FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-30022
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00012-RRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GLEN REIL PITKA, a.k.a. Arthur Dale
Pitka,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Glen Reil Pitka appeals the special condition of supervision requiring him to
participate in sex offender assessment and treatment. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Pitka challenges the condition of supervised release that requires him to
participate in an evaluation for sexual deviancy and, if required, sex offender
treatment. In a motion filed on October 25, 2016, Pitka states that he has
completed the evaluation. Thus, his challenge to that portion of the condition is
moot. See Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 1996). With
respect to the portion of the condition requiring treatment, Pitka argues that the
court was required to give a fuller explanation for its necessity because the
condition is broad enough to allow plethysmograph testing and, thus, implicates a
significant liberty interest. In light of the government’s declaration filed on
November 28, 2016, in which the government supports its assertion that penile
plethysmograph testing is not used in the District of Alaska, we reject this
contention. The district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the
condition. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008).
Pitka finally argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
the condition because it involves a greater deprivation than is reasonably
necessary. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion because,
in light of Pitka’s circumstances and criminal history, the challenged condition is
reasonably related to deterrence and protection of the public, and it does not
involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18
2 16-30022
U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008).
Pitka’s motion to stay the challenged condition is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
3 16-30022