This opinion was flied for record
at a~oQrm, on~lan 21e ~wn
~~ SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ESTATE OF VIRGIL VICTOR BECKER, )
JR., by its Personal Representative,)
Jennifer L. White, )
)
Petitioner, ) No. 92972-6
)
v. ) En Bane
)
AVCO CORPORATION;.PRECISION ) JA_N_2_6_"'_20_U'_ __
Filed _ _
AIRMOTIVE LLC; VOLARE )
CARBURETORS LLC; MARVEL- )
SCHEBLER CARBURETORS LLC; )
TEMPEST PLUS MARKETING GROUP )
LLC; AERO ACCESSORIES, INC.; )
SYNERGY SYSTEMS, INC.; CASHMERE )
MOLDING, INC.; CREST AIRPARI(, INC.;)
PREMIER AIRCRAFT ENGINES, INC; )
AUBURN FLIGHT SERVICE, INC; and )
ESTATE OF BRENDA L. HOUSTON, by its )
Personal Representative PAUL THOMAS )
CREWS, )
)
Defendants, )
)
and )
)
FORWARD TECHNOLOGY )
INDUSTRIES, INC., )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________)
Estate ofBecker v. A VCO Corp., eta!.
No. 92972-6
OWENS, J.- Virgil Victor Becker, a retired doctor, was killed in a plane crash.
His estate (Estate) claimed that a faulty carburetor caused the crash. Forward
Technology Industries Inc. (FTI) built a component for that carburetor. The Estate
brought numerous claims against FTI, including a state product liability claim
implicating a faulty carburetor component. FTI moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Federal Aviation
Act), Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569, preempted state law.
In certain circumstances, federal law and state law will interact in such a way that
the federal law will take priority and preempt state law. The Federal Aviation Act does
not include an express preemption clause. However, federal law can preempt state law
if it pervasively occupies a particular field of law. The Third Circuit recently found that
federal aviation regulations do not preempt the state product liability of an aviation
systems manufacturer because they are not so pervasive as to indicate congressional
intent to preempt state law. We follow the Third Circuit and find that the Federal
Aviation Act does not preempt state law. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 2008, a single-propeller airplane crashed near McMurray, Washington. The
pilot and two passengers were killed in the crash. One of those passengers was
Becker, a retired doctor. Though the parties dispute the ultimate cause of the crash,
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No. 92972-6
the Estate claims that the engine stalled due to a poorly manufactured carburetor and
that this engine failure led to the crash and the death of Becker.
The plane's fuel system was designed and produced by Precision Airmotive
LLC (Precision). Though Precision assembled the final product, it contracted with
several other companies to produce various components for the fuel system, including
the carburetor. FTI was one of those companies.
FTI normally manufactures machines designed to weld plastic parts. Sometime
before 1997, it sold Precision a machine designed to heat and hermetically seal two
plastic components together. Though Precision bought the machine and three tools
capable of sealing three different types of carburetor components, it subsequently
contracted FTI to use two of those tools to weld carburetor floats for Precision.
Precision would procure two plastic components from a plastics manufacturer
and ship those components to FTI. Using Precision's tools, FTI would weld the
plastic components into a completed, sealed carburetor float. After a batch of these
floats was completed, FTI would test them and send them to Precision.
FTI produced floats for Precision from at least 1997 until2005. During that
time, it produced over 30,000 floats. FTI understood that it was responsible for
generating carburetor floats that would eventually be placed in airplane engines. It
also knew that the weld on the float needed to be perfect for the float to function
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Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., eta!.
No. 92972-6
properly. Around 2001, a carburetor containing one of these floats was installed in
the plane that crashed and killed Becker.
During its investigation into the crash, the National Transportation Safety
Board examined the carburetor of the downed airplane. The investigation revealed
that one chamber of the float was completely filled with aviation fuel. A float filled
with fuel can force the engine's fuel feed to remain open, causing the engine to flood
and stall out. The investigator did not explain what caused the float to leak and fill
with fuel. However, the Estate asserts that the float leaked because of an imperfect
weld applied by FTI.
In 2010, the Estate and another plaintiff filed suit against FTI and 11 other
defendants. The Estate claimed numerous tort violations, alleging FTI and the other
defendants had caused an unreasonably dangerous condition in the carburetor float
and that this condition caused the airplane's engine to stall, resulting in the crash that
caused Becker's death.
FTI moved for summary judgment. It argued that because of pervasive Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, federal law occupied the field of aviation
safety and that all of the Estate's state law claims were preempted. In the alternative,
FTI argued that the Estate could bring a product liability action only under the
Washington tort reform and product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW. 1
1
Because neither of the lower courts addressed the WPLA issue, we decline to do so here.
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No. 92972-6
King County Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment on
federal preemption grounds, declining to address the WPLA issue. The Estate
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint. The trial court denied both motions.
The Estate and the other plaintiff settled the remaining claims, deconsolidated
their cases, and voluntarily dismissed the remaining defendants. The court then
entered a final judgment.
The Estate appealed the summary judgment order, as well as the order denying
leave to amend, to the Court of Appeals. Estate ofBecker v. AVCO Corp., 192 Wn.
App. 65, 365 P.3d 1273 (2015). The court found that "federal regulations pervasively
regulate an airplane engine's fuel system," and that this constitutes "implied field
preemption [that] precludes applying a state law standard of care to [the Estate's]
claims." Id. at 79. It reasoned that preemption applies when '"pervasive regulations'
govern a specific area of aviation safety." I d. at 76. The court held that federal law
preempted state law because the specific legal area at issue was the "engine's fuel
system," and the "many federal regulations focused on performance and safety
standards" for airplane engines pervasively regulate this area. Id. The court also
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying leave to amend,
reasoning that the Estate's delay in filing the motion was a reasonable basis for denial.
Id. at 83. It also declined to address the WPLA issue.
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Estate ofBecker v. AVCO Corp., et al.
No. 92972-6
The Estate sought review by this court, which was granted. Estate ofBecker v.
AVCO Corp., 185 Wn.2d 1040, 377 P.3d 763 (2016).
ISSUES
1. Are the regulations promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act so
pervasive as to constitute field preemption of state product liability law?
2. Did the trial court err when it declined to provide the Estate the
opportunity to file a third amended complaint?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of any material fact, if
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, and if reasonable minds
could reach only one conclusion from the evidence presented. Bostain v. Food
Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846 (2007). We review grants of
summary judgment de novo. Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788,
794-95, 64 P.3d 22 (2003).
ANALYSIS
In this case, we hold that the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt
Washington law. Congress intended the act to allow for the creation of minimum
standards. It is not so pervasive or comprehensive enough to preempt state remedies
that exceed that minimum. Two circuit courts have recently made similar
conclusions. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir.), cert.
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Estate ofBecker v. AVCO Corp., et al.
No. 92972-6
denied, 196 L. Ed. 2d 433 (2016); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir.
2007). In addition, the history of the act itself indicates that Congress intended to
avoid federal preemption rather than aim for it. Because we rule that federal law does
not preempt state law in this case, we decline to address whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying a third amendment. Because the Court of Appeals erred
when it concluded that state law was preempted by federal law, we reverse the Court
of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.
1. The Regulations Promulgated under the Federal Aviation Act Are Not So
Pervasive as To Preempt State Product Liability Law
The Estate contends that the Federal Aviation Act and the regulations
promulgated under it are not pervasive enough to indicate intent by Congress to
preempt state product liability law. We agree. Though we have never ruled on this
issue, several federal courts have. First, the Third Circuit recently ruled in a case
almost identical to this one that the Federal Aviation Act was not pervasive enough to
preempt state product liability law, and that there was no evidence to suggest that it
was ever intended to do so. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that a regulation
must not only be pervasive, but also must comprehensively regulate an area of law to
have preemptive effect. Finally, Congress' actions after passing the Federal Aviation
Act indicate that, rather than attempting to preempt state law, it was trying to avoid
preemption. Because of this, state law is not preempted.
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Estate ofBecker v. AVCO Corp., et al.
No. 92972-6
There are three methods Congress may use to preempt state law: express
preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. Progressive Animal Welfare
Soc 'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 265, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (plurality opinion).
To effectuate field preemption, Congress must "occup[y] an entire field of regulation
to the exclusion of any state laws." Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth.,
177 Wn.2d 417, 444, 327 P.3d 600 (2013). However, state laws "'are not superseded
by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"
Progressive Animal Welfare, 125 Wn.2d at 265 (quoting Wash. State Physicians Ins.
Exch. & Ass 'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 327, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993) (plurality
opinion)). Further, there is a strong general presumption against finding that federal
law has preempted state law. Resident Action Council, 177 Wn.2d at 444-45 (citing
State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 546, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993)). If federal law does
not preempt state law, state law applies and our analysis ends. Gilstrap v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
A. The Third and Ninth Circuits Have Both Ruled That the Federal Aviation
Act Is Not Pervasive Enough To Preempt State Aviation Law
This court has not yet ruled on whether the Federal Aviation Act preempts state
product liability claims relating to aviation safety. However, a number of federal
circuit courts have, and we give '"great weight"' to those decisions. State v.
McCormack, 117 Wn.2d 141, 144, 812 P.2d 483 (1991) (quoting Home Ins. Co. of
NY. v. N Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Wn.2d 798, 808, 140 P.2d 507 (1943)).
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Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., eta!.
No. 92972~6
A recent Third Circuit decision, not published when the trial court and the
Court of Appeals made their rulings, deals directly with the issue in this case. In
Sikkelee, 822 F .3d at 680, a single-propeller aircraft crashed and killed David
Sild