UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George J. Hazel, District Judge.
(8:14-cr-00456-GJH-1)
Submitted: January 13, 2017 Decided: January 18, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Justin Eisele, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Mara V.J.
Senn, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Leah Jo
Bressack, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Davis pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012); robbery of mail, money,
and other property of the United States, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2114(a) (2012); using, carrying, and brandishing a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012); and possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). On appeal, Davis argues that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. We affirm.
We review a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424,
434 (4th Cir. 2008). A defendant seeking to withdraw a plea
that has been accepted by the court must demonstrate “a fair and
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(d)(2)(B). In determining whether this burden has been met,
courts should consider the six factors identified in United
States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). Where a
proper Rule 11 plea colloquy is conducted, a defendant has a
“very limited basis upon which to have his plea withdrawn.”
United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Davis does not dispute the validity of his guilty plea, and
our review of the plea colloquy confirms that Davis’ plea was
knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, there is “a strong
presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United States
v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our consideration of the remaining Moore factors reveals
nothing that would overcome this presumption. Davis does not
offer a credible assertion of innocence, nor does he reasonably
challenge the competence of his plea counsel. Davis waited
months to bring this motion, a delay that we have previously
considered “long.” Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Although there was
minimal evidence of prejudice to the Government and
inconvenience to the court, these factors alone do not warrant
reversal. See United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th
Cir. 1995).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’ motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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