This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0606
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Christopher Davis Schultz,
Appellant.
Filed January 17, 2017
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-32912
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jodi Proulx, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree controlled-substance crime,
arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against
him. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2014, police officers executed a search warrant at a house located in
New Germany, Minnesota. The officers observed evidence of a recently dismantled
marijuana-grow operation including equipment, wiring, ventilation, temperature-control
systems, dried marijuana clippings, and paraphernalia. The officers also found receipts
connecting appellant Christopher Davis Schultz to the operation.
The house’s residential tenant, J.H., was present when the search warrant was
executed. Officers interviewed J.H. regarding the grow operation. J.H. admitted his
involvement. He also suggested that Schultz financed the operation, visited the house
weekly to check on the operation, and received several pounds of marijuana every few
months in exchange for financing the operation. J.H. described Schultz, his residence, and
his vehicle to the officers.
Law enforcement confirmed J.H.’s description of Schultz’s residence and vehicle.
Officers began surveillance of Schultz’s property the same day that they executed the
warrant at J.H.’s home. When Schultz left his residence that day, an officer stopped his
vehicle and arrested him based on his suspected involvement in J.H.’s marijuana-grow
operation. The officer searched Schultz incident to arrest and found a baggie of suspected
2
cocaine. Later, the police searched Schultz’s car and found multiple bags of suspected
cocaine weighing approximately 160 grams. Respondent State of Minnesota charged
Schultz with two counts of first-degree controlled-substance crime based on the narcotics
recovered from his person and vehicle.
Schultz moved to suppress the narcotics, arguing that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Schultz “was committing a crime
in the form of participating in a marijuana grow operation and receiving 3-5 pounds of
marijuana.” The district court further concluded that the subsequent searches of Schultz’s
person and vehicle were valid.
Schultz agreed to a stipulated-facts trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, and
the district court found him guilty of two counts of first-degree controlled-substance crime.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Schultz contends that his “convictions should be reversed because the district court
erred when it found probable cause existed to arrest [him] and that the subsequent search
of his person and vehicle was valid.” He argues that his warrantless arrest was unlawful
and that the evidence against him should have been suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful
arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (stating
that if “evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of”
3
illegal police conduct, the evidence may not be used against the subject of the illegal
conduct (quotation omitted)).
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution protect “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “Under both
the federal and state constitutions, subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions, searches or seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable.” State v. Dickey, 827
N.W.2d 792, 798 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted). “A well-established exception
to the warrant requirement permits police officers to arrest a felony suspect without an
arrest warrant in a public place provided they have probable cause.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
“Probable cause exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the
totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a
specific individual has committed a crime.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). A finding of probable cause requires “more than mere
suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We review a determination of probable cause for a warrantless arrest de novo. State v.
Horner, 617 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Minn. 2000).
The district court’s probable-cause determination was largely based on J.H.’s
statements to the police regarding the grow operation. J.H. told the police that the operation
had been in existence for “about a year and a half.” J.H. admitted that he had recently
dumped his marijuana crop in a river.
4
The police asked J.H. about Schultz:
Q: Just a question, can you tell us who is Christopher
Schultz, too?
A: Yeah I sold him a little bit, nothing too sizeable. Personal
amounts.
Q: Like what’s personal amounts?
A: Quarter, half pound.
The police pressed J.H. for details regarding Schultz’s involvement in the operation.
They asked:
Q: Ok, so when you give Chris [Schultz] how much for three
months? Just tell me a number.
A: How much[?]
Q: Three pounds, four pounds, five pounds?
A: Probably two or three.
Q: Ok, so let’s say three. When you’re giving him three
pounds every three months, that’s what I’m gonna call it, not
five, what are you getting in return for it? Or what’s coming
off your tab?
A: That amount.
Q: $3200? Per pound?
A: Yeah.
Although J.H. never expressly implicated Schultz in the grow operation, J.H.’s
responses suggested that Schultz was involved:
Q: Ok seeing how you meet with [Schultz] every three
months, give or take, how often do you stay in contact with
him? Is it daily? Is it weekly?
A: It’s sporadic I mean.
Q: Again, if you had to pick a number is it weekly, daily,
monthly?
A: Weekly.
Q: Ok, how do you get in contact with [Schultz]?
A: Just call him or text him.
Q: Good. That’s a good answer. What number do you have
for [Schultz]? Is it in your cell phone?
A: Yeah.
....
5
Q: Ok. And who’s Michael?
A: Michael?
Q: Mike and [Schultz] together? Mike and [Schultz] come
to pick up?
A: No I don’t know any Mike.
Q: It’s your writing man. Mike and [Schultz] will be here
when (Inaudible) Might come Wednesday night.
A: Oh oh, that’s ah a friend of Michael and . . . I probably
haven’t talked to him in a year and a half.
Q: Is he a friend of yours or a friend of [Schultz’s] or both?
A: Ah both
Q: Is he part of [Schultz’s] op?
A: No.
Q: Ok, so now we got your relationship with [Schultz], we
got a way to contact [Schultz], we know you meet him and
deliver every three months. How often does he stop by and
check up upon you?
A: Um I mean I mean sporadically maybe twice a week,
maybe one a week, maybe.
Q: Just to check on you or the crop or both, right?
A: Just to hang out and.
Q: Check on the crop, true?
A: No, just to hang out I mean we’re friends you know?
Q: Would it be safe to say that while you’re hanging out
every time he comes, he takes a quick glimpse at the crop?
A: (inaudible).
At the hearing on Schultz’s motion to suppress, the state asked one of the officers
who questioned J.H. about J.H.’s inaudible response. The officer testified that J.H. nodded
affirmatively when the officer asked if Schultz checked on the crops when Schultz visited
J.H.
The district court’s probable-cause determination was also based on receipts found
during the search of J.H.’s residence. One receipt was for a honey-bee extractor. The
receipt contained Schultz’s name and home address. An officer testified that the extractor
is “commonly used—by people who produce marijuana to also extract THC from the
6
marijuana plants, and create—a wax or hash type substance.” Another receipt was for 12
1000-watt bulbs. This receipt contained Schultz’s address and the name “Charlie Schultz.”
An officer testified that the bulbs were consistent with the kind used in a growing operation.
A third receipt was for building equipment from Menards. The receipt contained Schultz’s
cellphone number and the name “Chris Scholtz.” An officer testified that the equipment
purchased was consistent with a grow operation “and some of the modifications that [the
officers] saw at the house.” The purchase dates on the receipts predated Schultz’s arrest
by approximately one year to one-and-a-half years, which, according to J.H., was when the
grow operation was in existence.
When viewed objectively, J.H.’s statements suggesting that Schultz was involved
in the grow operation and the receipts found at J.H.’s residence connecting Schultz to the
operation would cause an ordinary and prudent person to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that Schultz was involved in the operation.
Schultz argues that J.H.’s “tip was unreliable and failed to establish probable cause
for a warrantless arrest.” Where a probable-cause determination is based on an informant’s
tip, the informant’s veracity and the basis of knowledge are considerations under the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 108 (Minn. App.
1991). “Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the
preferred basis for an informant’s knowledge.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269
(Minn. 1985). An informant’s reliability may be established by sufficient police
corroboration of the information supplied, and corroboration of even minor details can
“lend[] credence” to the information where the police know the informant’s identity. State
7
v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008). Also, the fact that an informant
makes a statement against his or her own interest “is of some minimal relevance in a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn.
1990). Statements against interest enhance reliability because “‘[p]eople do not lightly
admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own
admissions.’” State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388, 395 & n.7 (Minn. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971)).
Here, J.H.’s knowledge is based on his recent personal observation of incriminating
conduct. He reported that Schultz came to his home weekly, inspected the grow operation,
and received three pounds of marijuana from the operation every three months. J.H.’s
suggestion that Schultz was involved in the grow operation was corroborated by the
receipts connected to the operation and to Schultz. Lastly, J.H.’s admissions that his home
housed a marijuana-grow operation for the last year and a half, and that he dumped the
resulting marijuana crop in a river, are statements against interest that enhance J.H.’s
reliability.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances established J.H.’s reliability for the purpose
of a probable-cause determination. J.H.’s statements established probable cause to believe
that Schultz had been involved in a recently dismantled marijuana-grow operation with
J.H., from which Schultz received three pounds of marijuana every three months. Thus,
there was probable cause to believe that Schultz had violated Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subd.
1 (2014), which provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit any act prohibited
by this chapter, except possession or distribution for no remuneration of a small amount of
8
marijuana as defined in section 152.01, subdivision 16, is guilty of a felony.” See Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 16 (2014) (defining small amount of marijuana as 42.5 grams or less).
Because Schultz’s arrest was lawful, the district court did not err by refusing to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of his arrest.
II.
Schultz also contends that his warrantless arrest “was unconstitutional because there
was no identified felony for which [he] was arrested.” He argues that the “police never
identified the requisite felony offense prior to [his] arrest.” He concludes that “[b]ecause
there was no identified felony offense, police did not have probable cause to believe
[Schultz] had committed a felony and [his] warrantless arrest was unconstitutional.”
It is not clear whether Schultz is arguing that before the police arrest a person
without a warrant in a public place, they must somehow pronounce or document the
suspected felony offense, or that there was not probable cause to believe that Schultz had
committed a felony-level offense.1 If the former, Schultz does not provide supporting legal
authority for the argument, and we do not discern obvious prejudicial error. We therefore
do not analyze the issue. See State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 795 (Minn. App. 2006)
(“An assignment of error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument
or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation
1
This case was submitted without oral argument.
9
omitted)), aff’d, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007). If the latter, we reject the argument for
the reasons in section I of this opinion.
Affirmed.
10