United States v. Geoffrey Ramer

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4186

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

GEOFFREY ALEXANDER RAMER, a/k/a Geoffrey Alexander Ramer-
Mesen,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00022-MOC-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: February 3, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

C. Fredric Marcinak, III, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD, LLP,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland
Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General,
Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy R.
Sanders, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Based on his role in an international telemarketing scam,

Geoffrey Alexander Ramer pled guilty to conspiracy to commit

wire fraud, eight counts of wire fraud and aiding and abetting,

conspiracy to commit money laundering, and four counts of

international money laundering and aiding and abetting. The

district court sentenced Ramer to 108 months’ imprisonment, and

he now appeals, challenging the district court’s calculation of

his Sentencing Guidelines range and the procedural

reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

Ramer first argues that the Government failed to present

evidence at his sentencing hearing regarding his leadership

role, the number and vulnerability of victims, and the amount of

loss attributable to him. However, we conclude that Ramer has

waived appellate review of these claims. We have recognized

that “[a] party who identifies an issue, and then explicitly

withdraws it, has waived the issue.” United States v. Robinson,

744 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[W]hen a claim is waived, it is not reviewable on

appeal, even for plain error.” Id.; see also United States v.

Williams, 29 F.3d 172, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that

sentencing stipulation on issue waives right to appeal that

issue).

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Ramer raised these Guidelines calculation issues in his

objections to the presentence report, and he later agreed to a

sentencing stipulation that specifically resolved his

objections. Indeed, defense counsel agreed at Ramer’s

sentencing hearing that the sentencing stipulation resolved all

of Ramer’s objections to the presentence report and even relied

on the stipulation to argue for a lesser sentence. We find it

disingenuous for Ramer to now claim that the Government was

required to introduce evidence at the sentencing hearing on

these issues.

Moreover, contrary to Ramer’s argument, the Supreme Court’s

decision in Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338

(2016), does not require us to review his waived arguments. In

Molina-Martinez, the Supreme Court observed that “a court of

appeals has discretion to remedy a forfeited error,” or an error

that “has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned.”

Id. at 1343. Here, by agreeing to the sentencing stipulation,

Ramer “intentionally relinquished” his ability to appeal the

Guidelines calculation issues that he now argues. Id.

Next, Ramer contends that his sentence is procedurally

unreasonable for two reasons. First, Ramer asserts that the

district court failed to consider any of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2012) factors other than deterrence. Second, Ramer argues that

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the district court neglected to address his arguments for a

downward variance.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court

properly calculates the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range,

gives the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate

sentence, considers the § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently

explains the selected sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 49-51 (2007). As we have explained, “[r]egardless of

whether the district court imposes an above, below, or within-

Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an

individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the

case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

explanation must be sufficient to allow for “meaningful

appellate review,” such that we need “not guess at the district

court’s rationale.” Id. at 329, 330 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Furthermore, “[w]here the defendant or prosecutor

presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence

than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge

should address the party’s arguments and explain why he has

rejected those arguments.” Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Insofar as Ramer contends that the district court failed to

properly consider the § 3553(a) factors by only addressing the

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need for deterrence, we find that Ramer’s argument is meritless.

Although the district court’s statements in imposing sentence

were heavily focused on general deterrence, the court also

discussed Ramer’s personal characteristics, the seriousness of

the offense, and the need to protect the public from Ramer. Cf.

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 476 (4th Cir. 2007)

(recognizing that district court may “reasonably accord

significant weight to a single sentencing factor in fashioning

its sentence”). The district court clearly recognized that it

must consider the § 3553(a) factors and did so. The district

court was not required to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s

every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345

(4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, we conclude that the district court

did not commit procedural error in its consideration of the

§ 3553(a) factors.

Turning to Ramer’s second procedural unreasonableness

argument, Ramer does not specifically identify the downward

variance arguments that the district court failed to address,

but defense counsel requested a variance based on Ramer’s

personal history and characteristics, including his intelligence

and education, and the tragedy of his mother’s murder. Defense

counsel also argued in mitigation that Ramer intermittently left

Costa Rica while the scheme was ongoing, that he did not

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substantially profit from the scheme, and that he did not

particularly target elderly persons.

After some discussion with defense counsel, the district

court stated that it would not go below the stipulated

Guidelines range. While the district court did not discuss each

of Ramer’s arguments for a downward variance in rejecting his

request, the court’s remarks reflect that it considered Ramer’s

personal characteristics and his offense conduct in fashioning

his sentence. Therefore, we conclude that the district court

sufficiently addressed Ramer’s arguments for a downward

variance. Moreover, even assuming that the district court

erred, we find that the Government has demonstrated any error to

be harmless. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th

Cir. 2010) (providing harmless error standard).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED