NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50262
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:10-cr-05135-LAB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ADALBERTO RIVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Adalberto Rivera appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 12-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Rivera claims that the district court procedurally erred by improperly basing
its sentence on the seriousness of the underlying offense. We review for plain
error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010), and conclude there is none. The record reflects that the district court based
its decision on only proper 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, including
Rivera’s criminal history, his repeated breaches of the court’s trust, and the need to
protect the public. See United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir.
2007).
Rivera next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court placed undue weight on his prior violations of supervised release
and probation. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rivera’s
sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The court properly
considered Rivera’s prior violations as part of his history and characteristics, as
well as his criminal history. Moreover, the within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable in light of the section 3583(e) sentencing factors and the
totality of the circumstances, including the need to protect the public and afford
adequate deterrence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez,
587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a
2 16-50262
particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).
AFFIRMED.
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