Order issued February 7, 2017.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00299-CV
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WWW.URBAN, INC., Appellant
V.
CHRIS DRUMMOND, Appellee
On Appeal from the 281st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2012-33836
MEMORANDUM ORDER ON REHEARING
The parties have filed a joint motion stating that they have reached a
settlement agreement and requesting that we withdraw our opinion dated August 30,
2016, or, alternatively, if we elect not to withdraw the opinion, the parties request
that we re-designate our August 30, 2016 opinion as a memorandum opinion.1 The
parties also request that we vacate our judgment dated August 30, 2016, and issue a
new judgment setting aside the trial court’s judgment without regard to the merits,
remanding the case to the trial court for entry of a final judgment pursuant to the
parties’ settlement agreement, and releasing a cash deposit that WWW.Urban, Inc.
filed with the registry of the court. We grant the motion in part and deny the motion
in part. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(2) (providing that appellate court may dispose of
appeal in accordance with agreement signed by parties or their attorneys); TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.1(c) (“In dismissing a proceeding, the appellate court will determine
whether to withdraw any opinion it has already issued. An agreement or motion for
dismissal cannot be conditioned on withdrawal of the opinion.”).
The Texas Supreme Court has made the policy concerns with withdrawing
opinions after settlement clear:
A settlement does not automatically require the vacating of a court of
appeals’ opinion—either by this court or by the intermediate appellate
court. Our courts are endowed with a public purpose—they do not sit
merely as private tribunals to resolve private disputes. While settlement
is to be encouraged, a private agreement between litigants should not
operate to vacate a court’s writing on matters of public importance.
Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood W. Civic Ass’n, 860 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Tex. 1993);
Vida v. El Paso Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 885 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex. App.—El
1
We construe the parties’ motion as a motion for rehearing. See e.g., Verburgt v.
Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
Paso 1994, no writ) (“Although this Court certainly encourages the settlement of
controversies, we remind the parties that we do not sit as a purely private tribunal to
settle private disputes. We believe that our opinion in this case involves matters of
public importance, and our duty as an appellate court requires that we publish our
decision.”). Because our opinion in this case addresses matters of public importance,
our duty as a public tribunal constrains us to publish our decision. See Houston Cable
TV, 860 S.W.2d at 73; Vida, 885 S.W.2d at 182. We therefore deny the parties’
motion to vacate the opinion.
However, to facilitate the parties’ settlement agreement, we grant the motion
to vacate our August 30, 2016 judgment, and we set aside the trial court’s judgment
without regard to the merits, and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a final
judgment. See Houston Cable TV, 860 S.W.2d at 73; Piro v. Sarofim, 80 S.W.3d
717, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Polley v. Odom, 963
S.W.2d 917, 918 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, order) (per curiam).
Furthermore, the Harris County District Clerk is ordered to release the $500
cash deposit that WWW.Urban, Inc. deposited into its Registry in accordance with
the parties’ settlement agreement.
Costs of the appeal are taxed against the parties who incurred them. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 42.1(d).
The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate upon issuance of this order, in
accordance with the parties’ agreement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 18.1(c).
Russell Lloyd
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Lloyd.