
her rights could not have been vindicated had she pursued an appeal through the normal
procedures. We therefore VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals judgment
addressing whether the family court order for random drug screens constituted an illegal
search and seizure, because it was unnecessary to decide the case.
2
However, the appellee conceded in its first supplemental brief that the appellant
may be entitled to some form of relief. See Rose v Aaron, 345 Mich 613, 615 (1956)
(“We do not think, in view of the circumstances of this case and the provisions of the
lower court’s order, that that court is called upon to protect its dignity by resentencing
defendant for violation of a temporary restraining order improperly entered.”), citing
Holland v Weed, 87 Mich 584, 590 (1891). Given that the appellee conceded the
underlying order was improperly entered, and that enforcement of the contempt orders
has been stayed pending appeal, the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division shall not
be required to enforce the contempt orders on remand.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
December 22, 2016
d1214
Clerk