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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-14373
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02517-ELR
TRENESHIA DUKES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NICHOLAS DEATON,
in his individual capacity,
STEVE BRANHAM,
in his individual and supervisory capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 26, 2017)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and UNGARO, *
District Judge.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires that we decide whether a police officer who threw a
diversionary device, known colloquially as a “flashbang,” into a dark room
occupied by two sleeping individuals, without first visually inspecting the room, is
entitled to qualified immunity against a complaint of excessive force, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and to official immunity against a complaint of assault and battery. At
dawn, officers of the Clayton County, Georgia, Narcotics Unit executed a search
warrant for Jason Ward’s apartment. Ward and his girlfriend, Treneshia Dukes,
were asleep in his bedroom. After an officer detonated a flashbang outside the
apartment and another officer broke the glass in a window to the bedroom, Officer
Nicholas Deaton threw a flashbang into the bedroom. The flashbang exploded near
Dukes, who suffered serious burns. Dukes filed a complaint against Deaton and
Deaton’s supervisor, Commander Stephen Branham, for excessive force, assault,
and battery. The district court granted the officers summary judgment on the
grounds that they are immune from suit. Although we agree with Dukes that
Deaton used excessive force, we also agree with the district court that Deaton is
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that his
*
Honorable Ursula Ungaro, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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conduct violated the Constitution. And he is entitled to official immunity because
Dukes offers no proof that Deaton intended to injure Dukes. Deaton’s supervisor,
Branham, also enjoys qualified immunity from the complaint against his
subordinate. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2010, a special agent with the Narcotics Unit of Clayton County,
Georgia, obtained a warrant to search Jason Ward’s apartment. The application for
the warrant stated that a confidential informant had observed a “small quantity of a
green leafy substance suspected to be marijuana” in the possession of Ward. The
application also stated that Ward had several arrests for possession of marijuana,
sold narcotics from his apartment, and was known to carry a silver nine-millimeter
handgun. The application sought a “no-knock” provision because “drug dealers
commonly utilize weapons, dogs, and barricades to hinder law enforcement in the
execution of their duties.” A magistrate judge approved the no-knock provision.
Ward resided in a two-bedroom apartment on the first floor of an apartment
complex. The front door to the apartment lay halfway down a short hallway. A
window in Ward’s bedroom faced an outdoor courtyard. Adjacent to Ward’s
bedroom, a living room with sliding glass doors opened onto a small balcony
overlooking the courtyard.
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To execute the search warrant, Stephen Branham, the commander of the
county SWAT team, prepared an operational plan with four teams: Alpha, Bravo,
Charlie, and Delta. Alpha was the “entry team.” Its job was to breach the main
door to Ward’s apartment and secure the persons inside. Bravo was the support
team. Its job was to wait outside and enter the apartment through the sliding glass
door if help was needed. Deaton was a member of Bravo team. Charlie was a
diversion team. Its job was to divert Ward’s attention by performing a “break and
rake” on his bedroom window. A break and rake is a tactic in which an officer
breaks and clears out all of the glass in a window. This tactic is used to cover a
room until the rest of the officers make entry. It is also used as a diversionary
tactic. Delta team, composed of only Officer Suzanne Bennett, was also a diversion
team. Bennett’s job was to deploy a “bang-pole,” a stick with a flashbang on the
end of it, on the outside wall of the apartment.
The flashbang manual used by the county SWAT team explains that police
use flashbangs in “high-risk warrant service” to “minimize the risk to all parties
through the temporary distraction or disorientation of potentially violent or
dangerous subjects.” The manual classifies flashbangs as explosives that can
generate heat in “excess of 2,000 degrees centigrade,” a flash of light up to 80
times brighter than the flashbulb of a camera, and over 150 decibels of noise for
less than one half of a second. Because flashbangs have the potential to cause
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“serious bodily injury,” Deaton and Branham testified that they received official
instruction to visually inspect an area first before deploying a flashbang. The
operational plan contemplated the use of two flashbangs––one thrown by Officer
Scott Malette through the front door, the other deployed by Officer Bennett with
the bang-pole. But the plan vested all SWAT team members with the authority to
use more flashbangs if needed.
At 5:00 a.m. on July 21, the SWAT team members met to review the
operational plan. Half an hour later, the SWAT team executed the warrant. Ward
and his girlfriend, Treneshia Dukes, were asleep in the bedroom of Ward’s
apartment. Ward was awakened by a “boom” and then heard his “window break
and shattering.” Next, he remembered “Treneshia screaming,” telling “her to get
down,” then grabbing the “pistol up under my head – up under my pillow,” and
“kicking into the hallway.” Ward never discharged his gun. Dukes heard a “boom,
and then [heard] the window like rattling and shattering . . . , and like as I’m
waking up I just seen an object coming towards me.” Dukes did not see who threw
the object because she “was asleep.” After the object hit her and exploded, Dukes
ran into the bathroom where she was detained by the police.
The SWAT team detonated three flashbangs during the search. Bennett and
Mallette deployed their flashbangs as the operational plan prescribed. Deaton
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deployed the third flashbang. He was the only officer outside the window with a
flashbang and testified that he threw his flashbang outside the window.
Although Deaton argues that his flashbang detonated outside the apartment,
we construe the facts and draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, Dukes. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d
739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). Viewed in that light, Deaton threw the flashbang
through the bedroom window where it landed near Dukes. Dukes testified that an
object came through the window; that she was under a comforter; that the object
landed on her right thigh; that the object “flashed” and “exploded”; that the
explosion “blinded” her; and that the sound from the object “discombobulated”
her, causing her run “into the [bedroom] wall.” Several witnesses who saw the
bedroom after the search testified that the walls were covered in black residue
consistent with an explosion. For example, Andrea Ward, who was asleep in the
second bedroom of the apartment the morning of the raid, testified that “the
bedroom looked like it had been on fire, the window was busted out. The room was
a mess and there was a black something, smoke and stuff on the walls, black
smoke was on the walls in the hallway also.”
Dukes suffered severe burns across both thighs and her right arm that
Deaton testified were consistent with the detonation of a flashbang. She was
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admitted to the hospital for three days after the raid. Ward was arrested and later
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Dukes filed a complaint against Officer Deaton and Commander Branham in
the district court. The complaint alleged a violation of Dukes’s right to be free
from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C § 1983, and state law
claims of assault and battery against Deaton. She alleged a claim of supervisory
liability against Branham.
After the close of discovery, Branham and Deaton moved for, and the
district court granted, summary judgment. The district court inferred in Dukes’s
favor that Deaton threw a flashbang that landed on Dukes, but concluded that
Deaton was entitled to qualified immunity against the claim of excessive force,
official immunity against the claims of assault and battery, and that Branham was
entitled to qualified immunity against the claim of supervisory liability.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether the officers are entitled to immunity. Hoyt v.
Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 981 (11th Cir. 2012) (official immunity); Townsend v.
Jefferson Cty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010) (qualified immunity).
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “In an appeal of a denial of summary judgment based on qualified
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immunity, ‘[a]ll evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.’” Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1157 (alteration in original) (quoting
Crosby v. Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004)).
III. DISCUSSION
Dukes challenges the grants of immunity to both Deaton and Branham.
Dukes argues that the district court erred when it granted Deaton qualified
immunity against her claim of excessive force, when it granted Deaton official
immunity against her claims of assault and battery, and when it granted Branham
qualified immunity against her claim of supervisory liability. These arguments fail.
Both officers are entitled to immunity. Although we conclude that Deaton’s
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity protects him from
suit because his violation was not clearly established in law when he acted. And
official immunity protects Deaton from Dukes’s complaint of assault and battery
because she offers no evidence that he threw the flashbang with the intent to injure
her. Qualified immunity also protects Branham because his subordinate’s
constitutional violation was not clearly established.
A. Deaton is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
“Qualified immunity protects . . . officers from liability in [section] 1983
actions as long ‘as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Lewis v.
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City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The officer bears the initial burden to prove
that he acted within his discretionary authority, Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,
1194 (11th Cir. 2002), which neither party disputes in this appeal. With
discretionary authority established, the burden shifts to Dukes to prove that Deaton
is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
To determine whether an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity at
summary judgment, we employ a two-part inquiry. First, we ask “whether the
facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show
[that] the officer’s conduct violated a [federal] right.” Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d
1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015) (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Tolan
v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014)). Second, we ask “whether the right in
question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. (quoting Tolan,
134 S. Ct. at 1866). When we perform this analysis, we “may not resolve genuine
disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan, 134 S.
Ct. at 1866. Our function at summary judgment is to “determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial,” not to weigh the evidence. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
As a threshold matter, Dukes argues that the record supports a factual
inference that Deaton intentionally threw the flashbang at Dukes, but we disagree.
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In support of her argument, Dukes cites the testimony of Deaton and Branham that
their training requires a visual inspection of an area before they deploy a flashbang
into that area. This testimony does not warrant the inference that Deaton looked
into the bedroom, saw Dukes, and threw the flashbang toward her. Dukes’s
argument would require us to infer that Deaton followed his training in one way by
looking into the room, but ignored his training in another way by purposefully
harming a bystander, Dukes. Although we must draw all inferences in favor of the
non-movant at summary judgment, those inferences must be plausible. Mize, 93
F.3d at 742–43. The record does not support a reasonable inference that Deaton
intentionally threw the flashbang at Dukes.
1. Deaton Violated the Fourth Amendment.
Dukes argues, and we agree, that Deaton’s deployment of the flashbang
constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Official action
constitutes excessive force when it is objectively unreasonable. Salvato, 790 F.3d
at 1293. To measure the objective reasonableness of official action, we weigh “the
quantum of force employed” against “the severity of the crime at issue; whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and
whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight.”
Id. (citation omitted). But we do not apply these factors mechanically. Id. Whether
an officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable” is a function of “the facts and
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circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (citation omitted).
The facts construed in the light most favorable to Dukes establish that
Deaton used excessive force. Deaton’s conduct posed a significant risk of harm.
He threw a flashbang that can generate heat in excess of 2,000 degrees Celsius into
a dark room in which the occupants were asleep. He also failed to inspect the
room, as he was trained to do, to determine whether bystanders, such as Dukes,
occupied the room or if other hazards existed. And there existed minimal need for
Deaton’s use of force. True, the warrant stated that an informant advised law
enforcement that Ward kept a handgun on his person, and the applying officer
attested that drug dealers are known to be violent. Perhaps this record could have
supported the use of the two flashbangs contemplated by the operational plan to
disorient the occupants of the apartment. We need not decide that question. Even if
the record supports the use of the first two flashbangs, these earlier flashbangs
made Deaton’s deployment gratuitous. The break and rake and the detonation of
the flashbang on the exterior wall diverted the attention of Ward and Dukes before
Deaton deployed his flashbang. There is no evidence that Deaton was aware that
Ward had drawn his gun or that Dukes or Ward resisted the officers. And the
suspected crime that prompted the search was possession and sale of marijuana.
Deaton deployed a dangerous device into a dark room for a de minimis return.
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The decisions of our sister circuits support our conclusion that Deaton’s
conduct was unconstitutional. Our sister circuits have held that an officer’s failure
to perform a visual inspection before throwing a flashbang into an area weighs
against reasonableness. Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 785 (7th Cir.
2010); Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004). And they have held
that the use of a flashbang in an area occupied by bystanders, like Dukes, similarly
weighs against reasonableness. Bender, 600 F.3d at 786; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779; cf.
Krause v. Jones, 765 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2014); Molina ex rel. Molina v.
Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003). The totality of the circumstances
establishes that Deaton violated the Fourth Amendment.
2. Deaton’s Violation Was Not Clearly Established.
To overcome qualified immunity, Dukes also must prove that Deaton
“violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time
of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). Official conduct violates
clearly established law if the “contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates
that right.” Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
Because no precedent of the Supreme Court, our Circuit, or the Supreme Court of
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Georgia has addressed the constitutionality of flashbangs, Dukes must establish
that “a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law . . .
appl[ies] with obvious clarity” to Deaton’s conduct. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
741 (2002) (citations omitted).
To satisfy this narrow exception, official conduct must be so egregious that
“every objectively reasonable government official facing the circumstances would
know that the official’s conduct did violate federal law.” Coffin v. Brandau, 642
F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002)). When this exception for obvious clarity is “properly
applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted). It allows an officer to make “reasonable mistakes” about the law. Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
We conclude that it was not clearly established that Deaton’s conduct was
unconstitutional when he acted. Although we recognize that the doctrine of
excessive force makes some official conduct off limits even in “novel factual
circumstances,” Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 741, Deaton’s conduct was not so lacking in
justification that every reasonable officer would know that what he did constituted
excessive force. The operational plan contemplated the use of flashbangs to
disorient the residents, and there is no evidence Deaton intended to use his
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flashbang for any other purpose. And the application in support of the search
warrant stated that “drug dealers,” such as Ward, “commonly utilize weapons,
dogs, and barricades to hinder law enforcement in the execution of their duties.”
The application also stated that an informant had advised law enforcement that
Ward carried a handgun “on his person.” To be sure, Deaton should have followed
his training and checked the bedroom before he threw. But a reasonable officer
could have found it “difficult . . . to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here
excessive force,” would apply. Katz, 533 U.S. at 205.
Dukes argues that “no decisional law is necessary to inform a reasonable
officer that he should not blindly throw a [flashbang] grenade into the bedroom of
a small apartment, at 5:30 a.m., . . . occupied[] by people who . . . were doing
nothing other than sleeping,” but this portrait ignores facts stated in the warrant
and the purpose of a flashbang. Ward carried a weapon. The warrant stated that
drug trafficking occurred in his apartment. A flashbang is meant to disorient and
avoid physical harm. And the operational plan permitted the officers to use a
flashbang if needed. In the absence of binding caselaw to the contrary, Deaton,
though badly mistaken, could have reasonably believed, based on the facts known
to the officers on the morning of the search, that throwing a flashbang into Ward’s
bedroom was not excessive force.
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Our conclusion that Deaton violated the Fourth Amendment, but that the
contours of the right were not clearly established, also finds support in the
decisions of our sister circuits. In Boyd, for example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the detonation of a flashbang in a room with up to eight bystanders without first
looking was unconstitutional, but that the right was not clearly established. 374
F.3d at 783–84. In Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, the Sixth Circuit also
decided that the use of a second flashbang violated the Fourth Amendment, but
that the violation was not obvious. 456 F.3d 555, 571 (6th Cir. 2006). Consistent
with these decisions, we affirm the ruling that Deaton is entitled to qualified
immunity.
B. Deaton is Entitled to Official Immunity.
With two exceptions, the Constitution of Georgia protects public officials
from personal liability for actions performed in their official capacity. Ga. Const.
Art. I, § II, para. IX. Official immunity does not apply to ministerial acts
performed negligently or discretionary acts performed “with actual malice or with
intent to cause injury.” Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (Ga. 2007) (citation
omitted). Dukes raises issues about both exceptions.
Dukes argues that the district court erred when it granted Deaton official
immunity against her tort claims. Dukes argues that Deaton negligently performed
a ministerial act when he deployed the flashbang, or, in the alternative, that the
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deployment of a flashbang was a discretionary act that Deaton performed with
actual malice. Both arguments fail.
Settled Georgia caselaw delineates between ministerial and discretionary
acts. “A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty.” Id. at 57 (citation omitted). By contrast, “A
discretionary act . . . calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment,
which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and
acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” Id. (citation omitted).
Deaton’s use of a flashbang was discretionary. It called for the “exercise of
personal deliberation” because an officer must “examin[e] the facts” and “act[] on
[those facts] in a way not specifically directed.” Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d at 57 (citation
omitted). The operational plan contemplated the specific use of two flashbangs, but
vested every team member with the authority to use flashbangs. The search of
Ward’s apartment called for the kind of “split-second decision[s]” the Supreme
Court of Georgia has held are discretionary. E.g., Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d
341, 344 (2001) (holding that a high-speed police chase was discretionary).
Dukes’s argument that we should evaluate the relevant conduct more
narrowly fails. She argues that we should examine Deaton’s failure to perform a
visual inspection of the bedroom. Dukes argues that Deaton’s training to inspect an
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area before deploying a flashbang, makes this conduct ministerial. But her
argument runs counter to Georgia law. In Phillip v. Hanse, for example, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that a decision of a police officer to engage in a
high-speed chase, not his several violations of a police manual, was the relevant
conduct for the purpose of official immunity. 637 S.E.2d 11, 12 (Ga. 2006). And
the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the decision to engage in a high-speed
chase is discretionary. Id. Like Hanse, Deaton’s decision to deploy a flashbang was
discretionary despite the violation of his training.
Deaton is entitled to official immunity under Georgia law. An officer is
entitled to official immunity for discretionary acts performed in his official
capacity unless he acted with actual malice or intent to injure. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d
at 60. Actual malice means “a deliberate intention to do wrong, and does not
include implied malice, i.e., the reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others.
. . . A deliberate intention to do wrong . . . must be the intent to cause the harm
suffered by the plaintiffs.” Id. (citations omitted). Although Dukes asks us to infer
that Deaton acted with actual malice, no evidence in the record suggests that
Deaton “inten[ded] to cause the harm suffered by” Dukes. Id. She cites Deaton’s
training to inspect an area and argues that he likely knew people were in the room,
but these facts, at most, establish recklessness. We agree with the district court that
Deaton is entitled to official immunity under Georgia law.
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C. Branham is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
Dukes makes two arguments that Branham is liable for Deaton’s conduct
under a theory of supervisory liability: that Branham failed to train his officers in
the proper use of flashbangs or, in the alternative, that Branham personally
participated in the deployment of the flashbang. The first argument fails, and
Dukes failed to preserve the second argument.
Dukes argues that Branham failed to train his subordinate officers in the use
of flashbangs and that this failure exposes him to supervisory liability for Deaton’s
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but we disagree. A supervisor cannot be liable
for the constitutional violation of his subordinate if the constitutional violation was
not then clearly established. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 763 (11th
Cir. 2010) (explaining that supervising officers are only liable under section 1983
if subordinate officers violated clearly established law); Harper v. Lawrence Cty.,
592 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must analyze whether Plaintiff
properly stated a violation of [constitutional rights] against [the supervisor], and
whether those rights were clearly established.”). Branham is entitled to qualified
immunity because Deaton’s conduct was not a clearly established violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
The district court ruled, and we agree, that Dukes offered her alternative
argument too late in an improper attempt to amend her complaint. “A plaintiff may
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not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary
judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). “At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure
for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” Id. In her amended complaint, Dukes alleged one theory of
supervisory liability: Branham’s failure to train his officers in the proper use of
flashbangs. Although the amended complaint alleged that Branham gave Deaton
“unbridled discretion to deploy [flashbangs],” nowhere did the complaint allege
that Branham deployed the flashbang. But in her brief in opposition to Branham’s
and Deaton’s motions for summary judgment Dukes asserted an alternative theory
of supervisory liability that “Branham personally participated in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct by Branham, himself, throwing a flashbang on to Ms.
Dukes.” Personal participation is a distinct ground for supervisory liability, cf.
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2003) (articulating the
alternative theories of supervisory liability), which makes the assertion of it in a
brief in opposition to summary judgment improper. Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1315. As
a result, we agree with the district court that Branham is entitled to qualified
immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Deaton and Branham.
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