THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
April 6, 1989
Honorable Jim Mapel Opinion No. JM-1937
Criminal District Attorney
Brazoria County Re: Whether the Texas open
329 N. Arcola Meetings Act, article 6252-17,
Angleton, Texas 77515 V.T.C.S., authorizes a city to
hold an emergency meeting to
discuss indemnifying council
members in a lawsuit and hiring
an outside law firm to repre-
sent the council (RQ-1545)
Dear Mr. Mapel:
You ask whether an "emergency meeting" held by the
Alvin City Council complied with the Texas Open Meetings
Act, article 6252-17, V.T.C.S. You advise that, on April
25, 1988, during a regularly scheduled meeting, the city
council eliminated the position of a city employee. Near
the conclusion of that regular meeting, the terminated
employee handed the city council copies of the pleadings in
a lawsuit the employee filed that same day. The city
council was not served formally with the lawsuit until April
29. The city council posted notice to hold an emergency
meeting, a meeting with only two hours notice, to discuss
the lawsuit under the following topics: "Indemnify the
Alvin City Council" and "Hire a law firm to represent the
Alvin City Council."
Section 3A(h) of article 6252-17 provides, in part:
Notice of a meeting must be posted in a
place readily accessible to the general
public at all times for at least 72 hours
preceding the scheduled time of the
meeting . . . .
The act authorizes a shorter notice period for
emergencies:
p. 5376
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 2 (JM-1037)
In case of emergency or urgent public neces-
sity, which shall be clearly identified in
the notice, it shall be sufficient if the
notice is posted two hours before the meeting
is convened. Any public official or person
who is designated or authorized to post
notices of meetings by a governmental body in
accordance with Section 3A of this Act shall
post the notice taking at face value the
reason for the emeruencv as stated bv the
aovernmental body. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
Section 3A(h) contains two requirements that are signi-
ficant to the case at hand: (1) that notice for emergency
meetings must state the reason for the emergency and
(2) that an lVemergency,'q within the meaning of section
3A(W, must exist. The notice you describe, e, "Indem-
nify the Alvin City Council" and "Hire a law firm to repre-
sent the Alvin City Council,1' does not meet the first
requirement of section 3A(h). The notice states no reason
for the emergency.
The 70th Legislature added the requirement that the
reason for an emergency meeting be stated in the notice.
See Acts 1987. 70th Leq.. ch. 549. 5 5. at 2213-14. In
River Road Neishborhood-Ass*n v. South .Texas Soorts, 720
S.W.2d 551. 554 (Tex. Am. - San Antonio 1986. no writ).
decided prior to this amendment, the court held that notice
need not describe the nature of the emergency warranting an
emergency meeting. The amendment of section 3A(h) responded
to that case by requiring expressly that emergency meeting
notice state the reason for the emergency. Section 3A(h)
requires that the emergency or urgent public necessity "be
clearly identified." In addition, the person who posts
notice shall take "at face value the reason for the emer-
aencv as stated bv the aovernmental body." (Emphasis
added.)
Further, on the facts you present, it does not appear
that an "emergency," within the meaning of section 3A(h),
existed. The 70th Legislature also added the language of
section 3A(h) that limits expressly the situations that
warrant emergency meetings:
Cases of emergency and urgent public neces-
sity are limited to imminent threats to pub-
lic health and safety or reasonably unfore-
seeable situations requiring immediate action
p. 5377
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 3 (JM-1037)
by the governmental body. (Emphasis added.)
Section 3A(h) requires an imminent threat to the public
health and safety or a reasonably unforeseeable situation
requiring immediate action. Neither was present in the case
at hand.
Although it is understandable that council members
would be concerned about their liability, the situation
presented was not one.that required "immediate action." The
council was not served formally with notice of the lawsuit
until April 29. At that time, the council had 20 days from
the Monday following service in which to answer plaintiff's
initial pleadings. Ample time existed during this period to
post 72 hours notice of a meeting to discuss indemnifying
council members and hiring a law firm to represent the
council members, both actions that would require the
expenditure of public funds. For this reason, the notice
for the emergency meeting did not comply with section 3A(h).
&g Attorney General Opinion JM-985 (1988) (action taken in
violation of the Open Meetings Act can be voided in court
action).
SUMMARY
An "emergency meeting," a meeting posted
with only two hours notice, to discuss the
topics l'Indemnify the Alvin City Council" and
"Hire a law firm to represent the Alvin City
Council" does not comply with the notice
requirements of section 3A(h) of article
6252-17, V.T.C.S., when the notice fails to
state the reason for the emergency and when
the city had more than 20 days in which to
take action on the topics discussed.
Attorney General of Texas
MARY KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
LOU MCCREARY
Executive Assistant Attorney General
p. 5378
,
Honorable Jim Mapel - Page 4 (JM-1037)
JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY
Special Assistant Attorney General
RICK GILPIN
Chairman, Opinion Committee
JENNIFER S. RIGGS
Chief, Open Government Section
of the Opinion Committee
Prepared by Jennifer S. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
P. 5379
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Combined Opinion