FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 14, 2017
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DORIS TAYLOR, o/b/o N.A.T.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 16-5046
(D.C. No. 4:14-CV-00464-JED-FHM)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,* (N.D. Okla.)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Doris Taylor, on behalf of her minor granddaughter N.A.T., appeals the
Commissioner’s denial of N.A.T.’s application for supplemental security income
benefits. She argues the ALJ erred in finding her testimony concerning N.A.T. less
than credible and in not finding N.A.T. has marked limitations in attending and
completing tasks. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s factual
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for
Carolyn Colvin as the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
findings and the agency applied the correct legal standards, we affirm. See Briggs ex
rel. Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing our
review of the Commissioner’s disability determinations).
BACKGROUND
Taylor sought benefits for N.A.T. when N.A.T. was six years old and had
completed first grade. Taylor claimed N.A.T. was disabled due to Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and behavioral problems. The Commissioner had
denied an earlier application on N.A.T.’s behalf, so the relevant period for evaluating
N.A.T.’s disability began on June 29, 2011.
A child is considered disabled if she has “a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations,
and . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The Commissioner has established
a three-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a child claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a); Briggs, 248 F.3d at 1237. The first step asks if the
child is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the next step is to determine if
the child has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. If so, the
third step asks if the child’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in
Appendix 1, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a); Briggs,
248 F.3d at 1237. A child’s impairment or combination of impairments functionally
equals the listings and, thus, constitutes a disability, when it results in “marked”
limitations in two domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain, as described in
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20 C.F.R. § 416.926a. The Commissioner assesses how a child functions “‘in terms
of six domains: (i) Acquiring and using information; (ii) Attending and completing
tasks; (iii) Interacting and relating with others; (iv) Moving about and manipulating
objects; (v) Caring for [ones]self; and, (vi) Health and physical well-being.’” Briggs,
248 F.3d at 1238 (footnote omitted) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi)).
Here, the ALJ found at step two that N.A.T. had severe impairments of
ADHD, behavioral problems, and language delay. But the ALJ concluded at step
three that none of N.A.T.’s impairments met or equaled a listing. In considering the
six domains, the ALJ found that N.A.T. had a marked limitation in only one domain:
acquiring and using information. The ALJ considered Taylor’s testimony that
N.A.T.’s impairments had worsened since her previously denied application for
benefits, but found her testimony was not fully credible because it was inconsistent
with the medical evidence and appeared to be exaggerated. Thus, the ALJ found
N.A.T. wasn’t disabled at any time from June 29, 2011, through January 14, 2013,
the date of the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council denied review, and the district
court (adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge) affirmed the
denial of benefits.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Taylor argues the ALJ (1) failed to perform a proper credibility
determination as to her testimony, and (2) erred in relying only on the evidence of
one of N.A.T.’s teachers in determining N.A.T. had less than a marked limitation in
acquiring and completing tasks.
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Credibility Determination. Taylor testified that N.A.T.’s impairments
worsened since her first application for benefits. She also testified that N.A.T.
becomes angry; won’t communicate; doesn’t follow directions at school; and stomps
her feet or crawls under a table when she doesn’t get her way at school and home.
She testified N.A.T. doesn’t play well with others, is easily frustrated, and needs help
with homework, cleaning her room, and being bathed. And according to Taylor,
N.A.T.’s behavior continued to worsen even though she was on medication. The ALJ
accurately described Taylor’s testimony, but found her assertion that N.A.T.’s
condition had worsened was not fully credible because it was inconsistent with the
medical record.
The ALJ is best suited to assess credibility, and we will not disturb credibility
findings that are supported by substantial evidence. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136,
1144 (10th Cir. 2010). Taylor argues the ALJ failed to closely and affirmatively link
her adverse credibility finding to substantial evidence. See Knight ex rel. P.K. v.
Colvin, 756 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2014). But the ALJ did precisely that, citing
specific evidence in the record that was inconsistent with Taylor’s testimony. The
ALJ noted that a pediatric physician at Oklahoma State University stated in 2011 that
N.A.T.’s school progress had improved, her peer relationships were normal, and her
behavior at home was adequate.1 The ALJ also noted that Taylor told a physician in
October 2012 that medication prescribed for N.A.T. seemed to help with school,
1
The ALJ incorrectly identified the date of this report was September 15,
2011, but the medical record containing these findings is dated October 6, 2011. The
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which was inconsistent with her testimony that N.A.T.’s behavior continued to
worsen even with medication.
Taylor argues the ALJ ignored evidence that was consistent with her
testimony. For example, she says the ALJ ignored evidence in the same 2011
Oklahoma State medical report that N.A.T. continued to have outbursts at school, and
though N.A.T.’s behavior was noted to be improved, it was still described as
inadequate at school. She also contends the ALJ ignored an October 2012 report
describing N.A.T.’s oppositional behavior when she doesn’t get her way and
evidence from N.A.T.’s teacher that N.A.T. was sullen, loses her temper easily, is
easily frustrated, and disturbs others. But Taylor’s reliance on this evidence is
misplaced. The ALJ didn’t question the credibility of Taylor’s testimony that N.A.T.
has ADHD or behavioral issues; rather, the ALJ questioned Taylor’s assertion that
N.A.T.’s condition had worsened since the original benefits application.
Taylor also argues the ALJ ignored evidence that the Oklahoma State
physician referred N.A.T. to a specialist, which she claims indicates N.A.T. wasn’t
improving. But that note indicates that the physician referred N.A.T. to a specialist
because an ADHD testing questionnaire was inconclusive—not because N.A.T.’s
condition had worsened. Thus, we conclude the evidence that Taylor claims the ALJ
ignored doesn’t contradict or overwhelm the substantial evidence in the record
supporting the ALJ’s credibility determination, and we find no legal error.
ALJ’s incorrect date is a harmless mistake. “[C]ommon sense, not technical
perfection, is [the] guide” of a reviewing court. Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d
1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012).
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Attending and Completing Tasks. The ALJ found that N.A.T. had marked
limitations in acquiring and using information; less than marked limitations in
attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, and ability to
care for herself; and no limitations in moving about and manipulating objects and
health and physical well-being. Taylor argues the ALJ’s determination that N.A.T.
had a less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks is not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ relied on only one piece of evidence, the
report from N.A.T.’s special education teacher Faulk. But this argument relies on a
faulty description of the ALJ’s decision. True, in the ALJ’s specific discussion of the
attending-and-completing-task domain, the ALJ only referenced Faulk’s evidence,
but at the outset of her global discussion of all six domains, the ALJ discussed in
detail all of the substantial evidence supporting her functionality and domain
findings. This detailed discussion included the evidence from multiple state agency
experts who all concluded N.A.T. had a marked limitation only in acquiring and
using information and less than marked or no limitations in the other five domains,
including as relevant here, attending and completing tasks.
Taylor also argues that, notwithstanding Faulk’s evidence that N.A.T.
experiences only slight problems in nine of thirteen areas related to attending and
completing tasks, the combination of at least some problem in all thirteen areas
suggests a “cumulative impact greater than slight.” Opening Br. at 28. But the ALJ
wasn’t tasked with determining whether N.A.T. experienced a “greater than slight”
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impact. Rather, the ALJ was required to determine whether N.A.T. has marked or
extreme limitations.
Taylor also points to evidence that N.A.T. sometimes sat under her desk and
refused to work as evidence that N.A.T. had a marked limitation in attending and
completing tasks. But the record doesn’t contain any evidence indicating that this
behavior occurred with such frequency as to seriously interfere with N.A.T.’s ability
to attend to and complete tasks. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i) (defining a “marked”
limitation as when the impairment “interferes seriously with [the child’s] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities”). Taylor essentially asks this
court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We consider whether the ALJ followed the specific
rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in
disability cases, but we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for
the Commissioner’s.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, Taylor argues the ALJ erred by not addressing the report from
N.A.T.’s first grade teacher Kovin that N.A.T. often or very often experienced
difficulty with attention and task completion. Taylor notes the report is undated, but
suggests Kovin completed it in April 2012 while the Commissioner says Kovin
completed the report in August 2011. In any event, we agree with the district court
that regardless of its completion date, the report related to N.A.T.’s performance in
first grade, which was prior to N.A.T.’s June 29, 2011 benefit application date, and
thus was outside the relevant disability period. We are aware that the ALJ could
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have considered evidence from a time preceding the relevant period if it shed light on
the nature and severity of N.A.T.’s condition during the relevant time period. But
even if we assume Kovin’s report sheds light on N.A.T.’s condition, the ALJ stated
she considered all of the evidence in the record, including that not specifically cited
in her decision. We have repeatedly held that while an ALJ must consider all of the
evidence in the record, nothing requires the discussion of every piece of evidence.
See, e.g., Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, we
conclude the ALJ appropriately focused her discussion on the evidence during the
relevant period, and did not err in omitting any explicit discussion of Kovin’s report.
The ALJ’s determination that N.A.T. has less than marked limitations in
attending and completing tasks is supported by substantial evidence and we find no
legal error.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
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