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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PAULA L. STILLMAN, M.D. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM
AND TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,
INC.
Appellees No. 856 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 5, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 140203174
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JANUARY 31, 2017
Appellant, Paula L. Stillman, M.D., appeals from the judgment entered
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant is a
former at-will employee of Temple University Hospital System (“TUHS”).
During a meeting on November 20, 2013, a representative of TUHS informed
Appellant that her position was being terminated. TUHS offered Appellant
twelve weeks of severance pay in exchange for Appellant providing a
release. Appellant objected to the duration of the severance pay; TUHS
agreed to pay Appellant six months of severance instead. Following the
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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meeting, TUHS sent Appellant a letter stating she would receive six months
of severance, provided she made a good-faith effort to seek other
employment. The letter also stated the severance payments would be offset
by any compensation she earned as the result of other employment during
that time. Appellant refused to agree to the terms of the letter, and did not
sign a release.
On February 28, 2014, Appellant filed the instant complaint. Appellant
claimed TUHS breached her contract by refusing to pay her six months’
severance, without an offset provision; failing to pay Appellant a merit bonus
to which she was entitled; and interfering with Appellant’s subsequent
employment contract at another hospital. TUHS filed preliminary objections,
stating Appellant failed to prove the existence of a contract addressing
severance, or that she was entitled to a discretionary bonus. The court
sustained TUHS’s preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant’s Wage
Payment and Collection Law and breach of contract claims. The court
determined that Appellant’s claims of an oral severance agreement made
after her termination lacked valid consideration, and thus could not
constitute a contract. Appellant then filed a motion for permission to amend
her complaint, which the court granted. Appellant’s amended complaint
alleged that, at the time she was hired, TUHS promised her six months of
severance pay in the event she was terminated.
Thereafter, TUHS filed a motion for summary judgment. The court
granted TUHS’s motion as to Appellant’s claim for a merit bonus; it
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determined that Appellant was eligible for a bonus, but that she was not
guaranteed or otherwise legally entitled to one. Appellant proceeded to a
jury trial on her remaining claims. The court permitted Appellant to continue
to litigate her severance claim, but only as to whether Appellant and TUHS
entered into a valid oral contract prior to or simultaneous with the beginning
of Appellant’s employment. The court ruled that the jury would not evaluate
the question of whether any oral severance agreement had been made at
the time of Appellant’s termination on November 20, 2013, in keeping with
the court’s prior ruling on TUHS’s preliminary objections. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of TUHS. Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion requesting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) or a new trial. The court
denied Appellant’s motion, and she filed a notice of appeal.1
Appellant raises three questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to direct a
judgment in [Appellant’s] favor on her claims (a) for breach of a
contract to pay severance benefits and (b) for severance benefits
and attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Wage Payment and
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1
Judgment had not been entered on the docket when Appellant filed her
notice of appeal. In her notice of appeal, Appellant purported to appeal from
the denial of her post-trial motion. See Notice of Appeal, filed 3/15/16.
“Orders denying post-trial motions, however, are not appealable. Rather, it
is the subsequent judgment that is the appealable order when a trial has
occurred.” Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 524 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court issued an order
directing Appellant to praecipe the trial court prothonotary to enter
judgment. See Order, filed 5/4/16. Appellant complied with our order and
judgment was entered in the lower court on the next day. We have corrected
the caption accordingly.
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Collection Law, where the undisputed evidence at trial
established all the elements necessary to prove [Appellant’s]
claim for breach of an oral contract to pay six months’ severance
made on November 20, 2013?
2. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant
[Appellant’s] motion for a new trial on her claims (a) for breach
of a contract to pay severance benefits and (b) for severance
benefits, attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages pursuant to the
Wage Payment and Collection Law, where errors in the jury
charge, the verdict sheet, the permitted scope of closing
argument, and the evidence admitted at trial, resulted in
prejudice to [Appellant] that affected the outcome of the trial?
3. Whether the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment to TUHS on [Appellant’s] breach of contract and Wage
Payment and Collection Law claims for a performance-based
bonus?
Appellant’s Brief, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In her first issue, Appellant argues the evidence proved TUHS
breached an oral agreement with Appellant to pay her six months’
severance. Appellant contends TUHS promised to pay severance during the
November 20, 2013 meeting when Appellant was terminated. Appellant
claims the trial court erred when it determined that any post-termination
agreement lacked consideration because Appellant did not sign a release in
exchange for the purported severance pay. Appellant avers her oral
agreement with TUHS’s representative to increase the severance amount
implied Appellant would accept the release. Appellant asserts the trial court
erred by sustaining TUHS’s preliminary objections on this issue and not
allowing the jury to hear evidence of the post-termination agreement.
Appellant concludes she is entitled to JNOV. We disagree.
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We review this issue according to the following standard of review.
A JNOV can be entered upon two bases: (1) where the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or (2) the evidence
was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the
verdict should have been rendered for the movant. When
reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV, we must
consider all of the evidence admitted to decide if there was
sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. In so doing,
we must also view this evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict winner, giving the victorious party the benefit of
every reasonable inference arising from the evidence and
rejecting all unfavorable testimony and inference. Concerning
any questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. Concerning
questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial,
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact.
If any basis exists upon which the jury could have properly made
its award, then we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the
motion for JNOV. A JNOV should be entered only in a clear case.
Griffin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Center-Braddock Hosp., 950 A.2d
996, 999 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “[A]bsent an abuse of
discretion, the reviewing court is bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations.” De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. v. M.B.
Management Co., Inc., 888 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
omitted).
In reviewing Appellant’s motion for JNOV, the trial court found that the
parties did not agree to the alleged oral contract dictating the terms of
Appellant’s severance. The court concluded that any contract for severance
payments was explicitly conditioned on Appellant signing the release. Thus,
Appellant’s refusal to sign the letter providing six months of severance pay
meant the contract lacked consideration, and precluded her from enforcing
it. Consequently, the court did not permit Appellant’s breach of contract
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claim based on a post-termination oral severance agreement to proceed to
the jury. The record supports the court’s conclusions, and so we cannot
conclude the court abused its discretion in preventing Appellant from
presenting this claim to the jury, or subsequently denying Appellant’s motion
for JNOV. Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief on her first issue.
In her second issue, Appellant contends that three separate trial court
errors entitle her to a new trial. We review Appellant’s contentions that the
trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial according to the
following standard of review.
“Our standard of review from an order denying a motion for a new trial
is whether the trial court committed an error of law, which controlled the
outcome of the case, or committed an abuse of discretion.” Mirabel v.
Morales, 57 A.3d 144, 150 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “A trial
court commits an abuse of discretion when it rendered a judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law,
or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Unless an error of law controls the outcome of a case, we will not
reverse an order denying a new trial. See Lockley v. CSX Transportation,
5 A.3d 383, 388 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[A] litigant is entitled only to a fair trial
and not a perfect trial.” Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
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First, Appellant takes umbrage at the court’s omission of certain points
for charge and items on the verdict sheet related to her claim of an oral
severance agreement made at the time of her termination.
A jury charge is adequate “unless the issues are not made clear, the
jury was misled by the instructions, or there was an omission from the
charge amounting to a fundamental error.” Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc.,
104 A.3d 328, 351 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
However, we have already determined the court was well within its
discretion to preclude the jury from evaluating Appellant’s post-termination
oral severance claim in its entirety. The appropriateness of jury instructions
on a claim is necessarily derivative of that claim’s ability to proceed to the
jury in the first place. Therefore, this argument fails.
Appellant next indicates the trial court erred in directing the jury to
disregard evidence at trial related to Appellant’s post-termination oral
severance claim. Appellant maintains this refusal to allow counsel to present
evidence of the post-termination agreement in closing argument prejudiced
her case and entitles her to a new trial. We disagree.
“While counsel usually has great latitude in his closing argument, he
may not present facts to the jury not in evidence and which are prejudicial
to the opposing party.” Coffey v. Minwax Co., Inc., 764 A.2d 616, 620
(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
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Instantly, the court refused to permit Appellant’s counsel to reference
the post-termination oral severance agreement in closing argument. The
court previously ruled that the jury would not evaluate the existence or
validity of any post-termination oral severance agreement. Thus, the court
properly prohibited Appellant’s counsel from referring to such an agreement
in closing argument.
In her third claim of error, Appellant disputes the propriety of the
court’s decision to allow into evidence an email between Dr. DiSesa,
Appellant’s supervisor, and Dr. Kaiser, the CEO of TUHS, as a business
record exception to the hearsay rule.
With regard to the admissibility of evidence:
[A] trial court has broad discretion…and is not required to
exclude all evidence that may be detrimental to a party’s case.
Such rulings on the admission of evidence will not be overturned
by this Court absent a conclusion that the law has been
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.
Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 102 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Rule 803 of our Rules of Evidence concerns the business record
exception to the hearsay rule and provides, in pertinent part, as follows.
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
* * *
(6). Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record
(which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in
any form) of an act, event or condition if:
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(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or
from information transmitted by – someone with
knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a “business,” which term includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that
activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a
certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or
with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) the opponent does not show that the source of
information or other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.
* * *
Pa.R.E. 803(6).
Dr. DiSesa authenticated this email as a record kept in the course of
regularly conducted activity at TUHS. See N.T. Trial, 12/8/16, at 90. The
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that such evidence was
admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
Moreover, contrary to Appellant’s contention otherwise, multiple exhibits
included in the record confirm the practices of TUHS written in Dr. Kaiser’s
email. The information contained in the email at most provides cumulative
evidence, rather than uniquely prejudicial material as Appellant claims. Thus,
Appellant is due no relief on this claim.
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In Appellant’s final issue, she disputes the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to TUHS on her merit bonus claim. Appellant maintains
the bonus was not discretionary, and its award depended solely on whether
Appellant met agreed-upon performance goals. Appellant insists she met
these goals and was therefore entitled to a bonus as a matter of right.
Appellant asserts the trial court erred by accepting TUHS’s interpretation of
the word “eligible.” Appellant contends her claim for a bonus should have
proceeded to a jury, instead of being dismissed by the trial court on
summary judgment. We disagree.
We review a decision granting summary judgment according to the
following standard.
A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only
where it is established that the court committed an error of law
or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review
is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden
of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or
answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a
nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue
essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof
establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party.
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JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant misconstrues the phrase “eligible” to mean
“mandatory.” Appellant’s initial offer letter from TUHS states: “You will be
eligible for a performance based bonus of up to 15% of your salary.”
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 6, filed 4/17/15. Appellant
confirmed this precise phrasing in her response to TUHS’s motion for
summary judgment. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Facts, filed 5/20/15,
at 3. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving
party, we simply cannot give credence to Appellant’s seemingly willful
misinterpretation of the offer letter.
Moreover, Appellant’s own conduct belies her alleged interpretation of
the document. TUHS gave Appellant a bonus of 10% of her salary in her
second year. When Appellant questioned why she was not given a bonus of
15%, her supervisor informed her that the bonus was discretionary, and up
to 15% of her salary. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Ex. 2, at 1. Appellant did not
object or seek further review at that time. Appellant’s attempt to raise this
issue now rings hollow. Accordingly, we deny Appellant relief on this issue.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/31/2017
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