J-S16018-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CLARENCE TYRONE TAYLOR
Appellant No. 1090 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000785-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2017
In this matter, which returns to us by way of remand from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Appellant, Clarence Tyrone Taylor, appeals his
judgment of sentence entered on May 29, 2014 in the Criminal Division of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County. For the reasons that
follow, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand this matter
with instructions.
We adopt the statement of undisputed background facts set forth in
our prior unpublished memorandum. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2015
WL 7012589, *1 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). On
January 27, 2014, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, a jury found
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Appellant guilty of one count each of unlawful contact with a minor, 1 criminal
use of a communication facility,2 and solicitation to commit sexual abuse of
children.3 On May 29, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of three to six years’ incarceration, followed by four years’
probation. In addition, over the objection of counsel,4 the trial court ordered
Appellant to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his life on
grounds that he had two qualifying convictions for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.40.
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion but, on June 27, 2014,
he filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. On July 28, 2014, Appellant
timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter,
the trial court issued its opinion on August 25, 2014.
On appeal, Appellant argued that he should have been sentenced to a
25-year registration period under §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15 of SORNA, rather
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512.
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a) and 6312.
4
In his objection, trial counsel argued that Appellant should be subject to a
25-year registration period because his two convictions involved only one
criminal episode and one victim.
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than lifetime registration, because his offenses involved a single course of
conduct and one intended victim. On June 2, 2015, this Court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence, including the lifetime registration
requirement. Specifically, we held that Appellant’s convictions for unlawful
contact with a minor and criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of
children constituted “two or more convictions of offenses listed as tier I or
tier II sexual offenses” under § 9799.14 of SORNA such that Appellant was
subject to lifetime registration pursuant to § 9799.15.5 See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 2015 WL 7012589, at *2 (Pa. Super. June 2,
2015) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme
Court. By order of October 20, 2016, the Supreme Court granted
Appellant’s petition, vacated our order of June 2, 2015, and remanded this
matter for further proceedings consistent with Commonwealth v.
Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2016). In Lutz-Morrison, the Supreme
Court held that § 9799.14 of SORNA encompassed a recidivist philosophy
such that “the statute requires an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act to
trigger lifetime registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject to a
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5
Section 9799.14 of SORNA provides that tier III crimes include “[t]wo or
more convictions of offenses listed as [t]ier I or [t]ier II sexual offenses.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(16). Furthermore, § 9799.15 states that “[a]n
individual convicted of a [t]ier III sexual offense shall register for the life of
the individual.” Id. at § 9799.15(a)(3).
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fifteen- or twenty-five-year period of registration.” Lutz-Morrison, 143
A.3d at 895. Applying Lutz-Morrison in the present case, it is clear that
Appellant, who stands convicted of two tier II sexual offenses without an
intervening judgment of sentence,6 is now entitled to the relief he seeks, i.e.
registration as a sexual offender for a period of 25 years. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.15(a)(2)(individual convicted of tier II sexual offense shall register
for a period of 25 years). Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of
sentence and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to
amend the judgment to conform to the dictates of Lutz-Morrison.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/12/2017
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6
SORNA classifies Appellant’s convictions for unlawful contact with a minor
and criminal solicitation to commit sexual abuse of children as tier II
offenses. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(c)(4) (sexual abuse of children),
(c)(5) (unlawful contact with a minor), and (c)(18) (making solicitation of a
listed offense a tier II crime).
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Com. v. Taylor, C.
Combined Opinion